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The Decolonizing of Portuguese Timor

ASEAN: China's Diplomatic Offensive

Military Rule in Burma

Indonesia's National Security

Pacification in Vietnam in Retrospect

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

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PORTUGUESE TIMOR: *The author gives a detailed account of the various political forces at work in Portuguese Timor today. Since the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974, and the subsequent blossoming of local political parties in Timor, there has been an upsurge of regional interest in this hitherto forgotten colony.*



Portuguese Timor and Regional Stability

J. Stephen Hoadley

PORTUGUESE Timor is situated in the Nusatenggara (Lesser Sunda) Archipelago, East of Java and North of Australia. It shares the island of Timor (or Timur) with Indonesia, occupying half of the island's 30,000 square kilometres. Its 650,000 inhabitants are predominantly of proto-Malay stock with a Melanesian admixture. Intermarriage with Portuguese traders, soldiers, administrators, and deportees has resulted in a significant number of half-caste "Black Portuguese" who tend to live in urban areas and enjoy higher status than pure Timorese. The Portuguese Crown assumed responsibility for the territory in the early 1700s after 200 years of penetration by missionaries and merchants, and governed it as a colony from Macao until the late nineteenth century. In the early 1950s Timor ceased to be a colony and became an overseas province of Portugal. There was a British interregnum in the early 1800s, but the Portuguese half of the island was never occupied by the Dutch and the succeeding Indonesian Republic has never claimed sovereignty over this Portuguese possession.

The territory is one of the poorest in Southeast Asia, even more so than the Indonesian half of the island. With the exception of coffee, which provides 90 per cent of export earnings, agriculture is undeveloped and slash and burn subsistence cultivation is prevalent. There is no modern industry and even handicrafts are in a rudimentary state. The sandalwood which attracted the original traders is exhausted. Nevertheless Timor is not devoid of economic resources; it possesses significant quantities of oil, gold, manganese, chromium, and possibly iron, and has the potential for rubber and palm oil plantations, timber farming, cattle and sheep ranches, smallholder agriculture and animal husbandry. Tourism offers some potential, particularly if the new Dili jet strip attracts stopovers by airlines flying the Sydney-Singapore route. The labour force is as yet unskilled and virtually illiterate, but in time, under favourable conditions, could become a valuable resource. Unfortunately at present social services such as education and health care are at a low standard and will require substantial investment in the coming years. Physical infrastructure, too, is poorly developed.

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IN the months following the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon on 25 April 1974, with subsequent declarations by spokesmen of the Armed Forces Movement that Portugal would surrender her overseas territories, a great deal of speculation has arisen about the future of Portuguese Timor. In broad terms this speculation has focused on three mutually exclusive possibilities: Timor's continued association with Portugal; Timor's emergence as an independent State; and Timor's amalgamation with neighbouring Indonesia. The speculation is far from idle, for a number of politically interested parties have a direct stake or a strong interest in

Timor's future status. These actors include half-a-dozen political groupings in Timor itself, and the governments of Portugal, Indonesia, and Australia. In addition, the governments of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, of Papua New Guinea and New Zealand, and of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China have reason to pay close attention to developments in Timor that may affect the stability of South-east Asia and the fate of the Overseas Chinese.

The hypothesis that Timor has three possible futures does not mean that each is equally desirable, feasible, or just, or that the forces favouring one or the other are constant or balanced. This author's task here is not to predict the outcome but rather to assess the costs and benefits that are likely to accrue to each of the several parties as a result of actions they might take to influence that outcome, and to show how I believe the advantages for all political actors could be maximized.

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DIRECTLY involved in the debate on Timor's future are five new Timorese political parties. Three of these parties came into existence within a few weeks of the change of government in Lisbon, in response to an explicit invitation from Portugal's new leaders. The first to form was the **Uniao Democratica Timorense,** known as the UDT. In its first *communiqué* dated 11 May 1974 the UDT cited among its basic objectives the achievement of "progressive autonomy" and "increased participation of Timorese in all sectors of public administration" but "always under the Portuguese flag" (1). Some of the UDT's founders, for example Mario Carascalaon, son of a Portuguese deportee and a Timorese mother, had been associated with the Portuguese National Union, the single legal party of the Caetano regime. This fact, plus the fact that the UDT immediately received the backing of the Government in the form of a cash subsidy and radio time, earned the UDT the nickname "the Portuguese party", and there has been speculation that its leaders, many of mixed Timorese Portuguese ancestry were originally brought forward by the Portuguese as their heirs apparent. The party continues to receive quasi-official encouragement of a material nature. Indeed, this party symbolized the first possible solution of the Timor question mentioned above,-continued association with Portugal. Its closest followers are higher civil servants, native chiefs who serve as petty territorial officers, villagers who regard the Portuguese flag as a mystical symbol, some Chinese businessmen and, of course, the Portuguese community. But it has attracted the opprobrium of radical Timorese and also of the Indonesians across the border who labelled it "neocolonial".

The second party to emerge in May 1974 was the grouping that came to be known as FRETILIN, an acronym for **Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente** (2). Its original manifesto asserted the "right to independence" and called for "immediate participation of competent Timorese in the local administration and government" and "rejection of colonialism and active prevention of neocolonialism" (3). FRETILIN found support among low status civil servants, teachers, students, and recent migrants from the hills to the towns of Timor's North coast. Its deliberate adoption of a name to resemble that of Mozambique's guerrilla movement, FRELIMO, the fiery rhetoric of its leaders, especially of the young, energetic Ramos Horta, and its promise to declare immediate independence and to drastically change the colonial administrative structure when it gained power gave it a reputation as a radical party in the eyes of conservative Timorese, local Chinese, and many Indonesians. Indeed, conservative opponents for a time believed that FRETILIN's emergence in May was the result of prior preparation, possibly by Communist infiltrators. The facts have not borne this out, for FRETILIN did not spring into existence as a full-blown replica of a Communist Party; it evolved over a period of months, as a result of the deliberations and activities of a group of idealistic young Dili men, with pragmatic adjustments being made when necessary. No credible evidence of Communist association has been made public by FRETILIN's critics, who only point to some revolutionary rhetoric, ignoring the fact that such rhetoric is commonplace amongst young idealists throughout the world. Financially the party is supported by contributions by its members, by voluntary work by supporters, and by a government subsidy, matching that received earlier by UDT; there have been no extravagant expenditures either by the party or any of its leaders, suggesting outside or clandestine funding. FRETILIN's enthusiasm has caused difficulties,

though; in early December its leaders were reprimanded in court for overzealous campaign activities without a proper permit and the Government threatened to revoke the party's radio privileges (4).

A third Timorese party emerged at the end of May 1974. Its initial manifesto referred to Timor's immaturity in political and economic affairs, the "traditional mysticism of our Timorese ancestors", and the "unchanged Timorese geo-political situation", that is, Timor's ethnological, cultural, and geographical contiguity to Indonesia. It declared as its first demand the right to "an autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international law" (5). The source of support for this party, known as APODETI **(Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense)**, is somewhat less clear than that of the other two parties. It is said that Timorese near the border want to be reunited with villagers of the same ethnic group on the Indonesian side, and that Timorese Catholics want to have closer connections with their Indonesian co-religionists (6). Also, 250 Arab families living in Timor are reported to be "very loyal to Indonesia" because of the ties of Islam (7).

There is the more substantial attraction of money: APODETI leaders admit to receiving funds from the Indonesian side of the island, from private unnamed sources; there are scholarships and consultative trips to Indonesia for APODETI activists; and there is the lure of a rumoured development grant that would be made available to Timor when it becomes part of Indonesia. In Timorese eyes Indonesia is seen as a country of relative wealth and opportunity (8). Indonesia's presence is already felt in Timor in the forms of radio broadcasts from Kupang, distribution of cheap transistor radios and *batik* T-shirts, and the well-staffed Indonesian Consulate-General in Dili. Finally, there is the attraction of power and status: the Indonesians would replace the present administrators with APODETI loyalists, or reward the pro-Indonesia party's workers in other suitable ways, according to the APODETI plan.

APODETI refused to accept a proferred Timorese Government subsidy, which leads one to the conclusion that its activities are almost entirely dependent on Indonesian support. The question however remains: did the Indonesians first approach local men to start APODETI in May last year, or did Arnaldo and Osorio, APODETI's founder and Secretary-General respectively, approach the Indonesians? No clear evidence exists on which to base an answer. It is plausible that APODETI's leading members were motivated by a mixture of sincere conviction and political opportunism, and so made the first move, as they claim. In any event, the fortunes of the party declined significantly when it became known that Indonesia would not grant autonomous status to Timor, but would integrate it as a province. This means that Indonesians, not APODETI followers, would get all the important political and administrative posts; APODETI's ability to promise patronage has thus been crippled.

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TIMOR'S three main parties differed in several other respects in the first months of their existence; they had differing ideas on the timing and mechanism of the advocated constitutional changes, and on the preferred national language. The UDT favoured a measured pace towards internal self-government under Portuguese tutelage, but involving an electoral process. FRETILIN has consistently favoured a direct transfer of authority to itself as a precondition of sweeping internal reforms (9). And APODETI favoured a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia coupled with internal elections with a view to Timor becoming an autonomous province of Indonesia. Correspondingly, the three parties favoured Portuguese, Tetum (the majority ethnic language spoken by about 60% of the rural people), and Indonesian, repectively, as the official language.

There were similarities between the parties' platforms, however. All three parties enunciated the desire to protect basic human rights and liberties; to maintain a free enterprise economic system with appropriate safeguards to assure socio-economic justice; to avoid discrimination against resident Chinese while at the same time encouraging business participation by ethnic Timorese; to encourage balanced foreign trade, aid, and investment; and to combat all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

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TWO other parties emerged in late 1974: the Monarchist Party **(Associacao Popular Monarquica Timorense)** and the Labour Party

(Associacao Trabajadores). The Monarchist Party was formed by an individual who traces his ancestry back to sixteen Timorese warrior sultans who agreed in the fifteenth century to co-operate with the Portuguese in collecting taxes from their subjects in return for protection, status, and a share of the take (a pattern of dual rule that continues today) (10). This party would like the Portuguese to create a constitutional monarchy in Timor, the monarch to be chosen from among decendants of the original sultans, who in turn would be constituted as a council of rulers along the lines of the Malaysian precedent. The monarch and council of rulers would formally preside over an elected parliament, cabinet, and prime minister. The founder members of this party are a handful of men (less than 100) who formerly supported APODETI in the hopes that Indonesia would restore the traditional rulers to power; they broke away when they learned from Indonesian spokesmen that Indonesia did not intend to recognize any more sultans.

The Labour Party was proclaimed by a man living in Ossu, one of Timor's smaller municipalities. Its platform is based on general demands for independence, democracy, and social justice, and it attempts to appeal to urban working people. But its organization remains rudimentary and its activities scattered and barely visible, as yet.

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IN trying to estimate the degree of support enjoyed by Timor's five parties several considerations must be taken into account. First, no recent census of the population has been conducted, so one cannot work from an accurate demographic baseline. Second, Timor's former elections — for a deputy to Lisbon, the partly-elected provincial Legislative Council, and the twelve municipal councils — are little help in extrapolating future trends. They were conducted in a one-party context under a franchise limited to Portuguese citizens who could read and write the Portuguese language. In the capital city of Dili, for example, only about 2,000 persons were eligible to vote in the last municipal election and only 300 bothered to actually cast votes (11). The new electoral law allows more freedom for political party activity and enfranchises virtually all resident adults (12). So the vastly increased electorate, the transformed nature of the party system, and the totally new set of issues animating political life make the past a poor guide to the future.

Third, no public opinion polls have been conducted to assess the relative popularity of the parties. And fourth, the statements of the political party leaders themselves tend to be inflated, thus further confounding any attempt to assess relative popularity. For example, in December 1974, the leaders of UDT and FRETILIN were each claiming about 200,000 members and supporters on the grounds that each had printed and distributed 200,000 membership cards. In fact many Timorese may have accepted membership cards from both parties, to be on the safe side. In fairness it should be added that UDT leaders are aware of this and are attempting to conduct a census of UDT membership to gain more accurate information (13). APODETI for its part has consistently claimed the support of 70% of the population.

Nevertheless, observers concur on a ranking of party popularity. They agree that UDT and FRETILIN attract the lion's share of support throughout the territory. At first UDT, led by establishment figures such as the mayor of Dili, seemed to be ahead, but more recently, with the arrival of a new governor who has attempted to be impartial and avoid the risk of being seen to meddle in party affairs, and with the more vigorous campaigning of Francisco Xavier and Ramos Horta and their youthful supporters, FRETILIN appears to have caught up with and, some observers think, overtaken UDT.

APODETI is behind UDT and FRETILIN, by all accounts, with the Monarchist Party ranked fourth, and the Labour Party fifth. In fact, there is some question whether the latter two are qualified to register as political parties because of their small number of members and party branches. They have not yet succeeded in persuading the government to extend to them the subsidy received by the UDT and FRETILIN.

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TWO other groupings deserve mention, the Chinese and the Portuguese. Estimates of the number of Chinese residents in Timor vary from 14,000 to 30,000; the most probable figure is somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 (14).

The majority carry Taiwanese passports and the rest are Portuguese citizens; many have business or family ties with the Chinese of Macao. Chinese *entrepreneurs* run four of Dili's seven hotels, conduct all the import trade which is not handled by official bodies, and run virtually all the retail and transportation businesses in the province. Chinese students enter Timor's single academic high school in numbers disproportionally higher than their share of the population and have, in addition, a Chinese school which they can attend. Chinese political inclinations are not manifest yet, and upon questioning they profess to stay out of politics; but they are thought to favour UDT's moderation, to be suspicious of FRETILIN's populistic style, and to be uneasy about APODETI and the prospect of coming under the control of the Indonesians. All Timorese parties have publicly stated a policy of non-discrimination and commercial freedom for the Chinese, but privately it is voiced that the indigenous Timorese will have to be assisted by any new government so that they can compete for a fair share of the national wealth with the more experienced and commercially entrenched Chinese. Here one is reminded of parallel situations in Malaysia and Indonesia. Nevertheless a large Chinese (local and Macao) financed hotel and office complex is under construction in Dili, a sign that Chinese investors still have confidence in the future. There is no evidence of Communist or revolutionary activity on the part of the Chinese, nor of ties with or sympathy for the People's Republic of China: the Chinese are represented only by the Republic of China (Taiwan) Consul-General. But if Portugal extends diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, and Peking in turn demands that it be allowed to take over the Taiwan Consul-General's loyalties of the Timorese Chinese could be put to the test.

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THE Portuguese community numbers only a few hundred civilians, mainly in the coffee growing and exporting corporation, and in government; added to these are two thousand soldiers, mostly conscripts. An interesting addition to the Portuguese community have been the "fifteen majors", a group of officers despatched by the Armed Forces Movement to manage the decolonization process. These majors are now making the real decisions from the vantage points of the governor's office, the key ministries, the coffee corporation, and the editorial offices of the two Government newspapers, even though the former ministers and managers remain in place. These men work closely with the new governor, Lemos Pires, in encouraging the development of the two leading political parties, in drafting the laws necessary to regularize political activity, in preparing for eventual elections, in administering the funds Portugal is sending to pay for the Five Year Plan, and in recruiting Timorese into the higher ranks of the civil service. It must be added that the latter two trends were under way even before the change of government in Lisbon. Portugal had already since the 1960s made partly successful attempts to improve port, road, communications, health, and educational facilities. The Five Year Plan, 1974-1978, which will cost Portugal a total of 500 million Escudos (US$20 million), was drafted before the *coup d'état* (15). The civil service has always depended on local recruits to fill lower ranking posts, with Portuguese only in the critical top posts. At the end of 1974 85% of administrative class officers were Timorese; 164 out of 175 officers of the important Department of Civil Administration (that is, territorial administration) were Timorese; and 12 out of the 13 *administradors* (district officers) were locally recruited men or from other overseas territories such as the Cape Verde Islands (16). The two lowest levels of the territorial administrative system are entirely Timorese-staffed, being composed of hereditary sultans, chiefs, or local notables (17).

As mentioned before, the Portuguese community tends to favour the UDT. The Portuguese majors admit to having given preferential assistance to the UDT at first, because they knew its leaders and appreciated their pro-Portuguese sentiments. As time passed and the leadership of the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon passed from General Spinola to General da Costa Gomes, and decolonization was speeded up in Africa, the Portuguese became inclined to support any Timorese political party that had substantial public support, with the end in view of handing over power as smoothly and expeditiously as possible. In practice this worked to the advantage of FRETILIN primarily, for APODETI refused Portuguese assistance and the other two parties are still insignificantly small.

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THE Portuguese acceptance of FRETILIN was facilitated by FRETILIN's own shift towards the centre of the political spectrum in the last months of 1974, and by UDT's shift towards a similar point, almost to convergence. By mid-December, when this author interviewed Francisco Xavier, President of FRETILIN, and Domigos de Oliveira, Secretary-General of UDT, I found their positions virtually identical. FRETILIN was prepared to accept Portuguese as the official language, and was willing to leave the territorial administrative structure intact so long as elected advisory councils were created to guide the bureaucrats. More important, the call for immediate independence had become a call for eventual independence within five to ten years, after the Portuguese had had time to build up the territory's infrastructure so that Timor could become economically self-sufficient. Domigos Oliveira, for UDT's part, was also speaking about total independence for Timor, after a five to ten year period of tutelage and assistance, and also favoured local elected councils. About the only point of difference was that Francisco Xavier continued to argue for direct transfer of internal self-governing powers to a governing council dominated by FRETILIN, on the grounds that Portuguese favouritism for UDT would render an election invalid, while Domingos Oliveira was still holding out for an election for a constituent assembly to decide the issue of which party would predominate.

This gap was closed on 22 January 1975 when the two parties announced their formation of a coalition, claiming the exclusive right to negotiate with the Portuguese on the terms of self-government and eventual independence (18). Their *communiqué* proposed that an *ad hoc* committee, composed of equal numbers of UDT and FRETILIN representatives be immediately empowered to manage the conduct of all political activities in the territory, including the allocation of radio time and the dissemination of official political information during the transition period. No mention was made in the *communiqué* of an election or the formation of a constituent assembly.

The real significance of the announcement seems to be the claim by the leaders of the two parties to exclusive representation of the Timorese people during the transition period. This is borne out by the coalition's explicit repudiation of the "neo-colonialist" APODETI (the only significant rival), and rejection of the idea of Timor's integration with any other nation, especially Indonesia (19). However, the message was phrased in such a way as to allow other parties who wish to co-operate with UDT and FRETILIN to join the coalition, leaving the door open to the two minor parties and any new ones that might be formed in the coming months.

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THESE events seem to simplify the task of the Portuguese in accomplishing a graceful exit from Timor. The UDT-FRETILIN coalition clearly commands more popular support than any other possible combination of political groups (unlike the three-way split the Portuguese faced until recently in Angola). The coalition's bid for exclusive representation invokes precedents already set in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. The acceptance by the coalition of a period of tutelage squares with the opinion of the Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories, Antonio Almeida Santos, expressed in Jakarta in October 1974 and at the UN in November, that Timor is not yet ready for independence. This allows the Portuguese to continue to underwrite the Five Year Plan during a period of relative stability, but does not involve them in an open-ended commitment, as would Timor's permanent association with Portugal, or a prolonged period of local electoral campaigning. Once the Portuguese accept the coalition as the spokesman of the Timorese (and the still unanswered question is whether the Portuguese engineered the coalition from behind the scenes), they can virtually choose their moment of departure to suit their interests, either lingering benevolently if conditions are favourable and not too costly, or abruptly leaving the mess in the hands of the Timorese if things go wrong. Correspondingly, the burden of responsibility falls heavily on the inexperienced leaders of the new coalition, for once they become the government-designate they will be blamed if they fail to meet the rising expectations that usually attend progress towards independence.

Certainly the Portuguese will be criticized if they accept the coalition and fail to insist on elections, as they have done in Africa. Spokesmen of the new Portuguese Government have repeatedly emphasized the ideals of self-determination of peoples. This is usually taken to mean the holding of a reasonably free and

democratic election to decide the issue. Although other means of self-determination can be conceived, and have been conducted, the electoral process is still preferable in spite of its practical pitfalls. In Africa, the Portuguese, by accepting groups who claim, without passing an electoral test, to represent their countrymen, lay themselves open to the charge that they are transferring power to illegitimate parties. This serves the short run interests of both the Portuguese Government and the parties receiving power. But it does not serve the long run interests of either. Rather, it leaves Portuguese actions looking cynical and hasty in the light of history and the newly empowered parties tainted as Portuguese puppets, vulnerable to challenge by domestic and foreign opponents. One may understand and even sympathize with Portugal's course of action when Portuguese lives were being lost in a colonial war. But even this rationale is flawed, for a hasty transfer of power to a party or coalition that is not yet consolidated or legitimized does not end the war, it merely allows the Portuguese to back away from it.

This course of action would be doubly dubious in the case of Timor. There, pressure for quick independence is slight; there is ample time to draft implementing legislation and conduct elections first for a constitutent assembly, and then for a legislative assembly. An additional referendum on the modalities of independence would be highly desirable even though the outcome might be decided in advance, for it would give the Timorese additional experience with the ballot and clearly show the international community where the Timorese people's sentiments lie. But further and even more important, elections might forestall misperceptions and precipitate actions by Timor's neighbours. Here one must be aware of current Indonesian thinking on Timor.

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THE relevant general policy has been enunciated by Indonesian leaders on innumerable occasions: opposition to colonialism and imperialism; support for self-determination of peoples; opposition to outside interference; and friendly relations with all countries. More to the point, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, in mid-June 1974, stated:

> "We will support Portuguese Timor if its own people want to obtain their independence....Indonesia will give guarantees of not interfering in the determination of the future of Portuguese Timor." (20)

But statements such as this must be seen in the context of Indonesia's overriding desire to maintain security and stability in areas on her borders. Timor is not seen by Indonesia as an area of security and stability now, but rather the reverse. It is instructive to dwell on this point for a moment and ask what image of Timor does the politically informed member of the Indonesian public have in his mind. One may attempt a rough answer by consulting Indonesian press reports on Timor. During 1974 Jakarta press reports, in Indonesian and English, revealed signficant distortions of the Timor situation. For example, featured prominently were items on FRETILIN political rallies, with headlines suggesting that FRETILIN was a Communist front, or at best a group of rowdies. "FRETILIN Movement Supported and Financed by Communist Chinese", asserted one *Sinar Harapan* headline on 2 October 1974. The story did not indicate the source of its information and was not corroborated by subsequent stories. Another newspaper stated:

> "Repeatedly in the political campaign the FRETILIN leaders openly intimidated Timorese to choose FRETILIN. While showing a picture of Mao Tse-tung to supporters of APODETI, the pro-Indonesian party, the leaders said, 'Mao is our champion. Don't choose Indonesia.'" (21)

The Jakarta newspaper-reader is also led to believe that Timor is a target for Communist infiltration. The alleged avenues are the local Chinese and young Portuguese Communist Party members coming to Timor. One newspaper stated knowingly: "The Portuguese authorities are very strict with Communism. Therefore the Chinese disguise themselves as good Taiwanese citizens, whereas inwardly they are staunch followers of Peking." (22) Another, reporting on the court reprimand of FRETILIN's leaders, added, "Besides the main leaders, also receiving sentences were several Lisbon University students of Communist inclination who had returned to Timor to spread Maoism there." (23)

Instability is another recurrent theme: "Po-

litical Atmosphere is Deteriorating in Timor." (24) Jakarta readers are also told that APODETI, the pro-Indonesian party, is popular and that the movement to join Indonesia is strongly supported in Timor. One newspaper, reviewing the situation stated, "The largest party, which has the support of 70% of the Timorese, is APODETI...." (25) Visits to Indonesia by APODETI leaders are widely reported (26, 27). Statements by the leader of the "Democratic Students of Timor", a group of Timorese students studying in Indonesia, to the effect that Timor should become part of Indonesia without a referendum, were reported in the official news agency bulletin, Antara (28). Even the Governor of Timor was reported to favour integration of his territory with Indonesia (29).

The Indonesian public is naturally interested in the views of its government on this matter. Statements issued by President Suharto upon Prime Minister Whitlam's visit to Jakarta in September 1974 and by Adam Malik at the UN also carried the same message: that the Timorese should choose their own future, but that no one would object if the Timorese chose to join Indonesia. In Indonesia the latter phrase has been given more emphasis than the former one, for example, by General Ali Murtopo, a close adviser to the President, and by General Amir Machmud, Minister of Home Affairs, both men of significant influence (30). Further, even Adam Malik seems to have moved away from a position of strict neutrality on the issue, as illustrated by an exchange which took place in early December 1974. I quote at length from Antara:

> "To a question the Minister answered that there are only two choices for the Timorese, that is, remain under the Portuguese or combine with Indonesia. According to the Minister, 'They (the Timorese) are not strong enough to stand by themselves. There are only about 600,000 inhabitants who are still backward, with a weak economy. If they decide to remain under Portugal that, besides adding to Portugal's burden, would also constitute a new form of colonialism." (31)

This interpretation was challenged by Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Willesee, who reasserted that the Timorese still had three options (32). Whereupon Adam Malik clarified that he had meant that Timor had three alternatives but only two choices, for to remain associated with Portugal was not a choice. Malik then stated that it would be better for Timor to join Indonesia (33).

If these news stories and public comments by government leaders in any way affect the images of Timor being acquired by the reading public during the past year, then it can be concluded that the Indonesian public is now prepared to accept Timor as their twenty seventh province. Indeed, it would be only a slight exaggeration to say that the Indonesian public can see the annexation of Timor as an act of generosity, one which would save the Timorese from Portuguese colonialism, domination by outside powers, infiltration by Communists, subversion by Chinese, deception by FRETILIN, political instability, poverty, and general backwardness.

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TURNING from the public to elites, one may ask the question, what are the Indonesian leaders likely to do, given this climate of opinion? Taking into consideration the news stories, the reported statements by prominent officials, and the hints provided by well-connected and well-informed individuals in Jakarta, one can conclude that the only acceptable course of action for Indonesia is the eventual annexation of Timor. There are some indications that some persons in the Foreign Ministry, and in the People's Representative Assembly, and some intellectuals and scholars, are dubious about the wisdom of Indonesia's taking on a new, underdeveloped territory lest it become a burden like West Irian and detract from development efforts closer to home. But for the majority of important decision-makers the question is no longer "whether" but rather "when and how?".

Indonesia's first answer to the latter question, the attempt to support the pro-Indonesian APODETI, coupled with radio propaganda and monetary inducements, has not yielded a solution yet. This is unfortunate in a way, for the best possible outcome for all external parties would be for the Timorese voluntarily to choose Indonesian hegemony: the problem of a potentially unstable Timor would disappear into the Indonesian territorial administrative apparatus. But this solution is now a non-starter because the Timorese people, insofar as they are represented

by the UDT-FRETILIN coalition, seem to have expressed their opposition to this option.

Another possible course of action is direct intervention. But Indonesia at present has no credible justification for stepping in univited. The Communist menace has not yet materialized and FRETILIN has not lived up to its radical reputation. Neither has internal political violence accompanied the décolonization process; the Portuguese are keeping the peace effectively, but at the same time moving visibly away from their colonial past. Can the Indonesian leaders find a justification in the **Wawasan Nusantara,** the archipelago concept argued by Indonesia at the Caracas Law of the Sea Conference last year? Timor could be seen as a foreign body in the middle of an unified jurisdiction encompassing all the Indonesian islands and the seas lying between them. However this concept offers incomplete justification for annexing Timor, for Timor in fact lies at the southern edge of the archipelago, not in the middle of it, and thus has navigational access to the open sea without the necessity of passing through Indonesian waters. The tiny enclave of Ocussi Ambeno, however, is completely surrounded by Indonesia and so might present a problem in this regard. Indonesia at present allows air and sea communications between the two parts of Timor, so a precedent is in force, offering a practical solution to the juridical problem. Even if the archipelago concept becomes a compelling guideline, its logic dictates annexation only of Ocussi Ambeno, at most, not all of Timor. Finally, the threat of outside intervention on Indonesia's exposed flank is postulated as the ultimate justification for annexation in the name of self-defence. This is another threat that has so far failed to materialize.

If the Indonesian leaders are committed to the annexation of Timor, their task of accomplishing this goal gracefully and economically appears to be getting more difficult every day. Not only have suitable opportunities to act failed to turn up, but also the Timorese sentiment for independence, and the political parties that express this feeling, are growing stronger. The latest development in this process is the recent formation of the UDT-FRETILIN coalition, which confronts Indonesia with a considerable dilemma. If the Indonesians object to the anti-Indonesian coalition and insist on an election rather than a direct transfer of power, they may end up strengthening the very Timorese independence forces they wish defeated. For if the UDT and FRETILIN do win the election (possibly to be held in late 1975), as most observers believe likely, and the international community sees unambiguously that popular support for Indonesia is small and that for independence is large, Indonesia will find it much more costly in terms of international acceptance to achieve her ultimate goal. If Indonesia seriously intends to take Timor, by force if necessary, using the annexation of Goa by India as a precedent (a possibility openly discussed in Jakarta), it might be wiser for her to allow the Portuguese to commit themselves to the coalition and to begin talking of not holding elections. Indonesia could then mount criticism of the neocolonial and undemocratic nature of the bargain and cloak her subsequent actions with the professed desire to restore democracy to the Timorese. The Portuguese, on their side, would be well advised not to let their protégés (UDT and FRETILIN) get themselves into this situation.

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AUSTRALIA, too, is in a somewhat sensitive position. The last thing Canberra wants is an unstable or insecure Timor 350 miles from Darwin, which might attract intervention by hostile powers. But the agreement made between Whitlam and Suharto in September 1974 that Australia would have no objections if Timor chose to go with Indonesia, seems to have been read in Indonesia as a blanket pledge of non-interference in the event of the annexation of Timor. Subsequent Australian statements have stressed the precondition of Timorese self-determination, almost as if to signal to the Indonesians that Australia was not, after all, "giving" Timor to them, to the point where Australia will be obliged to make strong protests should the Portuguese contemplate surrendering power directly to the UDT-FRETILIN coalition without a formal act of self-determination having taken place. But by urging the Portuguese to hold an election, Australia will be contributing to the legitimacy of the anti-Indonesian parties in Timor and making it harder for Indonesia to enact the scenario suggested above. This may be construed by Indonesia as Australian interference in a sphere of influence that is rightfully Indonesia's. Furthermore, if Indonesia does undertake unilateral action to annex Timor, Australia, having stressed self-determination so strongly, will be forced either to censure Indonesian actions or renege

her professed ideals. Either would embarrass the Whitlam Government if still in power. There are two ways out: first, if Indonesia quickly promises to condone Timorese self-determination, saving face for everyone; or second, if a new government comes to power in Canberra, reinterpreting the prior government's commitments.

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AT least five political actors are now faced with dilemmas as a result of the factors described above. The two coalition political parties are caught between their desire to preempt APODETI and receive the mantle of power, on the one hand, and their need to achieve political legitimacy for the long-term exercise of that power on the other. And they must forestall Indonesian actions.

The Portuguese want to cut their losses and make a quick departure, but are loath to desert a coalition of Timorese leaders who desire, and need, their tutelage and economic support to survive. They are attracted to the short cut of a direct handover of power, but must be aware of the possible long-run costs of by-passing democratic elections on the way to the exit.

Indonesian leaders are committed to the absorption of Timor sooner or later, possibly by force, but the longer they wait the more viable and visible the Timorese independence forces become and the more costly in terms of international prestige will be a subsequent takeover.

The Australians are caught between their commitment to the ideals of self-determination and the survival of small Pacific nations on the one hand, and the obvious need to be on good terms with her giant neighbour to the North, Indonesia.

Other nations, such as the ASEAN nations and New Zealand, by virtue of the fact they are associated with the two principal outside parties, Indonesia and Australia, are indirectly concerned as well, although not involved officially. The more sensitive of their leaders will be pondering questions such as: ought we to encourage the Portuguese to transfer power as quickly as possible to the coalition, or should we insist on them staying to supervise elections? If Indonesia were to take direct action to annex Timor should we accept this action or take a principled stand?

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THE crucial actor in this entire situation is Indonesia. If Indonesia does not attempt to annex Timor, most of the hypothetical dilemmas posed above will never materialize. But Indonesian leaders may feel compelled to act to protect their security. So the crucial question is whether Timor really constitutes a security threat. The Indonesian perception of this threat stems from the fear that Timor's small size, economic backwardness, and powerlessness will make it a power vacuum, attracting hostile outside powers, either directly via aid, trade, and military bases, or clandestinely, via radical or Communist infiltrators, the one bringing hostile troops close to Indonesia's border, the other providing a channel for infiltration and support for opposition groups within Indonesia itself. More specifically, the Indonesians fear that Russia or China will establish a naval base in Timor, or that Timorese Chinese will smuggle propaganda, guns, and agents from Communist China via Macao into Timor and thence into Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or secessionist hands in Indonesia. Certainly all these things are possible, but are they likely?

The two major Communist powers seem at present to be occupied mainly with problems of internal economic reconstruction and political leadership: the moderates are firmly in command of both regimes. Any surplus energy available for outside adventures is already committed to the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Indo-China, and the Sino-Soviet dispute, and even those commitments are being fulfilled within the limits imposed by the evolving *detente* of the 1970s. Thus, would Russia or China be interested in, or be capable of, establishing a military presence in so distant, inaccessible, and strategically peripheral a spot as Timor? One thinks it would be unnecessarily risky, and would distract from efforts made in areas of greater promise, notably the attempt by Russia to cement good relations with Indonesia and the desire by China to thaw Sino-Indonesian relations. Penetration of Timor would therefore be counter-productive.

Regarding subversion, there is little evidence that Communist China has given more than token support to Overseas Chinese in any country in the past two decades (34). And there is no evidence of which this author is aware that the Timorese Chinese, who lean towards Taiwan, have been or will be interested in working on Peking's behalf. As for Timorese radical groups

harbouring subversive elements, the reverse seems to be the case: one of FRETILIN's arguments for independence is that severing the Timor-Lisbon link will also stop Communist influences from arriving from Portugal (35). Ramos Horta, during his December 1974 trip to Australia was careful to distinguish between FRETILIN and FRELIMO (36), arguing that his own party was a democratic, socialist party, like the Australian Labor Party. UDT similarly has been allowed by the Armed Forces Movement to establish a screening committee in the Immigration Department in Lisbon for the purpose of preventing known Portuguese Communist Party members from travelling to Timor.

Another fear expressed by the Indonesians is that rural strife will break out, either between different ethnic groups as in Papua New Guinea, or between peasants and landlords, as in Indonesia in 1962-1966. Any such strife would threaten the peace, create uncertainty and tension, and might lead to outsiders taking sides, as in Indo-China and Nigeria, with unfortunate consequences for the entire region. These are superficially plausible scenarios in view of the variety of ethnolinguistic groups (about 15) and the depth of poverty (average annual per capita income is about US$40). But these conditions have not as yet given rise to strife. And it could be argued, that the way to avoid such strife is not to impose order by force but rather to set to work to alleviate the conditions before they become fuel for politically focused grievances. In my view a Timorese-run government, responsible and responsive to the needs of the various ethnic and economic groups and acting as a broker between them to assure that each receives a share of the available public resources, provides the best hope of gaining the acceptance of these groups and the avoidance of violent conflict between them. An Indonesian-run government, responsible to Jakarta, whether staffed by Timorese or Javanese, would have a harder time of it, and, imposition of Indonesian rule, far from avoiding strife, might instead create it, with Indonesian authorities the target of an unified Timorese independence struggle.

Indonesian military forces could no doubt contain the disturbances and disperse the rebels for a time, but one can visualize the problem festering for years as it still is in West Irian and Kalimantan. The inefficiency of this sort of governance must be set against the hypothetical gain in security.

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I BELIEVE there is a more desirable long term alternative: Timorese independence. This is an alternative the Indonesian leaders may well find more attractive the longer they hesitate and the more carefully they weigh the costs and benefits of different courses of action. If they come to conclusions similar to those I have presented above, i.e. that an independent Timor would not constitute an unacceptable security threat or violate the integrity of the Indonesian archipelago, and that the costs of annexing an unwilling Timor might be unacceptably high in terms of expenditures of physical resources, disturbance of political relationships with other small neighbours, and damage to her international prestige, then a new and exciting set of possibilities for Australasian regional co-operation opens up. This co-operation can take two forms: economic and political.

If poverty and the lack of economic viability of Timor are seen as problems, then solutions can be found in economic aid and co-operation for trade and investment (37). I have in mind a joint Indonesian-Australian-Portuguese economic co-operation consortium, which could pool economic and technical aid from the three countries and assist the Timorese in utilizing it efficiently. Certainly the list of development projects that could benefit by capital and technical assistance is extensive: roads and bridges, water conservancy and management, animal husbandry, agricultural diversification, fisheries storage and distribution, basic rural preventive medicine, better housing, basic vocational education, and so on. Australia has decades of experience with such programmes in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. Portugal knows the problems of Timor and is already committed to helping until 1978. And the Indonesians would probably be intrigued by the thought of giving aid rather than perpetually receiving it. The giving of aid to Timor might well capture the imaginations of the Indonesian public, and exploit in a beneficent way the paternalism Indonesians feel towards small nations.

The very fact of setting up and operating this consortium would have other implications of a political nature. It would project Australia into

a working relationship with Indonesia, supplementing ties already established. It would help Portugual discharge her burden of colonial guilt. The co-operative effort would create a framework wherein other nations could be drawn into Timor in a controlled fashion for investment and trade, with no single country being allowed to predominate. The joint protection of Timor by her three patrons would not only attract outside investors but would also deter involvement by unwelcome outside powers, fulfilling a fundamental foreign policy objective of both Indonesia and Australia. It is possible that the consortium experience would lead to realization of the mooted Indonesia - Australia - New Zealand - Papua New Guinea co-operative organization, with one additional member, Timor.

The Timorese party leaders would welcome the growth of economic and later political ties as suggested here, for their professed objective is friendly relations with all nations but domination by none. They want to have foreign aid, trade, and investment, but in a balanced, controlled fashion to avoid dependence on any one donor, partner, or investor. The one obstacle is their wariness of Indonesia (38). The Timorese have to be convinced that Indonesia must be given a say in the future of Timor, for if not given it, she will take it, with less happy consequences. So a consortium as suggested here, committed to an independent and economically viable Timor, might be the middle ground politically most acceptable to all parties – and a way out of the dilemmas now faced by Portugal, Indonesia, and Australia (39).

Notes and References

1. Quoted from UDT's manifesto dated 11 May 1974, Dili.

2. FRETILIN started its life under a different name, **Associacao Social Democrata Timorense.**

3. Quoted from the original manifesto.

4. *Berita Yudha* (Jakarta), 2 December 1974.

5. Quoted from APODETI's 27 May 1974 manifesto. See *A Voz de Timor* (Dili), 7 June 1974 for text in Portuguese.

6. According to Peter Hastings, "The party's main strength derives from Catholic clerical and lay supporters who have close connections with Catholics in Koepang where the Bishop and clergy are among the most active irredentists on the island." Quoted from page 17 of his unpublished paper prepared for a seminar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 16 December 1974, entitled "The Timor Problem".

7. *New Standard* (Jakarta), 28 September 1974.

8. Indonesians visiting Dili are identifiable by their bright clothes and well-fed appearance. Dili merchants travel over 100 kilometres to the Indonesian border to buy consumer goods from the better-supplied Indonesian merchants. Indonesia has placed several development projects near the border, further heightening the contrast between the two sides. *Indonesian Observer* (Jakarta), 24 September 1974.

9. The "minimum programme" calls for "recognition of FRETILIN as the only legitimate representative of the people of Timor. See *FRETILIN: Manual e Programma Politicos* (Dili: FRETILIN, n.d.), p. 23, author's translation. This was printed in both Portuguese and Tetum, the leading ethnic language.

10. Interview with Tomas Dias Ximenes, Secretary-General of the Monarchist Party, Dili, 19 December 1974. Also see interview report in *A Voz de Timor* (Dili), 14 December 1974 and *Indonesian Observer* (Jakarta), 17 January 1975.

11. Figures provided to the author by Augusto Cesar da Costa Mousinho, mayor of Dili.

12. At present political activity is governed by a provisional decree and is subject to elaboration and official promulgation. Legally, no political parties are registered in Timor, only "associations".

13. The membership census was to have been conducted in early 1975. The results are not yet known.

14. Colin McIntyre offers a figure of 30,000 Chinese in a Reuters/NZPA story in the *Auckland Star*, 18 November 1974. Peter Hastings, op. cit., suggests a figure of 14,000. The need for a population census is keenly felt here.

15. In addition, Portugal has made up the deficit between the budget expenditures and revenues in the territory, underwriting between 25% and 50% of the annual budget. Timor is not a profitable territory for metropolitan Portugal.

16. Figures supplied by the Director of Information and Tourism, Dili, 16 December 1974. Hastings, op. cit., p. 14, citing the Bureau of Planning, states that only four out of twelve *administradors* are Timorese.

17. The "chefes de sucos" or local chiefs still assist the Finance Department in collecting a head tax of 190 Escudos (about US$6) from every adult in their area between 17 and 60 years of age. For this and other services they receive a remittance of 25% of the tax take, some of which must be paid to the "regulo" (sultan) of the district. Neither chiefs nor sultans are salaried officials, but both are vital elements of the territorial administrative system.

18. The text of the *communiqué* was shown to the author by diplomatic sources.

19. The feelings of the mayor of Dili, one of the coalition's UDT representatives, are clear: "They (the Indonesians) broadcast across the border, accusing us of being neo-colonialists, and FRETILIN of being Communists. That's interference.... We don't want to join those...those black people. This is our country.... Why don't they leave us alone." *Indonesian Observer* (Jakarta), 17 January 1975.

20. *Sinar Harapan* (Jakarta), 17 June 1974. This and following Indonesian news items translated by the author.

21. *Birita Yudha* (Jakarta), 2 December 1974.

22. *New Standard* (Jakarta), 28 September 1974.

23. *Berita Yudha* (Jakarta), 2 December 1974.

24. *Indonesian Observer* (Jakarta), 6 December 1974.

25. *Kompas* (Jakarta), 4 October 1974.

26. *Sinar Harapan* (Jakarta), 2 July 1974.

27. A spate of stories appeared at the end of August 1974 reporting on APODETI founder Arnaldo des Reis Araujo's meetings with Indonesian Government officials and private personalities. In late October and early December the visit by APODETI president Jose Fer-

nando Osorio Soares and two aides to Jakarta was widely reported.

28. *Antara Bulletin*, 12 and 19 November 1974.

29. *Antara Bulletin*, 25 September 1974.

30. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 October 1974 and *Indonesian Newsletter* (Wellington), 19 September 1974. General Amir Machmud has stated publicly that there are no constitutional barriers to making Timor a new province.

31. *Antara Bulletin*, 3 December 1974.

32. *Antara Bulletin*, 6 December 1974.

33. *Kompas* (Jakarta), 7 December 1974.

34. Stephen Fitzgerald, "China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies", *China Quarterly* (London), No. 44, October/December 1970, pp. 1-37 and *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949-1970* (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

35. *Antara Bulletin*, 24 October 1974.

36. *Editorial Note:* In the early 1970s Horta was banished by the Portuguese to Mozambique for denouncing Portuguese colonialism at a cocktail party in Dili. In Mozambique he worked as a journalist on a government newspaper, covering the campaign against the FRELIMO insurgents; but, he stated recently, "People do not believe this, but over there I had no contact at all with the FRELIMO freedom fighters." *(Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 April 1975).

37. Keep in mind that Timor is far from being the world's smallest territory, for at least 25 others, many newly independent nations, have smaller populations. Timor's economic resources are sufficient to feed her population even at the present low level of development. Timor is certainly as viable as Guinea Bissau or Fiji.

38. The 22 January 1975 *communiqué* by the new coalition invites the UN to supervise decolonization, but specifically excludes Indonesia from participation. In my view this is unnecessarily provocative to Indonesia, for inviting Indonesia to participate would prevent misunderstandings and give Indonesia a stake in the decolonization process.

39. A reader of a draft of this essay suggested an Indonesian-Portuguese condominium as a transitional apparatus to ease the move to independence. Certainly this would allow Indonesia a voice in the future of Timor. But it would require reversal of Indonesia's fundamental aversion to entangling treaty commitments. And it might not be acceptable to Timorese party leaders who desire a more direct route to independence with a minimum of Indonesian involvement.

OIL: *Since the Arab oil embargo of 1973, Japan has been very conscious of her vulnerability to fluctuations in the supply of imported fuels. In the hopes of guaranteeing reliable oil imports in the future, the Japanese are seeking alternative sources closer to home.*

Japan: Rising Sun in the South-East Asian Oil Economy

Richard E. Bissell

CHANGES in the economics of oil during the last two years have led to much speculation about Japan's future energy arrangements. South-east Asia has an important place in such forecasting due to its proximity to Japan, and the unproven nature of its oil reserves. Conclusions have tended to fall into two camps. On the one hand, Japan is seen as unable or unwilling to change course drastically, preferring present patterns of strong dependence on Iranian and Saudi Arabian crude oil to continue (1). It is maintained, in support of this view, that the principal vendors of oil in the future will be Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) governments selling their oil stocks, derived from production-sharing contracts, and thus Japan will be turning to the Saudi and Iranian Governments for oil. On the other hand, observers have suggested that the Japanese will be unable to resist the temptation of developing the oil fields in their own back yard in South-east Asia, thus cutting transportation costs and reducing the political risks of dependence on Arab producers (2).

The purpose here is not to suggest that Japan should necessarily follow one path or the other, but to point to certain factors affecting Japanese attitudes toward petroleum sources. South-east Asian governments which ignore Japanese preferences may find co-operation in the petroleum field a frustrating experience. Given the right circumstances, though, we feel that Japan could increase the present 12 per cent share of its petroleum needs obtained from Asia to nearly 50 per cent within 15 years.

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ONE can look at Japan's present oil import structure as a base point (see Appendix), but remembering that significant changes have already begun to appear in Japanese import patterns. Revisions have also been made in projections of demand by Japanese industry, due to the 1974–1975 recession. Within the last few years, for instance, Japanese consumption of 4.2 million barrels per day (1972) was projected to rise to over 10 million barrels per day by 1985. Now most observers refuse to make projections, uncertain as to the impact of conservation measures, the recession, and other factors to be mentioned below. Japanese domestic production of crude oil may rise dramatically in percentage terms between now and 1985, but a change from 14,000 barrels per day in 1974 to 100,000 barrels per day in 1985 will not cause tremors in international oil circles.

The third link in the petroleum chain, aside from production and consumption, is that of refining, and Japan has now constructed nearly enough capacity to satisfy domestic demand (3). With present refineries capable of producing 5.2 million barrels per day of refined products (up from 3.8 million in 1972), Japan has not yet shown symptoms of a change called for by many close observers. For reasons to be enumerated, Japan hopes to transfer an increasing share of refining activities abroad, and South-east Asia

will certainly be the favoured location. Under what conditions and in what time-frame such a change occurs remains a matter of conjecture.

Japan has also tried to establish firm trading ties with China and the USSR with a view to importing oil from those countries. The Japanese negotiations with the USSR, eventually envisioning an investment of US$3.2 billion to take oil and gas out of undeveloped Siberian fields, lasted for several years until their breakdown in November 1974. The reason for their failure appeared to be the massive capital investment demanded of the Japanese, as well as political obstacles such as the Russian-held Kurile Islands and the Russian-proposed Asian security zone (4). There were, too, unvoiced but very well understood Chinese objections to any form of Japanese co-operation with the Russians in Siberia. Japan was prone to ignore such criticism from Peking, until the Chinese indicated that they would be willing to export increasing amounts of oil to Japan, without Japan having to invest any money at all (5).

The Chinese promise was converted into real oil within a few months, when a Japanese importer was given a contract in early March 1975, providing for an increase of oil shipments from China to Japan. Such sales had begun in May 1973, at a 20,000 barrels per day level and, under the new contract, were slated to rise to 160,000 barrels per day for 1975 (6). Indeed, China is reported to have promised 10 per cent of its production to Japan in 1980, and the Chinese have indicated that the Japanese share could amount to 750,000 barrels per day (7). The Chinese have also offered certain political incentives to the Japanese, including a peace treaty for the 1937-1945 conflict, and the possibility of later joint development of Chinese offshore reserves. But both of these dividends have only been offered as enticements, not promises, and any Japanese efforts to obtain them would involve protracted negotiations.

The Japanese are not completely satisfied, however, with the Chinese connection, since the cost of oil to them is still exorbitant. Their petroleum costs have risen from US$1 billion in 1965 to about US$15 billion in 1974 (8). Japan continues to look beyond North-east Asia, to richer oil fields further South, where oil may be obtained at lower cost, and with fewer political complications. The nations of South-east Asia thus form an essential part of the Japanese energy equation.

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JAPANESE petroleum interests in South-east Asia have three distinct focuses. South-east Asia is, firstly, a transit region for oil coming from the Middle East and Africa; secondly, a zone of production that presently supplies 20 per cent of Japan's crude oil needs and could supply much more; and, thirdly, a region of growing importance for petroleum "downstream activities", including refining and petrochemical complexes, many financed with Japanese capital.

The most urgent problem is the Japanese need for assured transit through the maritime straits of South-east Asia. Interest focuses, naturally, on the historically important Strait of Malacca. But the Indonesians are pushing consideration of the Sunda and Lombok Straits as major sea-routes, since such transit traffic would provide income for ports on these purely Indonesian straits. At the present time, most income from ships passing through the Strait of Malacca goes to Singapore, political and economic rival for Indonesia.

One major problem is that of maritime safety and pollution control, a crucial issue in this day of super-tankers. The question had been largely academic until 1974, despite the rapid growth of traffic through the Strait of Malacca (Iranian and Saudi crude en route to Japan), and Japanese urging installation of shipping beacons in the Strait. Even with the formation of the Malacca Strait Council (a Japanese financed and initiated body that included Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia), little was accomplished except to make clear the sensitive issue of national sovereignty in the region. None of the States wanted an international body with independent rights to regulate traffic in what they consider to be national waters (9).

The issue of the Strait of Malacca, however, is being pushed toward a solution. The oil spill caused by the tanker **Showa Maru** in January 1975, which fortunately caused little oil damage, made crystal clear the need for navigational beacons. And, at the current round of the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva, the three States concerned will find it much to their advantage to evolve a common policy on the Strait of Malacca before the Conference imposes a settlement on them (10). The Japanese do not really

care which solution to the Strait problem is adopted (national, regional, or international), so long as navigation is made safer, and access to the Strait by Japanese tankers is assured.

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SOUTH-EAST Asia as a region for the location of refineries and petrochemical complexes is fast becoming more attractive. Several factors are persuading the Japanese to site new installations in Indonesia, Singapore, and elsewhere. In 1973, Japan was already spending US$626 million on refined imported petroleum products, and 30 per cent, or US$232 million worth came from Indonesia.

The forces that push Japan towards an "invest-abroad" policy are many. First, labour costs in South-east Asia are lower than in Japan. It is true that labour is not the major input in refined petroleum prices, but it is an important one if one considers petroleum biproducts industries as well. Secondly, the Japanese have come to associate the major causes of pollution in Japan with petroleum-related industries. Thus companies, with the threat of law-enforced expenditure on pollution-control equipment hanging over their heads, are looking at less-controlled industrial environments for future investments.

With an increasing Japanese commitment to invest abroad, some of the less obvious advantages are emerging. Petroleum-related downstream activities are a natural corollary of production-sharing contracts, under which the producer nation receives its share in oil. This means that Japan does not have to store such a large oil surplus, as much of the oil pumped belongs to, and is controlled by, the South-east Asian countries concerned. A country such as Indonesia then incurs the obligation to erect large oil tank farms, maintaining stocks to feed into the refinery pipelines, and then selling the product to Japanese industries at market prices. Japan, too, is finding the South-east Asian governments far more stable than they were ten years ago (even though they may not be in the next decades), and thus investments of Japanese capital in joint projects is not as much of a gamble as it was in the past.

Thus there are few reservations in Japanese thinking about an investment such as that recently announced: a refinery to be owned by Japanese interests, constructed on Batam Island near Singapore, and scheduled to process 300-400,000 barrels per day. That would nearly double Indonesian refining capacity when completed. Even alongside the large Singapore complex of refineries, the Batam Island refinery will boost the area's refining capacity by 50 per cent.

Such investments by Japan, of course, merely reinforce the dominant geographical position of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in petroleum strategic thinking. Thus the first two problems facing Japanese interests in South-east Asia are related, and becoming more crucial. Expansion of refining capacity in the Singapore region merely increases the chances of more oil spill disasters in the future. Hence a more orderly approach to shipping in the area will be an essential adjunct to Japanese investments.

There is great speculation about Japanese intentions regarding oil production in South-east Asia. Part of this speculation is derived from uncertain Japanese plans, and part from lack of knowledge regarding the area's oil potential. Only a few of the geologically-promising regions have actually been drilled intensively, and political instability makes future drilling in some areas highly problematical.

Direct Japanese involvement in oil production in South-east Asia has been rare to date. Initially, Japan relied on the major Western oil companies to supply the oil its industry needed; recently, Japanese importers have been doing more business direct with foreign governments, by buying the oil from producer countries through production-sharing contracts. Thus most of the oil exported from Indonesia to Japan comes from the major producer, Caltex. The latent Japanese capability to exploit foreign oil directly should become more important in the future but in the meantime, oil produced by Western companies for Japan will continue to play an important role.

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IN Indonesia, the largest Producer of oil in South-east Asia, production seems bound to increase. From a peak of about 1.5 million barrel per day, output shrank somewhat in late 1974 to accomodate the Japanese recession. But

General Sutowo, head of Indonesia's national petroleum company, Pertamina, is aiming for a total annual production of 3 million barrels per day in the near future, and he will push the companies to achieve that figure (11). Since 70 per cent of Indonesia's oil exports go to Japan, the state of the Japanese economy is of critical concern to Indonesian planners. Such a dependence is not enjoyed by Indonesia, but it is seen as necessary in order to pay for the rapid development of Indonesian industries. The Japanese approve of the structure of the oil industry in Indonesia, since oil production there is being developed not only by a giant company such as Caltex, but also by numerous independents such as Petromer Trend; further oil is controlled by the Indonesian Government, through the production sharing principle. (12).

With the rest of the oil industry pushing exploration in Indonesia, the Japanese have shown more interest in building refineries and developing other industrial projects, including timber and textiles. It is widely recognized that market forces will cause a rise in oil exports and mutual trade between Indonesia and Japan.

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HEAVY Japanese involvement can also be seen in Brunei, from where crude oil has traditionally been sent to Japan. Currently the biggest development is in the area of liquified natural gas (LNG), and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation has taken a 45 per cent interest in the project at Lumut. Nearly all the exported gas goes to Japan, and the Japanese were involved in the financing, construction, and management of the LNG plant (13). The project was of additional importance in serving as a demonstration for the rest of South-east Asia: large amounts of natural gas are "flared off" each year, and the Indonesians among others are interested in constructing their own LNG plants to increase export earnings and avoid wasting a resource.

Where the Japanese may be able to find an important role in direct exploration and production will be in areas closed to the Western companies for political reasons, such as Vietnam. The Vietnam War rendered inaccessible the oil-bearing deposits which have been found along the Annamese coast. An informal agreement has been reached, for instance, between Japex (the Japanese oil exploration company) and the North Vietnamese government for eventual probing of deposits in the Gulf of Tonkin. Off South Vietnam, the Japanese trading company, Kaiyo, had taken a minority interest in a few concession blocks handed out by the Thieu Government. In neither case has any actual exploration been undertaken, but the gradual achievement of political stability in the area should put the Japanese in a position to become involved in production in one or both of the areas.

Japanese attitudes towards oil and the South-east Asian sources of that valuable commodity are clearly going through period of rapid change. The Japanese seem to prefer the anonymity of being just another customer in the Middle East, and yet hate the distance and undependability of Persian Gulf sources. The ambivalence of Japanese views is reversed in South-east Asia, where the Japanese are well aware of the resentment engendered by the economic giant of the North. Yet the governments in the area press the Japanese to take more of the region's resources, in an effort to increase trade and presumably to raise the Asian standard of living.

Japanese policies on oil must be regarded as crucial to the region. The increase in resource extraction is being balanced by the development of industries throughout South-east Asia. It may be that Japan is allocating the more polluting industries to the other countries, but the move is certainly not being resisted. Indeed, Japan's economic partners to the South are happy to undertake any industrial development for which the necessary investment is forthcoming.

For the South-east Asian countries, this answer to petroleum development does not solve what they regard as an equal problem, i.e. their dependence upon Japan for export earnings. It must be recognized, though, that diversification of production through refining and petrochemical plants will increase the ability of those countries to reach other markets. It should become clear in the near future, therefore, to what degree new arrangements for petroleum contribute to a healthier regional economy in South-east Asia. Japan will remain the key actor, but hopefully in a fashion that meets the policy needs of both sides in this mutually profitable relationship.

Appendix

Japanese Sources of Petroleum Imports (1972)

Iran	1,660,000 barrels/day
Saudi Arabia	834,000
Indonesia	667,000
Kuwait	619,000
Abu Dhabi	267,000
Brunei	105,000
Nigeria	77,000

Japanese Cost of Imported Mineral Fuels

1965	$1.6 (Billion)
1966	1.8
1967	2.2
1968	2.7
1969	3.0
1970	3.9
1971	4.7
1972	5.7
1973	8.3
1974	15.0

Notes and References

1. Saburo Okita, "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy", 52 *Foreign Affairs* (July 1974), p. 720. See also "Interview with Kiyotibu Kurokawa", *To the Point International* (25 January 1975), p. 22.

2. J.D.B. Miller, "Changing Balances in the Western Pacific", *The World Today* (February 1975), p. 77-78.

3. For statistics, see *The Oil and Gas Journal* (30 December 1974), pp. 121-122.

4. Koji Nakamura, "Japan balances on a Siberian Tightrope", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (15 November 1974), p. 41.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Richard Halloran, "Japan Doubles Oil Purchases from China", *New York Times* (11 March 1975), p. 21.

7. Nakaruma, *op. cit.*

8. US-Japan Trade Council, *How the Energy Crunch Affects Japan* (1974), p. 16.

9. Peter Simms, "Three Nations in a Cleft Stick", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (28 February 1975), p. 15.

10. *Editorial Note:* The eight-week Geneva session ended on 9 May with a 40,000 word "single text", which is in effect an assessment by conference officials of the state of negotiations so far. There was apparently a substantial consensus in favour of a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, together with a strong trend in favour of unimpeded passage through straits used for international navigation, that are affected by the 12-mile zone. It was nevertheless decided in Geneva that it would be necessary to convene another Law of the Sea conference in New York in 1976.

    However, on the day after the Geneva conference ended, the Malaysian Minister of Law, Tan Sri Kadir Yusof, announced that Malaysia and Indonesia had both stressed at the conference that they could not wait any longer for an international agreement, and that they had agreed to introduce their own law soon to control shipping through the Strait of Malacca. He added that the free passage of tankers through the strait continued to pose a serious problem relating to pollution and danger to marine life: "Malaysia and Indonesia considered the strait their territorial waters and therefore urgent actions should be taken to safeguard their interests ... Any further delay in reaching the agreement would force many countries to take unilateral action to safeguard their interests." *(Kuala Lumpur Domestic Radio,* 10 May 1975).

11. *Far Eastern Economic Review,* (1 November 1974), p. 46.

12. *Editorial Note:* Japanese bankers recently decided to extend an emergency loan to Pertamina, which is in financial trouble. The sum involved will probably be somewhere between US$150 million and US $200 million, but will be only one part of a total figure of some US$1,000 million in loans that Pertamina is expected to receive from world banks. Japanese eagerness to extend the loan is partly motivated by the knowledge that Pertamina will in the future control a much larger section of the Indonesian oil industry than it does at present (20 per cent). For example, Indonesia's work contract with Caltex will expire in 1983 and Caltex will then be obliged to share production with Pertamina (see *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 23 May 1975).

13. Gerald L. Farrar, "Brunei LNG Project Ahead of Schedule", *Oil and Gas Journal* (17 September 1973), pp. 61-66.

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH ASEAN: *"As her economy grows, and with her prodigious population, it will become harder to deny China a pre-eminent role in Asia, similar to that now enjoyed by the United States in the western hemisphere, or by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe."*



The Development of Relations between China and the ASEAN Countries

Victor C. Funnell

THE collapse of resistance to Communist forces in Cambodia and Vietnam serves as a reminder of the exclusion of the Indo-China theatre of war from the whole optimistic panorama that seemed to open up after the Sino-American *rapprochement* three years ago. That *rapprochement* itself has become a little tarnished in the intervening period. In assessing the perspective of relations between China and South-east Asia, therefore, it is as well to bear in mind that the exact nature of the relationship between China and those countries which are now, or soon to be, Communist, is somewhat obscure. It cannot be assumed that Peking's purposes are always served by Hanoi's policies in the region. The position of Sihanouk, for example, as a *protégé* of China, and in relation to the forces which have now emerged triumphant in his own country, is distinctly misty, and the determinants are to be sought in Hanoi as much as in Peking. The events of the next few months may reveal more clearly the outlines of a reconstituted Indo-China under Hanoi's aegis.

Until that happens, the main interest in the developing relationship between China and South-east Asia lies in those countries whose policies can be openly examined, and form the subject of continuing dialogue and debate. This applies particularly to those countries which are members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), - Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Burma, while displaying a new interest recently in Asia and the Pacific, remains something of a special case since, not only is policy formulation hidden from public view, but it also has had a diplomatic relationship with China dating back to independence in 1948. The relationship most markedly and most relevantly awaiting definition today is that between the ASEAN countries and China.

This definition cannot be made in a purely bilateral sense. As a result of China's "great power" status at the United Nations since 1971, and following the clear signal given by President Nixon in visiting China in 1972, South-east Asia is in a period of greater change now than it has been since 1945. A new world is in formation, and it is being shaped by the sharpened Sino-Soviet rivalry consequent on American withdrawal from the Asian mainland, by Japanese economic power and political ambition, and by the oceanic politics of navies in the Indian Ocean. The old guidelines have gone and new assessments have to be made by each country, on a more individual basis than before. The passivity or resignation of the United States Congress and public opinion in the face of Communist successes in Indo - China is simply an illustr - tion of the range of factors to be taken into account. No longer is there a clear dividing line between two sides, both monolithic, the Communists and non-Communists. It is a complex quadrilateral world that South-east Asia faces, where the main contenders are China, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States.

Quite clearly, the main vacuum is in relations

with China, and most countries in the region have felt that this is the area that provides most scope for expansion and development, by whatever stages and at whatever speed. While it is ultimately a matter for each nation to decide for itself, there has been in ASEAN an attempt at mutual consultation, arriving at agreed positions. This in no way represents a power concentration to match the other sides of the quadrilateral, yet it can only strengthen the arm of each to have the support of other member countries of ASEAN. Indeed, if they can speak unitedly and with authority about the affairs of the region, as they have on the question of the "neutralization" of South-east Asia, or the position of the Malacca Strait, however half-hearted their adherence may have been in practice in some cases, the mutual confidence engendered by a growing habit of collective consultation is entirely to the benefit of the region in dealing with powerful and persistent outsiders.

Having said this, however, there is a qualification to be made, and that is that any such regional initiative must depend on great power guarantees to be effective. It is little use "nationalizing" the Malacca Strait, for example, if Soviet warships and Japanese tankers continue to use the waterway at will. At least the concept of "neutralization", that some would criticize as idealistic and impractical, recognizes the need for underwriting by the major Powers. Here, China alone has felt able to support both initiatives. This is an obvious example of the sort of benefit that could be derived from having closer diplomatic and political contacts with the Chinese, both at the United Nations and through an exchange of embassies in the respective capitals. The question for South-east Asia is no longer whether to recognize Communist China, but how long the establishment of formal relations can be postponed. If it is a matter of pressures on South-east Asian governments, Chinese pressure could balance Soviet pressure, as North Vietnam has ably demonstrated over the years. Again, for some countries neighbouring on North Vietnam, Chinese influence might be seen as an antidote to Hanoi's ambitions. It could even be that China would prefer to see American (or Japanese) influence retained in the area, rather than have it replaced by a Soviet sphere of influence.

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IT is arguable, for instance, that China's attitude to subversion is determined as much by the actions of rivals in the area, or by the relations between her principal rivals and regional countries, as it is by any unswerving attachment to revolutionary movements as such. These are nice calculations, and dangerous ones to rely on, since each country is acting for its own, and, of course, they raise more acutely the nature of China's real intentions in South-east Asia and the reliability of her affirmations. The fears of South-east Asian countries, and the suspicions that they harbour of the Chinese, are of long standing. They account for the hesitations and delays that are occuring now in the approach to a closer relationship. The famous Bandung Conference in 1955 illustrated exactly the same misgivings twenty years ago,-fears of subversion, of support for local Communist parties, mistrust of the local Overseas Chinese population, and the endemic fear of a huge and populous country felt by smaller peripheral neighbours. These things have not subsided in the intervening years and are as effective today in influencing official policies as ever they were. What is new is the frank avowal of South-east Asian governments that the speed of the march to Peking depends in large degree also on the effectiveness of domestic confidence. Malaysia's front role as the first of the ASEAN countries to extend recognition could scarcely have been undertaken lacking the judgement that it could master the problems posed by the guerrilla movement and communal difficulties. China, then, is not solely an external problem, for it touches on some of the most fundamental domestic concerns of South-east Asia. This alone would ensure it energetic consideration of the kind that has occupied the policy-makers since 1971, and that is still under way. When this is added to the broader picture of the whole web of economic relations, military alliances, and overall alignments in world affairs, a disposition to seek an accomodation with China can be seen to have far-reaching implications.

It may seem odd, therefore, that the search has been most rigorously conducted by the South-east Asian countries themselves. While the Chinese have conducted "ping-pong" diplomacy with some success, much of the running has been made by their smaller neighbours, those who have most to fear, but yet perhaps most to gain, from working towards a new basis of mutual understanding. Nearly all the ASEAN go-

vernments have been engaged in more or less covert talks with their Chinese opposite numbers, often at the United Nations in New York, and quite often inside embassies in foreign capitals. Sporting occasions have usefully served a political purpose. China has naturally proved receptive. Officials in Kuala Lumpur have little doubt that China is anxious to extend its relationships to other South-East Asian governments, in the way that it has done with Malaysia. China obviously has much to gain from a deeper penetration into the political life, and access to government ministries, of neighbouring countries. Indeed, it is surprising that Peking has seemed content for so long with embassies only in Rangoon, Vientiane and Hanoi. Now that a Chinese embassy has been opened in Kuala Lumpur, all eyes will be on it, and doubtless the Chinese diplomats in it will have orders to adopt a very correct stance towards their hosts. In extending her influence, and in damping down fears and giving assurances on such matters as subversion and citizenship where required, following the Malaysian precedent, China can look forward to opening further embassies in South-east Asia before very long.

There is just one proviso. That is, that the politics of normalcy and of *detente* continue to inspire the leaders in Peking. Any further upsurge of mass ideological fervour, as occurred in the Cultural Revolution, could do much to deter those, on both sides, who wish to normalize diplomatic relations, and could delay China's "opening to the South" once again. South-east Asian views on developments inside China are, therefore, important. It remains to be seen just what "ping-pong" diplomacy really means in the longer perspective. In the shorter term it is no substitute for proven friends and reliable allies. For the moment, China may give the impression of having substituted a realistic nationalism for a sense of world mission. The contemporary transition to a post-Mao, post-revolutionary era can show much evidence of trends that have occurred within similar systems, for example in the case of the Soviet Union after 1971, where the demands of economic growth and international intercourse lead to the establishment of an entrenched, bureaucratized administration, wedded to the mechanisms of regulation and planning, and accustomed to necessary compromises with a once dogmatic creed. Such a process could only be hastened by the departure of Mao Tse-tung who, in this sense, could be characterized as one of China's heaviest liabilities, at least since 1958. The evidence of recent campaigns against Lin Piao, Confucius and "bourgeois" tendencies, suggests that the leadership succession is not yet settled, though the return, after a temporary eclipse, of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, one of the arch "revisionists" of the Cultural Revolution, may be a portent of the trends already noted. For South-east Asian leaders there is a need to know what sort of China they are dealing with, who the new men are, and where the real centres of power within the system are located. If these matters are not yet clear, or if the present State and Party arrangements in Peking appear purely transitional, anyone could be forgiven for biding time and keeping counsel until a more propitious moment. Such arguments do indeed colour the attitude of several senior men in ASEAN foreign ministries when considering serious negotiations with the Chinese.

The ASEAN governments, whether they recognize China or not, are in some kind of communication with Peking through one channel or another, and all have confronted the policy decision of recognition and diplomatic accreditation. Such steps are, in a sense, a purely formal procedure, a sort of old-fashioned courtesy, merely serving to confirm a host of contacts at other levels, whether trading links or cultural events, that have been taking place without special comment, and which have been regarded as perfectly natural and normal, for years past. What makes the present decision so hard and painful is the unique circumstance that there are millions of Chinese living in their adopted countries in the region. Thus relations with China are not seen only on the national or diplomatic plane, but China has a cultural and linguistic presence inside the nation, that could be, and sometimes is, ideological too. This is what makes the whole relationship so delicate, not that China happens to be a major Power, and a Communist one at that. Diplomatic relations exist between ASEAN states and Soviet Russia, and her East European satellites, on an apparently amicable enough level. The truth is, though, that these countries do not have millions of expatriates living in South-east Asia. That is the essential difference. The greatest handicap that Chinese diplomacy suffers in South-east Asia is the existence of the Overseas Chinse communities, a political fact of the first importance.

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IN Kuala Lumpur one finds, understandably, a measure of euphoria and enthusiasm for the *"coup"* pulled off by Malaysian diplomacy in being the first ASEAN country to enter into diplomatic relations with China. The evident satisfaction and self-congratulation is also prompted by their success in obtaining from the Chinese the public assurances sought, and stated in the joint *communique* of 31 May 1974. It was confirmed to me at *Wisma Putra* (the Foreign Ministry) that the initial Chinese refusal even to discuss the questions of subversion and relations with local Communists, was later modified to the suggestion that talks about this could be postponed until after recognition had taken place, and then, in face of Malaysian insistence, fully conceded in the final *communiqué*. The other outstanding problem, that of the position of Chinese living in Malaysia, was also resolved satisfactorily for the Malaysians by China's willingness to urge overseas compatriots to adopt the customs and citizenship of their chosen country. These, of course, are verbal formulae that the Chinese, in their desire to establish a bridgehead in South-east Asia, may have felt they could subscribe to without too much surrender of principle, or exposure to adverse criticism from the Soviet Union and her allies. In any case, subversive broadcasts from Chinese territory by the "Voice of Malayan Revolution" (VMR) have not ceased, despite the official friendship between the two countries. This duality in Chinese actions was underlined by Chou En-lai, even as he welcomed his Malaysian visitors on 28 May 1974, by referring to China's "internationalist duty to support the just struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed people"(1). Likewise, on the question of citizenship and China's attitude towards the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, little or nothing has been conceded in practice, and China's assurances on this score will need testing over time. The position of the "stateless" Chinese, estimated to number about 200,000, will need clarifying, as will the status of those permanent residents who opt for Chinese citizenship and who will, therefore, be eligible for China's "protection". A Malaysian identity is hard to establish for a non-Malay. Language, culture, education, economic differences, communal attachments, religion, even cuisine, militate against a true national allegiance. Even where a Chinese goes so far as adopting the Muslim religion in order to demonstrate his acculturization, his true motives and loyalty may be suspect. During the national elections in August 1974, in which the China policy was a big factor in the ruling National Front's success, an undercurrent of Chinese linguistic chauvinism was apparent in part of the electorate, and in particular in the propaganda of the Democratic Action Party (DAP). There are deep springs to the cultural pride of the ordinary Chinese. Attending a rally of the *Barisan Nasional* one night on the Malacca *padang*, when a Chinese member of the Government addressed the crowd in Malay, my Chinese companion pulled me away in disgust, asking in tones of shame how it was possible for a Chinese to behave in that way. There can be no glib or easy answers, no short cuts, in building a national identity over and above communities divided along ethnic lines. Nevertheless, this is the objective, and in some cases, the stated prerequisite to the opening of diplomatic relations with China.

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SINGAPORE is particularly relevant to this theme. Here is an island republic with few of the accepted criteria of nationhood relating to size, population and natural resources. It measures only 26 miles by 14. Its population of about two million is three-quarters Chinese, with the remainder made up of Malays, other Asians and a few Europeans. The Chinese themselves divide into several sub-groups, comprising Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese. The official languages are Malay, English, Chinese (Mandarin) and Tamil. Here is cultural and ethnic diversity enough to make the problem of national identity an absorbing one. The immigrant origins of the population simply accentuate the difficulty of creating a real sense of nationhood out of such diverse material.

Singapore is a special case among South-east Asian nations in that it is predominantly of ethnic Chinese origin. This has sometimes caused its neighbours to regard it with suspicion. It certainly complicates matters when it comes to relations with China. Singapore's twin policies of economic development and nation building are, of course, undertaken for their own sake, but they are also calculated to reduce the attractiveness of rival ideologies or alternative political systems in other countries. The composition of Singapore's population makes it clear enough which ideology and country are principally in mind. Ten years, from 1965 to the present, is not much time to build a nation. In this sense, in the words of the Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, "ping-pong diplomacy has come too soon". More time is needed to create an unambiguous

Singapore citizenship before the Government will feel ready to take positive steps towards normalizing relations with Peking. Doubts and fears about the true loyalties of the immigrant Chinese majority are bound to be Singapore's main concern in contemplating diplomatic recognition. No one supposes that a Chinese embassy would set about subverting the population as soon as it arrived. The potential threat is seen to come, not from China, but from the unscrupulous local agitators playing on or creating issues of a cultural or economic nature in order to exacerbate and influence communal and political tensions in society, in circumstances where an appeal could be made to Chinese representatives on the spot. The sparks from any such incident could easily lead to a situation where China felt obliged, perhaps without wishing it, to take official notice. On the other hand, were China anxious to bring pressure to bear on the Singapore Government, it might resort to an appeal to groups of local Chinese to act in a desired manner. In this way, and from either side, there is a certain leverage to be obtained from Chinese diplomatic representation that would be highly unwelcome to a State as small and as vulnerable, in an economic sense, as Singapore. This reasoning sufficiently accounts for the caution that has been evident in the approach to Communist China.

Like other countries in the region, Singapore has expanding trading relations with China. as well as the occasional sporting event. It is interesting, too, that one of the first acts of the newly constituted government in 1965, after secession from Malaysia, was to revoke the decision of the preceding Federal authorities to close down the local branch of the Bank of China. Perhaps it was felt useful from the outset to retain this subsidiary arm of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Government in order to have some point of contact. Possibly the Hongkong experience in this regard was found to be instructive. While China's entry to the United Nations will have obviated this factor, local trading concerns and Chambers of Commerce and other interested parties still need to do business and make their mutually advantageous arrangements. Shipping is an example: since 1971 Chinese ships have been carrying Singapore cargoes at very competitive rates. Chinese retail outlets, of the department store type, are also attracting much local custom. For the moment then, the Singapore authorities seem content to let events take their natural course, to tolerate low-level and practical contacts with the Chinese, and to envisage the possiblity of relations with China reaching a fuller flowering later in this decade. It is a measured and determined path that Singapore is following, without any disposition to abandon present commitments and friends.

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THE general impression received by the visitor to the ASEAN countries is that Indonesia or Singapore are likely to be the last to have full diplomatic relations with Communist China. There is much in recent Indonesian history to explain the caution and wariness that surrounds the subject of China in official circles in Jakrata. For Indonesia, of course, it is a question of the **resumption** of relations, that were so badly shattered by the events of 1965. Memories of that year are still fresh and the real concern is less with China than it is with the remnants of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Indonesia. This is the real priority, though, of course, the two are linked in the official mind. China's liaison with the PKI in 1965, and China's continuing support for the insurgents in Kalimantan, have been cited as obstacles to an understanding with China. Chinese radio broadcasts hostile to the regime have been another. Indonesia, in contrast to Malaysia, seems not prepared to accept any duality in the Chinese position, between friendship on the official level, and support for subversion behind the scenes. The test of China's sincerity, for Indonesia, is her abandonment of such practices.

The other determinant of Indonesia's attitude is the assimilation of her ethnic Chinese minority, numbering abour four million. As the Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik, expressed it in August 1974, "We need time to re-educate Indonesians of Chinese stock and Chinese in Indonesia" (2). The questions are how much time, and what education. There is little doubt that the same security concerns prevail in official Indonesian thinking as they do elsewhere in South-east Asia, when considering relations with China. The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have played a considerable role in Sino-Indonesian relations over the years. At the Bandung Conference twenty years ago, the first agreement on citizenship of Overseas Chinese was reached between the two countries: it seemed less controversial at that time, but became a politial issue in 1959 and again during the Cultural Revolution in China.

Clearly the legalistic distinctions between Chinese who opted for either Chinese or Indonesian citizenship, or chose to remain indeterminate, were an insufficient guide in the public mind to the identity and loyalty of Chinese citizens, especially where schools, newspapers and commercial undertakings were conducted by Chinese in the Chinese language. Cultural ghettos and economic entrepreneurship aroused their own resentment among Indonesians. Hence the "education" that Chinese in Indonesia are now supposed to receive will certainly be of an indigenous kind. Chinese schools are no more, and Chinese surnames are banned. (This had led to some amusing results, with Chinese sometimes adopting classical Javanese names of noble orgin). It has not led, however, to any real diminution in the economic power and influence of local Chinese business circles in Jakarta. Their technical and commercial expertise are invaluable for the development plans of the Government. Some of the most able advisers of the Generals are ethnic Chinese. Foreign investors usually prefer to do business with local Chinese contractors, the *"cukongs"*, who may have better contacts and organization than their Indonesian counterparts. When the foreigner is Japanese (and Japan is investing heavily in Indonesia), then the cultural affinities with the Chinese result in a natural partnership.

This interplay of Japanese with Overseas Chinese economic interests in South-east Asia generally, and the extent to which Chinese *entrepreneurs* mesh in with Japan's commercial and industrial enterprises in the region, has thoroughly aroused popular anti-Chinese sentiment. Peking's reaction to this development, particularly when its own pattern of trade is so tied up with Japan, will be interesting to watch. The riots of January 1974 in Jakarta during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka, that many interpreted as anti-Japanese in origin, were in fact directed against the Government and their Chinese allies. The attack on the Toyota showroom in Jalan Thamrin, for example, was directed against the Chinese holder of the concession. Chinese-owned stores were burned down, and some senior Chinese advisers to the Government threatened. There is, therefore, an ambiguity in the official attitude towards the local Chinese, some of whom occupy important posts, and others who need "re-education." If this latter process, whatever it may involve, is a prerequisite to the resumption of relations with China, then the re-opening of the Chinese embassy in Jakarta may be long delayed. According to Mr. Malik in 1973, re-education could take five to ten years (3). More recently, however, he enigmatically described relations with China as "near-far" (4).

This teasing uncertainty, however, could be abruptly ended at any time by the plain announcement of a resumption of relations. At the international conference on Vietnam in Paris in January 1973, the Indonesian delegation were able to use the occasion for talks with the Chinese, led by the then Foreign Minister, Ch'i Peng Fei. In July 1974, after Mr. Malik's visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Indonesians received what they accepted as a direct signal from the Chinese, when the plane carrying their Foreign Minister between Ulan Bator and Pyongyang was allowed to fly over China without the usual obligatory stop in Peking. So far, Indonesia has shown little inclination to hurry. Indeed, one is told in Jakarta that, but for the persuasion Indonesia was able to apply, through ASEAN and other channels, Malaysia might have prematurely hastened to Peking two years earlier. The Malaysians, in fact, are seen as a little naive. In the end, however, the thinking in Jakarta is likely to be influenced by the intentions of Indonesia's ASEAN partners. Apart from the timetable of "re-education" of Chinese and the needs of internal security, there seems little reason why Indonesia should not resume relations with China sooner rather than later, particularly if Thailand and the Philippines are actively contemplating a similar step.

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CHINA had already become an issue in Thai politics at the time of the military *coup* in November 1971. Marshal Thanom at that time voiced concern about growing insurgency and the loyalty of ethnic Chinese in Thailand (5). It was apparently felt that the new respectability of China as a member of the United Nations, and the *rapprochement* with the United States and other countries, might seriously affect the attitude and sway the loyalty of local Chinese. Despite the relatively successful assimilation of Chinese into Thai society, which by common consent has progressed further in Thailand than in other countries, it is clear that the stubborn

problems of subversion and the Overseas Chinese colour Thai attitudes to China as much as they do elsewhere in the region.

Nevertheless, it became clear in 1973 that the Thai Government was responding to changes in the international scene, including not only the friendly face of China but also the American disengagement from South-east Asia. Internal political changes in Thailand have not altered the general trend of widening contacts with China. Thais and Chinese have met at the United Nations and in various embassies around the world. In the past two years the Thais have utilized sporting occasions, involving half-a-dozen visits to China, and two reciprocal Chinese visits to Thailand, for exploratory talks. The most important of these to date was the visit of the Defence Minister, Air Chief Marshal Dawee, to Peking in February 1974, in his capacity as Chairman of the Thai Olympic Committee. While there, Chou En-lai apparently told him that China no longer supported the insurgents in Thailand (6). The reason given was that Thailand now had a democratically elected government. This sounds very odd. It is not generally known that Communist China has such respect for free elections. Nor were any similar assurances received by the Malaysians despite their democratic system of government, apart from the generalities of the "peaceful co-existence" formula. In addition, the subversive "Voice of the People of Thailand" (VPT) broadcasts from Chinese territory, and the activities of Chinese-trained insurgents supplied from China, belie Chou's words.

Nevertheless, the Thais have sought to move slowly towards Peking, using the strategy of a step at a time, testing the ground, as it were, before going on. Trade has been slowly increasing between the two countries, and in January 1974, after the Deputy Foreign Minister, Chartchai Choonhavan led a commercial delegation to Peking, China agreed to supply 50,000 tons of much sought-after oil at a favourable price. Now the removal of restrictions on trade with China, through repeal of Decree 53, will ensure that the economic side of the relationship develops more quickly. A political decision on recognition of China has had to await the elections that took place earlier this year, and the formation of a new government structure. Now that a government is in being a decision cannot long be delayed (7).

Despite the Thai misgivings about China's role in supporting subversion, and despite Chou En-lai's reassurance on this score, it is unlikely in any case that Thailand would seek formal Chinese guarantees of good behaviour. It is felt in Bangkok that such promises, even if forthcoming, would be unrealistic and at the mercy of changing national interests over time. The very specific matters on which Malaysia bound the Chinese, and on which the Malaysians set such store, as representing a breakthrough in relations with China and blazing a trail for others to follow, is seen by Thai officials as no such thing. For them, the repetition of the principles of "peaceful co-existence" in the Sino-Malaysian agreement is old hat, and a formula that has become meaningless in the twenty-odd years since it was first discovered by Nehru and Chou En-lai. Nevertheless, Thailand's course is set, with a civilian government installed, and a continuing run-down of American bases. The policy makers are well-informed, sophisticated and without illusions. All that is now necessary is an act of will by the Government. The regulators are in their own hands, and in China's.

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THE position is much the same with the Philippines (8), where the main domestic irritant in Sino-Filipino relations is Chinese support for insurgency. Despite this, trading and other contacts have flourished, assisted by several high-ranking Filipino delegations to mainland China. Although the Philippines has diplomatic relations with Taiwan this does not appear to have been a major obstacle. In the wake of Sino-American *rapprochement,* President Marcos in 1971 removed restrictions on trade with Communist countries, and that year Filipino business men attended the Canton trade fair. Trade missions were exchanged in 1973, and as in the case of Thailand, China agreed to supply crude oil, with the first shipment arriving in October 1974.

The President's personal emissary and brother-in-law, Governor Romualdez, first visited Peking in February 1972, when he was assured by Chou En-lai that the support for Filipino rebels had been a mistaken policy associated with the disgraced Lin Piao, and would not continue. Nevertheless, Chinese arms and supplies appear to have been sent subsequently to insurgents in the Philippines, according to

the President's speech on the second anniversary of martial law in September last year. Despite this, 1974 saw a lot of coming and going between the two countries, including basketball teams, a second visit by Governor Romualdez, and finally in September the visit to China of Madame Marcos herself. This would appear to set the seal on progress in Sino-Filipino relations. Admittedly, the First Lady in 1972 visited the Soviet Union, which has not yet established diplomatic relations with Manila; but the priority is now being given to China, as the President told reporters on 8 October last year.

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WHAT is clear from the ASEAN approach to China is that both sides have the will to overcome obstacles to open diplomatic intercourse. One country after another is ignoring the visible evidence that Chinese words and promises do not always mean what they say, and that China can speak with two voices. For its part, China is ignoring the military treaties that bind some South-east Asian countries into alternative power systems, and appears ready to pour soothing syrup on their sensitivities as to citizenship, security and subversion. For both sides, then, there is an advantage to be gained in terms of influence and manoeuvre at a time of maximum fluidity in Asian affairs. Chinese motives can confidently be ascribed, in large part, to the PRC's rivalry with the Soviet Union. China will have to hurry if it is to catch up with the Soviet diplomatic *demarche* in South-east Asia, that now includes every country except the Philippines. There was in any case a vacuum in Chinese diplomatic representation in the area, that was all the more marked after China's entry into the United Nations as one of the "big five", and on the Security Council.

China's expanding commercial interests, and its emergence as an oil exporter, also require better handling than can be performed by the occasional trade mission, or *ad hoc* agreement. Consulates and commercial attachés, as well as the information-gathering activities of embassies, will greatly benefit China's rulers in framing their policies towards individual countries in the region. From the South-east Asian side, any country that enters into relations with China purely on an individual basis is likely to find itself at the usual disadvantage of the weak when dealing with the strong. An identity of interest and co-ordination of policies between States in the region, on the lines of ASEAN, whether or not this includes a military dimension, between themselves or with outsiders, can only be beneficial. China is a nuclear power, even while she disclaims "great Power" status as a champion of the "Third World". As her economy grows, and with her prodigious population, it will become harder to deny China a pre-eminent role in Asia, similar to that now enjoyed by the United States in the western hemisphere, or by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

Notes and References

1. Reprinted in *An Historic Visit,* Malaysian Government publication, 1974.
2. *Indonesia Times,* 5 August 1974.
3. *Berita Buana* (Jakarta), 27 April 1974.
4. *Indonesia Times,* 5 August 1974.
5. *The Times* (London), 20 November 1971.
6. *The Nation* (Bangkok), 17 February 1974.
7. *Editorial Note:* On 20 June the Thai Foreign Minister stated that he was confident that the official agreement to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC could be signed on 1 July *(Bangkok Post,* 21 June 1975).
8. *Editorial Note:* On 9 June, during President Marcos's visit to Peking, the Philippines and China agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Previously Manila had severed ties with Taipeh.

MILITARY RULE: *The author traces the role of the Burmese military in politics since independence from the British in 1948.*

Burma's Military Ins and Outs

Saul Rose

THERE is no uniformity about the political evolution of the countries that formerly constituted the British Empire in the East. Some have followed, with varying degrees of imitation, the Westminster model. Others have tried the experiment of replacing cabinet government by a presidential system. There have been sorties towards 'basic democracy', towards a one-party system, and towards a no-party system; and there have been military take-overs. Yet amid all this variety the Burmese experience stands out (if that phrase may be used of a regime that has endeavoured so persistently to avoid notice) as exceptional. It is not only that Burma has passed through a series of political phases that cannot be matched by any of the other countries: the Burmese political system also has evolved into something quite distinctive.

When Burma became independent on 4 January 1948 - a date carefully chosen by the astrologers for its auspicious qualities - a constitution had already been adopted which provided for parliamentary democracy. In this respect Burma was ahead of India, although in other ways there were some striking similarities - particularly in relation to the national leadership and the ruling party. Like India, Burma lost her national leader at the outset: less than a year separated the assassination of General Aung San from that of Gandhi. But in both countries there was a successor - Nehru and U Nu - who was able to don the charismatic mantle. Not that the General resembled the Mahatma, nor was U Nu another Nehru. If anything, rather the reverse. U Nu's increasing dedication to Buddhism would classify him with Gandhi as a religious leader; while Aung San, like Nehru, was a secularist and modernizer.

In both countries, also, the nationalist party that had led the independence movement retained an overwhelming preponderance. Indeed, the position of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) was apparently stronger than that of the Indian Congress Party: in the election to the Constituent Assembly in April 1947 the AFPFL secured 248 out of 255 seats. It is true that some of the opposition - Karens and Communists - boycotted the election. It is also true that the main opposition with which the AFPFL had to contend was extra-parliamentary, in the shape of insurgents of various hues. Nevertheless, the AFPFL's position of dominance did at least mean that it had no problems in dealing with opposition in parliament.

The AFPFL did however have problems in managing itself, which were even greater than those experienced by the Indian Congress. If the Congress is sometimes described as a coalition rather than a party, then the AFPFL was a congeries rather than a coalition. It comprised not only a variety of political factions (in much the same way as the Congress included the Socialist Party until 1948), but also mass organizations such as the peasants' organization and the trade union congress. The AFPFL was not so much a

party as a 'national front'. Moreover, it was a body in which initially two rival factions - the Communists and the Socialists - competed for supremacy. Socialists as well as Communists professed to be Marxists; but in practice the portion of Marxist doctrine to which they devoted most attention was Lenin's theses on party organization. Both were organized on Bolshevik lines as 'cadre' parties, and operated under strict discipline. Each sought to control the AFPFL by placing their members in key positions. When in 1948 the Communists that had remained in the AFPFL were expelled and resorted to insurrection, the Socialists were relieved of their main challengers; but they still had to reckon with U Nu who was non-party and above party.

By the time of the first parliamentary elections in 1951-2 the Socialist Party's ascendancy over the AFPFL was established, but the ascendancy of U Nu (who was president of the League) was even greater, for it was he that had carried the Government through the crisis of 1949. That was the peak of the insurrectionary challenge when the Socialists withdrew from the Government for a time to open the way for negotiations with the rebels. U Nu was left to struggle on with the help of General Ne Win who briefly became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs and Defence.

This was Ne Win's first taste of governing Burma. He had already secured his place in the mythology of the independence movement, as one of the 'Thirty Comrades' who had left Burma in 1940 for military training by the Japanese, with a view to forming the Burma Independence Army. He became commander of that force, and in 1949 he succeeded to the command of the new Burma's army. It was in this capacity that U Nu called upon him to serve in the Government. In the Burmese situation the participation of the armed forces in politics was not surprising despite the British tradition of detachment: they had, after all, constituted the military wing of the independence movement. Moreover, Ne Win's career followed the pattern of Aung San's, albeit less prominently. Consequently, his direct participation in politics did not appear as odd or objectionable as it would in a country with a different tradition of civil-military relations.

Indeed, almost all the chief actors in Burmese politics since independence have come from the small pre-war group of Left-wing Thakins, and this applies to the Communist leadership as well. Apart from U Nu and Ne Win, the other prominent politicians were the leaders of the Socialist Party: Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Tin. They had all known one another intimately over a period of years and in difficult circumstances. When they fell out, their conflict had the bitterness of a family quarrel.

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THE ELECTIONS in 1951-2 resulted in another massive victory for the AFPFL; but it was not quite as overwhelming as in 1947. Out of 239 seats contested, the AFPFL and its allies won about 200. The main opposition was represented by the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP) which had originated in a Left-wing splinter from the AFPFL. It was regarded as the above-ground Communist party and together with its associates it won 30 seats.

The outcome seemed to augur well for the development of parliamentary democracy. The elections had been held in very difficult conditions created by the continuing insurgency; nevertheless, they were reported to have been reasonably fair and representative of the electorate. The preponderance of the AFPFL might seem excessive, but it was not much greater than that of the Congress Party in India.

The AFPFL still had to cope with the insurrections which presented a major problem; but subject to that important qualification, it was in a position within the parliamentary and administrative framework to apply the policies that it had proclaimed. The electorate had the opportunity to pronounce judgement on its performance in the election of 1956. The verdict was less favourable to the AFPFL than it had been on the previous occasion. The AFPFL and its allies won 182 seats out of 241. But the main opposition - the National Unity Front (NUF) - consisting of a combination between the BWPP and the Justice Party captured 48 seats; and the total potential opposition amounted to 68. The result was worse for the AFPFL in terms of votes, since the NUF secured more than 30% of the poll.

It was a rebuff for which a variety of reasons could be adduced. The administrative machine groaned under the strain of the AFPFL's Socialist programme. Minorities who had not joined

the insurgents chafed at what they regarded as a policy of Burmanization. The country's economy suffered from maladministration, compounded by the effects of the recession that followed the ending of the Korean War and the extortions of AFPFL officials who took advantage of their position to line their pockets and those of their friends and relations. In short, the AFPFL succumbed to the temptations which beset a party that holds unchallenged power over a long period - corruption and arrogance. Also the rifts between the leading personalities of the AFPFL were beginning to show through. It was ostensibly in order to effect a house-cleaning of the AFPFL that U Nu resigned the premiership for a period after the 1956 elections. It was suspected that the true motivation was to reduce the influence that the Socialists, particularly Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe, had been acquiring in the AFPFL and in the country at large. As the purging of the AFPFL had such a direct bearing on the balance of power within that organization, U Nu's period out of office did not produce any very marked results - which was less surprising because he announced at the outset that the job was "beyond the task of one man" and departed on a religious pilgrimage to Ceylon. When he resumed the office of Prime Minister in March 1957 - again on a date which was declared to be astrologically propitious - the split at the top of the AFPFL had widened. The leadership of the Socialist Party was divided between an anti-U Nu faction led by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein and a pro-Nu faction headed by Thakin Tin.

The split in the AFPFL was formalized in 1958 - in a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. With the AFPFL divided, the opposition NUF found itself in an unaccustomed position of strength. In the event U Nu survived the vote, but only by the support of the opposition. He secured 127 votes against 119 for the Swe-Nyein faction; but only a minority of the AFPFL supported him - 51 as against 97 for Swe-Nyein. On the surface, this development seemed to be a further step along the road to parliamentary democracy. Hitherto Burma had been ruled, not by parliament, but by the AFPFL. Now parliament seemed to have come into its own. The crucial decision on the future of the Government had been taken by a vote in the Chamber. What is more, after the vote Ba Swe crossed the floor to congratulate U Nu in best Westminster style. Henceforward it seemed Burma might have a two- or three-party system in place of one-party dominance. But these appearances were deceptive. In September U Nu announced that he had requested the Commander-in-Chief General Ne Win to form a caretaker Government, to ensure the holding of free and fair elections.

Although it was made to appear that the initiative lay with U Nu, he had little choice. Approaches from certain officers made it clear that if army intervention was not invited it would happen without invitation. It did not appear that General Ne Win was himself the prime mover; rather, the impetus seemed to have come from junior officers. But an important factor was the availability of Ne Win as one whose political record was unimpeachable and who had come to the rescue at a previous time of crisis.

But why did the army feel that it was time to intervene? Partly because, after the split in the AFPFL, the Government appeared to have lost its grip. U Nu was dependent on the opposition, which included the NUF and representatives of the minorities such as the Arakanese. He adopted a conciliatory line in both directions. To the Arakanese - and to the Mons as well - he held out hopes of separate statehood. Towards the Communists he was conciliatory. He negotiated with the insurgents and declared far-reaching amnesty for those who surrendered; and he legalized the formation by them of the People's Comrade Party. The army was disturbed by these moves on the part of U Nu, and also had reason to believe that U Nu's faction of the AFPFL regarded the army with suspicion. In fact, the immediate cause of the army's action was probably the decision of U Nu's Home Minister to move units of the Union Military Police (UMP) to Rangoon, a step which threatened confrontation between the military police and the army. It was claimed that the UMP movement was designed to forestall an army coup; but this charge and counter-charge only reflected the tension that had built up by this time.

By common consent, the army did its caretaker job well. There was an improvement in administration and a reduction in corruption. And although the army leaned towards the Swe-Nyein faction - partly because of their mistrust of U Nu - the elections that were held under army auspices in 1960 were undoubtedly free and fair: otherwise the results would have been different.

There were other achievements to the army's credit. The insurrections were tackled more determinedly. Economic management was more efficient. There was a drive against crime. More immediately obvious than any of these was the clean-up of the streets of Rangoon.

This experience had its effect upon the army. Although Ne Win governed with a civilian Cabinet, military officers to the number of about 150 were installed at key points of the administration. Their success in these posts left them with the impression that they were at least as capable as the politicians of governing the country, and induced a corresponding reluctance in some of them to hand back the reins to the winners of the election. Another significant development was the establishment under military sponsorship of a National Solidarity Association (NSA), designed to assist the Ne Win Government in its rectification campaign. The NSA comprised a network of local associations which was capable of being transformed into a political organization. Not a few of the army officers occupying civil administrative posts had served their apprenticeship in the Burma Independence Army and had seen how the AFPFL had been created.

The 1960 election gave the U Nu faction a sweeping majority in the Chamber of Deputies: it won 159 seats out of 237, compared with 41 seats for the Swe-Nyein faction. The personality of U Nu played no small part in achieving this result, and he played the Buddhist card by promising to make it the state religion. The army's preference for the Swe-Nyein faction may not have helped their cause. There were indications that some sections of the public were chafing under the authoritarian rigours of Ne Win's rule; and it was significant that U Nu during the election campaign warned repeatedly of the danger of 'fascism', a criticism by implication of military rule.

U Nu was given another chance to form a Government and operate Burma's democratic constitution. But this second attempt was terminated within two years for much the same kind of reasons as had induced the previous military intervention. There was a recrudescence of insurgency; the state of the economy deteriorated; corruption grew; U Nu's new party, like the AFPFL previously, split into two warring factions. In addition, U Nu's undertaking to make Buddhism the State religion introduced a novel element of religious strife, while his willingness to contemplate separate states for the Arakanese and Mons seemed to encourage the Shans to demand more autonomy. This growing trend towards separatism was the proximate cause of the military coup which took place in March 1962.

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ON THIS occasion there was no question of the army stepping in as caretaker: it was made clear that they had come to stay. The Revolutionary Council issued a policy declaration on 30 April 1962 entitled "The Burmese Way to Socialism" in which they emphasized that there would be no going back to the previous regime:

> "In the Union of Burma also, parliamentary democracy has been tried and tested in furtherance of the aims of socialist development. But Burma's 'parliamentary democracy' has not only failed to serve our socialist development but also, due to its very defects, weaknesses and loopholes, its abuses and the absence of a mature public opinion, lost sight of and deviated from the socialist aims, until at last indications of its heading imperceptibly towards just the reverse have become apparent. The nation's socialist aims cannot be achieved with any assurance by means of the form of parliamentary democracy that we have so far experienced. The Revolutionary Council therefore firmly believes that it must develop, in conformity with existing conditions and environment and ever-changing circumstances, only such a form of democracy as will promote and safeguard the socialist development."

The Revolutionary Council consisting of 17 officers headed by General Ne Win took over the Government and dispensed with parliament. Administratively, it reverted to the machinery that had been used to good effect during the caretaker regime - a network of Security and Administration Committees (SACs) at the various levels of government, composed of officials both civilian and military, and usually under the chairmanship of a military officer. In this respect, Burma's experience of military intervention differed significantly from that of Pakistan where, under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the administration remained in the hands of the civil service, with the armed forces in the background. In Burma the army regarded the civil servants with sus-

picion - of inefficiency, partisanship and corruption - and was determined to retain a grip on the administration.

Another contrast with Ayub's Pakistan was in the treatment of political parties. When Ayub seized power he promptly banned all political parties, but after a time he was constrained to allow them again. In Burma the Revolutionary Council initially permitted the political parties to continue to function, but sought to unite them in a single party. When this overture was rebuffed, the Revolutionary Council launched its own party - The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) - in July 1962, and moved by stages to eliminate the others; but it was not until 1964 that all the other parties were finally suppressed and Burma became a one-party state.

At that time the Revolutionary Council issued a statement on "The Specific Characteristics of the Burma Socialist Programme Party" designed to clarify its ideological position. It was a curious document, which listed in parallel columns the attitudes of Social Democrats, Communists and the BSPP, and showed that the BSPP fell (or stood) somewhere between the other two.

This ideological background of the Revolutionary Council was important, because it coloured their view not only of economic policy but also of political organization. Ne Win, like Ayub Khan, took a dim view of parliamentary democracy; but whereas Ayub's view about the kind of democracy that was suitable for Pakistan derived from British rule and his army experience, so that his regime of 'Basic Democracy' was unkindly termed the 'Sandhurst Raj', the Revolutionary Council drew upon their experience of the Left-wing Marxist anti-British and anti-Japanese independence movement. According to that ideology a military body was not the proper instrument to run a revolution. Hence the creation of the BSPP. The Revolutionary Council explained in the Party constitution:

> "The Revolutionary Council, forged by peculiar and powerful historical forces, is revolutionary **in essence** but wears the outward garb of a military council. This the Revolutionary Council deems undesirable. The Revolutionary Council believes that the natural leader of a revolution should be a revolutionary political party."

The BSPP was launched as a quasi-Marxist cadre party because that was the model with which the Revolutionary Council were familiar. Their comrades in the resistance had organized Communist or Socialist parties on these lines, and the BSPP was to meet them on the same footing. But this was to be a transitional stage. The constitution of the party adopted by the Revolutionary Council on 4 July 1962, bore the description "for the transitional period of its construction", and envisaged the organizational structure of the future National Party thus:

> "When the party construction work is done and the Cadre Party blossoms into the Party of the entire nation,
> a) the leading committees of the Party of all levels shall be elected by popular vote;
> b) lower committees and all Party members shall abide by the directions and decisions of the Central Committee and higher committees that are elected by popular vote;
> c) the minority shall abide by the decisions of the majority; and
> d) there shall be a reciprocal and regular flow of reports between higher and lower Party organizations.
>
> When the National Party has thus been constituted it shall operate on the principle of democratic centralism.
>
> The Revolutionary Council envisages the reorganization of the Party in the future on the principle of democratic centralism."

This transitional constitution retained in the hands of the Revolutionary Council, for an unspecified duration, full control of the Party and all its works. As is usual in a cadre party, a period of probation was prescribed for candidate members - in this case two years - after which, subject to favourable reports, the candidate might be admitted - by the Revolutionary Council - as a full member of the Party. In practice this did not happen. There was no dearth of candidates, but a tiny number of admissions to full membership; many were called but few were chosen. The BSPP consequently developed into a cadre party not unlike the Socialist Party with which several members of the Revolutionary Council were familiar - with a minute central core controlling a much larger circle of candidate members who in turn were active in the various organizations that functioned as "transmission belts". At the end of 1965, it was reported that the number of full members was no more than 20 (as compared with the 17 who constituted the ori-

ginal Revolutionary Council) while the number of candidate members was 99,638, to which was added a further 167,447 classified as "sympathizers" (1).

Beyond declarations of intent to transform the cadre party into a national party, and assertions that military rule was not designed to be permanent, the Revolutionary Council appeared to have no clear idea of the direction in which it was seeking a new framework for the country's future. There was a curious episode in 1968-9 when Ne Win invited 33 political leaders, including U Nu and a number of others whom he had previously ousted and placed in detention, to advise him on the shape of a new constitution. But the suggestions that they produced contained too many of the discarded parliamentary democratic principles to be accepted, and the move towards reconciliation proved completely abortive. Not long afterwards U Nu assumed the active leadership of the opposition to the regime, operating from a headquarters across the Thai border. Ne Win, having failed to find a formula to reconcile his former colleagues, was obliged to go ahead without them, and proceeded to the transformation of the BSPP into a mass party. By this time (1970) the BSPP had expanded somewhat, but was still tightly restricted. It was reported to have 859 full members, 296,471 candidate members and 734,167 registered supporters who had applied to be candidate members.

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THE FIRST step in the development of a mass party was the rapid promotion of a large number of candidate members to full membership. The number promoted by April 1971 was reported as 73,369 - of which 41,921 were members of the armed forces. On this basis a party congress of delegates was convened in June 1971 at which power was allegedly transferred from the Army to the Party. Ne Win declared that although "we are not yet able to hand back power to the people's representatives, we are now able to transfer it as from today to our party, which represents at least a good part of the people of Burma." (2) The Congress elected a Central Committee of 150 (including 120 military officers). The Central Committee elected a new Revolutionary Council of 15, comprising 11 military members of the old Council plus 4 civilians. The Revolutionary Council in turn appointed an 11-man Government, all military, with Ne Win as Prime Minister, with a civilian Consultative Committee of 30 to advise the Revolutionary Council.

The next task was to draw up a new Constitution for the country, and for that purpose a drafting commission was appointed, headed by Brigadier San Yu, general-secretary of the party and Deputy Prime Minister.

Before the drafting commission had produced its proposals, Ne Win took further steps towards civilianization. In 1972 he discharged himself from the Army and ceased to be a General. Twenty of his senior colleagues also shed their rank. At the same time he reconstituted the Government, expanding it from 11 to 15. Two civilians were brought in, 3 ministries were headed by officers, and the other 10 by recently retired officers, - so that the Government remained effectively in the same hands as before, but could now claim to be predominantly civilian.

In this sequence of moves may be seen the pressures that usually act upon a military regime, operating against a background of continuing insurgency, worsening economic conditions, and increasing dissatisfaction of the populace, with an alternative leader in the person of U Nu waiting in the wings. There was also the factor that Ne Win himself did not regard military rule as a natural state of affairs, and presented his coup d'état from the outset as a transitory and provisional arrangement which would lead, not to another return to parliamentary democracy, but to a better system. Consequently, the Revolutionary Council was increasingly conscious, as time passed, of the need to acquire legitimacy. The broadening of the party to a mass base and the civilianization of the Government were steps in that direction. The latter also facilitated the importation of non-military talent, which to judge by past performance was badly needed, while the former assisted the two-way process of relations between government and governed. All this would lead to the establishment of a new constitution for the country, which would secure the desiderata of continuity and stability otherwise lacking after a coup d'état.

A great deal of work was put into the new constitution which ran to three drafts. It was adopted by a referendum which lasted from 15 to 31 December 1973. Out of an electorate of about 14 1/2 million, some 13 1/4 million cast their

votes, and of those, 12 1/2 millions voted in favour of the new constitution. But these figures should be taken in conjunction with another set of statistics relating to the referendum - that the Commission which conducted it lost no fewer than 168 of its own members: 11 killed, 141 captured by insurgents and 16 missing - which gives an indication of the state of the country.

The new constitution came into force on 4 January 1974 (the anniversary of Burma's independence) and the inaugural session of the new People's Assembly convened on 2 March 1974 (the anniversary of the coup d'état) symbolizing the fresh start (3).

General San Yu, the leading figure in the drafting of the constitution gave an exposition of it, addressed to a Burmese audience. He began by explaining that the Revolutionary Council had prepared for the changeover by means of the administrative alterations that it had made in 1972, substituting Party, Workers' and Peasants' representatives for Government officials on the SACs, and establishing People's Courts. Consequently the transition would be effected by the Revolutionary Council handing over its power to the new People's Congress or Assembly, while the SACs at the various levels (State, Division, Township, and Ward or Village) would hand over to the corresponding People's Councils.

He then dealt with the election of representatives to these new bodies. The new constitution prescribed that there would be only one political party - the BSPP. This, according to San Yu, was "to enable the masses to work unitedly in the building of socialism". The Party would choose the candidates in consultation with its affiliated mass organizations. The candidates would then be presented to the electorate "to enable the people to approve or disapprove the candidature or in the latter case to propose their own candidates. Only after such consultations the candidates approved by the majority will be chosen for the elections. After that there will be secret voting - with the electors able to cast their votes for or against even if there is only one candidate. To be elected a candidate would need to secure the votes of more than half the electorate." San Yu emphasised that the constitution was designed for a socialist economic system, although private enterprise which did not imperil that system would be legally permitted to function. He also gave reassurances as to the full citizenship of those who had already qualified, freedom of worship, and equal rights for women.

So much from General San Yu. But there are several other points that call for comment. As compared with the previous constitution the socialist commitment was very much stronger. This was to be seen in the name of the country, which now became the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma". Moreover, there were fewer safeguards of individual rights and liberties. A typical reservation was to be seen in Article 157: "Every citizen shall have freedom of speech, freedom of writing and freedom of publication unless such freedom is contrary to the interests of the working people and to the interest of socialism." At the same time, the elaborate structure of an independent judiciary which was a feature of the old constitution was replaced by the system of people's courts operating under political control.

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THE NEW constitution stressed the religious neutrality which the Revolutionary Council had adopted after ousting U Nu. Whereas one of U Nu's last actions had been to make Buddhism the state religion, much to the discontent of the minorities, the new constitution made no mention of any particular religion. Originally the old constitution recognized "the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority". The new constitution did not even go that far: it referred merely to "the right freely to profess any religion". (Article 156)

Along with the religious controversy, one of the main incentives for the military intervention had been the apparently growing tendency towards separatism on the part of the minority peoples. The old constitution had attempted to meet minority claims by conceding a degree of federalism. It was not granted to all minorities - hence the agitation among the Mons and the Arakanese - and it was probably more on paper than in practice. But the old constitution did embody a right of secession, and distinguished between the powers of the Union Government and the State Governments, to the extent of incorporating a Union Legislative List and a State Legislative List and a further schedule giving a State Revenue List, so

that the States were not only allotted functions but also sources of income.

Nothing of this appeared in the new constitution. The federal element was virtually eliminated. And so far from recognizing the right of secession, it declared precisely the reverse,-e.g. Article 153: "Every citizen has the right to freely use one's language and literature, follow one's customs, culture and traditions and profess the religion he or she believes in. Exercise of this right shall not infringe national solidarity and the socialist social order which are the basic requirements of the entire Union." Unity and solidarity were the keynote. Almost the only trace of federalism was to be found in the division of the country into 7 States and 7 Divisions each of whose representatives in the People's Assembly was to elect one member to the Council of State. An equal number was to be elected from the People's Assembly generally, making a total of 29 members including the Prime Minister.

Elections to the People's Assembly were held after the inauguration of the new constitution in January 1974, and its 450 members convened for their first session in March. They elected the Council of State, who in turn elected U Ne Win as Chairman who thus became President of the Union *ex officio*. The Assembly then elected the Council of Ministers on the nomination of the Council of State. The list of the new Government consisted of 18 names, only three of whom carried military rank. But the Prime Minister (U Sein Win) for one, was a former Army officer. Similarly in the Council of State, only five out of 29 members held military rank, but the distinction for example between the title of the Chairman (U Ne Win) and that of the Secretary (**General** San Yu) was of doubtful significance.

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ARE THERE any conclusions that can be drawn from the Burmese experience? It may be said that the apparent reversion from military to civilian rule was a sham, merely cosmetic, and that realities were not changed by substituting bowler hats- or in this case *gaung baungs* - for peaked caps. But that would underestimate the changes that have been effected. There has undoubtedly been an extension of popular participation, both by the expansion of the BSPP and by the new constitution. Ten years ago Burma was effectively being ruled by the Revolutionary Council through the network of Security and Administration Committees. Since then Workers' and Peasants' Councils have been established and the People's Congress and Councils have been instituted. The Revolutionary Council has given place to a Council of State and a Government which are theoretically responsible to the People's Congress. This represents some change, if it is only from a "garrison state" to a "police state".

What was the motivation? The change was not forced upon the Revolutionary Council since they did not intend the military system to be permanent, even though they had no clear idea of the way they intended it to develop. The second military takeover, unlike the first, was not a caretaker operation, but neither was it designed to last. Nevertheless, the usual pressure on a military regime could be seen to be operating at an early stage. There was pressure for legitimizing the new rulers, for creating a stable and continuing system, for broadening its base among the people, and for infusing fresh talent to cope with the problems confronting the Government.

At the same time, the regime has been committed to policies which run counter to these pressures. Socialism, for example, has been the watchword of the Revolutionary Council and the BSPP, as it is of the new constitution, but that meant sweeping nationalization. To the extent that it resulted in breaking the power of foreign economic interests and the virtual expulsion of the Indian trading community, that policy no doubt commanded popular support. But it is not to be supposed that the adverse effects of that policy on the economy of the country and the standard of living of its people were equally popular. The most efficient of the 22 trading corporations established by the Government was "trading corporation no. 23" - i.e. the black market.

Moreover, the socialism that was professed was a variation of Marxism, in an extremely crude form. In the BSPP statement of its ideology ("The system of correlation of man and his environment") tnere are various intellectual gymnastics designed to reconcile Marxism and Buddhism. U Nu ran into trouble on the religious question, but his successors have made far fewer concessions to Buddhism which is strongly entrenched among the great majority of the popu-

lation. It may be argued that, just as the military were obliged to expand their base and change their uniforms, so the facts of life will oblige the civilianized rulers of Burma to moderate their economic dogmas and come to terms with Buddhism.

There have been signs of growing disaffection. The outburst over the funeral of U Thant was an indication. The repression that followed the seizure of U Thant's body by the students of Rangoon University in December 1974 was reported to have resulted in 15 dead, 81 injured and 2,887 arrests. In addition there was widespread damage to buildings and equipment in various parts of the city. It was significant that the students were supported by monks in considerable numbers. Their treatment under the Ne Win regime has been a good deal less favourable than it was under U Nu, and U Thant was remembered as a very close associate of U Nu when he was a Government official. Similarly, the slogans that were used in the demonstrations expressed political dissatisfaction: "Down with one-party dictatorship"; "Down with the fascist Government". The justification for the Ne Win Government has been progressively eroded. So far from eliminating corruption, it is recognized - by Ne Win himself - to be rife. And as for improving the condition of the people, the saying goes that Burmese socialism has produced a new kind of GNP-"Gross National Poverty". It may be that the departure of Ne Win, which cannot be long delayed, will be the occasion for an alteration of course. He played an important role in the parliamentary regime, and has been the dominant and determining figure in the military regime. There have recently been signs of change: some relaxation of domestic controls, and a departure from the policy of seclusion which for more than a decade virtually cut Burma off from the outside world. This trend may be accelerated by the impact of events in Indo-China. The Burmese Government has been showing more interest in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The growth of external contacts is bound to have internal repercussions. Even during the time when the military regime was not subject to outside influence it felt obliged to civilianize itself. If the barriers are lowered, the process of change is likely to quicken.

Notes and References

1. J. Silverstein, Military Rule in Burma, *Current History*, January 1967.
2. *F.E.E.R. Yearbook*, 1972, p. 112. In 1973, the party was reported to have expanded to 96,701 full members of whom 47,887 were military, with 374,724 candidate members of whom 77,228 were military.
3. See Joseph Silverstein: Change or the Same: The new constitution of Burma in action. *Spectrum*, October 1974.

REGIONAL SECURITY: *The author examines Indonesian attitudes to territorial security, and analyzes how, by extension, these may affect efforts to create regional security groupings in the area.*

Indonesia's National Security: Problems and Strategy

Justus M. van der Kroef

COMMENTING early in April 1975 on developments in Indo-China and on the ascendancy of Communist power there, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared that it was the "national resilience" of Indo-China's neighbours, i.e. the members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), that was now playing an important role in maintaining the stability of the region. Answering questions from newsmen in Jakarta on possible threats to South-east Asia resulting from the Communist advance, Malik emphasized that "the most important thing for Indonesia" now is, again, "to step up her national resilience", and, speaking about Thailand and its proximity to Communist-dominated Cambodia, Malik said that he thought the Thai Government should prepare its people so as not to become influenced by the Communists (1).

These remarks were not merely expressions of concern about the present condition of Indo-China as felt in Indonesia — a concern well understood by the US (in his address to the US Congress on 10 April President Gerald Ford said that he had scheduled meetings with Indonesia and other Asian powers, because the US had to face the fact that "what has happened in Indo-China has disquieted many of our friends") (2). But rather to those familiar with Indonesia's strategic vocabulary, in which the concept of "national resilience" has a distinctive meaning, Malik's reaction seemed to reaffirm the basic pattern of Indonesia's security strategy and foreign policy. As the largest, most populous and most resource-rich South-east Asian country, Indonesia's strategic and security concerns need to be better understood. The following pages will focus, first, on some key strategic assumptions and concepts of the Jakarta Government today, and, secondly, attempt to relate them to its present regional and Asian outlook.

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THE cornerstone of Indonesia's present national security strategy consists of two assumptions. The first is that South-east Asia will continue to be subjected to the competitive and potentially debilitating influence (be it in varying degrees) of the major Powers, and that a total "neutralization" of the region as endorsed by the ASEAN nations, while desirable as a policy ideal, perhaps, and even if acknowledged by others, will not automatically guarantee an end to direct or indirect super-Power gambits. Secondly, to meet effectively the pattern of these external pressures and the destabilizing domestic effects they may produce, it will be necessary to adopt a flexible and non-threatening defence and foreign policy posture.

Such a posture would not be predicated on near isolation from foreign influences (as Burma, for example, attempted until recently). Rather, it would recognize what some students have called the big Powers' right of "access" to or "interpenetration" of the region (3). In-

donesia's and South-east Asia's "permeability" thus would provide a limited, carefully balanced "access" to various commercial and development interests of the Powers, along with certain cultural and educational services. But this "access" would be without any (or, at least, without a too blatant) military relationship with one of the principal Powers, so as to preserve the formality, if not much of the substance, of that "non-alignment" and/or "independence" (some would say "neutrality") in international affairs that has, for so long, been an official principle of Indonesian foreign policy.

It must be stressed that "permeability" in a region that is subjected to continuing major Power influences and rivalries, does not mean defencelessness, however. In the later Sukarno years, particularly from 1960–65, Indonesia followed a militant course of diplomatic and limited military "confrontation", first to acquire Dutch-held Irian Jaya (West New Guinea), and later against Malaysia. This militancy, in tandem with People's China and other Asian Communist States, and accompanied by Indonesian Communist infiltration in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and even India, seemed designed to establish an ultimate "Greater Indonesian" hegemony over a part of the South-east Asian region (4). Since the advent of President Suharto, this regional aggressiveness has been abandoned in favour of a non-threatening, cooperative policy with Indonesia's neighbours, but which proceeds all the same from a position of national strength. Such strength is seen to lie in heightened national morale, accelerated economic development to meet rising popular aspirations, a distinctive cultural identity, and, not least, in preserving domestic political stability. One may hypothesize, *inter alia,* that the Indonesian guerrilla experience during the revolutionary war against the Dutch and, subsequently, in the effective confrontation of a Communist guerrilla insurgency along the Sarawak-Indonesian border in Kalimantan (Borneo), has exerted its influence on this conception of strategic national strength. General Abdul Haris Nasution, Indonesia's senior soldier, in his seminal book on guerrilla warfare, stresses appropriately the necessarily total participation of a people in modern warfare, including unconventional military tactics (5).

The doctrine of "national resilience" **(ketahanan nasional),** a key element in Indonesia's national security strategy today, reflects these concerns and experiences. As in the case of guerrilla warfare, "national resilience" makes allowance for possible alien penetration into the defending national structure. But there is a difference, also. Such penetration (unlike that encountered in guerrilla warfare) is not necessarily of a military nature, however, but in today's South-east Asia may have a primarily political or economic character. Given the realities of big Power rivalries (and, again, in keeping with guerrilla tactics) it may be necessary to accomodate such external pressures through appropriate mechanisms of "accessibility" and "permeability," just as the guerrilla would trade territory for time. But the guerrilla's ultimate strength is his morale, i.e. his "resilience". At the same time the guerrilla himself is not aggressive (in the sense of seeking control outside his national territory) though he may well be assisted from abroad. Rather, it is the external force, whatever its current diplomatic or economic shape in the South-east Asian world, that is or may be made to appear so.

Ketahanan nasional, therefore, implies maximum self-help and self-reliance, which, in practice, means, however, not rejection of all trade or aid, but, in the first place, rejection of a strategic dependence on a foreign power for military protection, not just in terms of modern weaponry but also, and perhaps more importantly, through the presence of foreign military bases, or through entangling collective security arrangements that may appear to be threatening to others. One top-ranking Indonesian military commander and former deputy Minister for Security and Defence has noted that **ketahanan nasional** is based on the following: "an inward-looking orientation"; an "effort to secure our own national identity" in the face of changing circumstances; an improvement in relations with all nations; and a "non-aggressive and non-belligerent attitude" (6). Other Indonesian commentators on national resilience have stressed the "human quality and the type of education and training required to fill the empty cells in national development". This, too, includes "institution-building to engender the psychological climate" necessary for the "financing" of national growth, and for an effective "strategy" with which to mobilize and use all "indigenous resources". This process, however, is considered quite reconcilable with "foreign participation" in Indonesia's develop-

ment and with a recognition of "greater international interdependence" in today's world economy (7).

Still, such "foreign participation" and recognition of "interdependence", dictated by the strategic necessity of "permeability", must fall short of a formal Indonesian identification with a military power bloc. Articulators of **Ketahanan nasional** walk a tight rope between the domestic accomodation of external political and economic pressure and influence, and resistance to such accomodation because of their consciousness of or pride in national self-reliance. The significance of the national ideology of Indonesia, the so-called "Pantjasila" or "five pillars" of the State (which include belief in God, nationalism, democracy, social justice, and humanism or internationalism) is generally held to be pivotal for the development of "resilience" among most Indonesian writers. Yet, on occasions, these commentators have also stressed the danger in making "national resilience" into a mere ideology, so that the nation is lulled into false confidence because of the existence or popular espousal of a national ideological creed, while, in fact, national political and economic dependence on other nations continues (8). Such a state of affairs, in the view of some Indonesian analysts, existed in the later Sukarno years, when a plethora of ideological symbols, all presumably reflecting Indonesia's national strength and identity, were being formulated, while in reality Jakarta's policies seemed to move primarily toward an increasing interdependence with Peking, and while diplomatic and economic relations with virtually all the other principal power centres including the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan cooled noticeably.

Some Indonesian writers, interpreting President Suharto's own views on "national resilience", have emphasized that "security and calm are essential for the improvement of the economic situation and the implementation of development (9). However, the interlocking of political stability and economic growth as prerequisites for "resilience", a view apparently shared by a number of Indonesian Army commanders, presents the country with some particularly difficult problems. The Sukarno era was one of considerable ideological indoctrination and control of public opinion. But also today, even among supporters of the present Suharto style of government, there is considerable disquiet over direct and indirect official pressure on the press and over the limited extent to which partisan political views can be freely expressed. Moreover, the problem of the thousands arrested for complicity in the 1965 coup, or for prior or subsequent Communist and subversive activity, continues to cloud Jakarta's international image, despite official claims that those being held are not "political" offenders, but that they are being held for trial or rehabilitation on grounds of other violations of the criminal law.

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THE significant strides forward being made by the Suharto Government in economic stabilization and growth, certainly compared to the chaos of the Sukarno years, have been widely noted. But not just on the Left, disturbing questions continue to be raised today as to whether the reconstruction of the Indonesian economy, undertaken with the aid of huge injections of foreign capital and development loans, necessarily has brought commensurate benefit to the mass of Indonesians (10). News of the recent financial troubles of Indonesia's Pertamina oil corporation, resulting from improper short term borrowing and a default of US $2 billion on its debts, rightly or wrongly has fed widespread popular suspicion about the questionable management practices of the political and military elite.

One can readily agree that all these problems are certainly not unique to Indonesia, and that, on balance, the Suharto era has witnessed a considerable economic improvement over the nearly catastrophic deterioration experienced during the Sukarno years. The point is that Indonesia's development difficulties have already had adverse affects on its political stability and therefore on its "national resilience". The root cause of the demonstrations in Jakarta in mid-January 1974, on the occasion of the visit of Japanese premier Kakuei Tanaka, was discontent with the economic policies of the Suharto regime which allegedly seemed to benefit foreign economic interests and their local ancillaries at the expense of the mass of Indonesians. As early as November 1973, the Jakarta press had noted the simmering popular discontent beneath the relatively undisturbed surface of public life, attributing the popular restiveness to the fact

that "poverty is still a main characteristic feature of our people", while at the same time "a small group" lives "extravagantly" (11). Fortunately, the January 1974 disturbances have impelled significant structural reforms, both in the economic and the policy making apparatus, and recent observers of the Indonesian political economy speak of a "changing tide" (12). There remains, however, the recent example of Thailand, where a wave of demonstrations ultimately culminated in October 1973 in the toppling of the Government of premier Thanom Kittikachorn.

Finding the particular governing style which will accomodate both a restless, young, reform minded Indonesian electorate, and at the same time stabilize the domestic political scene so that "national resilience" can be developed, is also rendered more complex since Indonesia's military have an acknowledged **dwi-fungsi** ("dual function"), being, in the words of General Nasution, "a military force as well as a social force" (13), and thus having an acknowledged role in all phases of government, social services and the direction of the economy. Much of the persistent (if muted!) domestic criticism of the Suharto regime involves just this role of the military outside formal defence matters, and it is clear that **ketahanan nasional** as a strategic principle or ideal may ultimately depend on the extent to which political accomodation of Indonesia's military establishment continues to be accepted and legitimized.

Meanwhile, some (but by no means all!) Indonesian officials and commentators look upon "resilience" not merely as a domestic requirement but, indeed, as something of a strategic norm for the entire South-east Asian region as well. There is no unanimity on the meaning of this "regional resilience", not least because of Jakarta's own awareness of its neighbours' sensitivities. However, "regional resilience" has come to be used as the springboard for a concept of common ASEAN defence. As early as the middle of 1973, for example, Indonesian Defence and Security Minister General Maraden Panggabean declared the stability and safety of the South-east Asian region to be dependent on development of individual national resiliences as an apparent foundation for what he termed a "regional resilience" based on "common views" for a "common stand and action in South-east Asia". By the end of 1974 Panggabean's cautious generalizations had moved to an advocacy of common "regional defence policies", and he added that the ASEAN context could be used to determine whether regional co-operation might be "oriented" toward "building up regional resilience" presumably in a strategic sense. Panggabean now perceived such "regional resilience" to be more than just the sum total of individual national resiliences. Rather, "regional resilience", in his view, seems to proceed from the development by each national South-east Asian security system of "a similar framework" for regional defense (14). This would suggest that, as a component of its own "national resilience", individual ASEAN members plan to contribute to regional defence, but just how such planning would be co-ordinated in a common "framework" remains to be explained.

The reason for Panggabean's caution and his admittedly vague formulations is obvious: a "SEATO-izing" of ASEAN, in the sense of creating a regional mutual defence treaty is, given the present delicate stage of South-east Asian nations' efforts to redefine their relationships with the US, USSR and People's China, and given, certainly Indonesia's long standing formal opposition to the conclusion of military pacts, hardly possible. Indeed, Panggabean himself, as early as April, 1972, during an Australian visit, had said that in the present world situation, with its wars of national liberation, formal military pacts among nations were no longer useful (15). This remark is perhaps noteworthy also for its appreciation of the tactical dimensions of guerrilla or people's war and the means to counter it, an appreciation which, as has been suggested, may well have influenced the doctrine of "national resilience". That despite all such constraints there remains considerable interest in ASEAN military circles in moving toward a common defence "framework" is perhaps as significant as the developing pattern of actual informal military consultations among the ASEAN members, as well as more formal, if limited, military co-operation in such areas as border security operations (e.g. between Thailand and Malaysia, or Indonesia and Malaysia).

Indonesian commentators on regional resilience have stressed, however, that, as an extension of individual national resiliences, even regional resilience remains, essentially, "an inward-looking defence orientation", though not

excluding *ad hoc* co-operation in "specific defence ventures" (16). South-east Asia's "permeability" to foreign pressures and to political and commercial penetration must be harmonized with (and indeed must be made to stimulate) the region's "economic and socio-cultural strengths", which, in the words of Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, "form the necessary basis for subsequent strength in over fields" (17). The Communist ascendancy in Indo-China, as indicated earlier, has elicited Indonesian reactions that the country must "step up her national resilience to meet the crisis", and that the inevitable "incentive to the subversive elements in South-east Asia" must be met not only by "raising our identity and national endurance", but also by increased unity and co-operation among the ASEAN member nations (18).

Regional resilience, then, seems to be but Indonesia's **ketahanan nasional** writ large. The difficulties of consistent implementation are obvious if one puts side by side, for example, Indonesia's formal aversion to any military pacts, and Thailand's and the Philippines' adherence to SEATO, the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, Malaysia's and Singapore's unwillingness to abandon the vestiges of the Five Power Commonwealth Defence Agreements, and so on. But regional resilience, like its national Indonesian counterpart, it may perhaps be suggested, must reflect the flexible, pragmatic, but high morale-oriented character of *guerrilla* or people's war. In the end, the variable tools and structures of defence (including treaty arrangments retained for their politico-psychological as much as for their military value), however makeshift and paradoxical they may seem, are less important than the zeal and dedication with which they are utilized. In this context Indonesia's urging of "regional resilience", obviously making allowance for the individual national variables remaining in bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements is in keeping with the pragmatic, flexible approach to their security currently being demonstrated by the ASEAN States and described elsewhere (19). Again, care must be taken, as Indonesian strategists see it, that this regional resiliency, which is also "inward-looking" (in the words of General Sumitro) and concerned with public dedication, political stability, and economic growth, and capable not of **excluding** but of **absorbing** and **neutralizing** potentially hostile pressures in the region, is not considered to be threatening to the interests of the major Powers. The well worn metaphor of the rice stalk or the young bamooo, bending with but not breaking in the wind, and having sufficient "resilience" to straighten itself after the gale has blown itself out, also suggests itself here.

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"RESILIENCE", in the perception of Indonesian strategists, requires effective strategic control over territory and resources, whatever the concessions made to others in the interests of "permeability". The Indonesian concept of **wawasan nusantara,** and its tactical implications, is designed to meet this strategic need. **Wawasan nusantara** in usually translated as "archipelago or island territoriality", from the Sanskrit root term *wawas* ("to observe" comprehensively in a *tour d'horizon* fashion), and *nusantara* or "island world". Some Indonesian commentators relate *nusantara* to or derive it from the Sanaskrit term *dwipantara,* meaning the "island world between", i.e. between (in ancient times) the "continents" of India and China, but, today, and also denoting the strategic significance of Indonesia's geographical position, as the island world between the continents of Asia and Australia and between two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific (20).

Commonly, **wawasan nusantara** has come to be translated as "the archipelago principle". **Wawasan nusantara** has several practical implications. The most important, perhaps, is that it declares all the waterways between the more than 13,000 islands of the Indonesian archipelago to be part of the Republic's national territory. The straits, channels, and inland seas between and among the "island world" of the Indonesian Republic thus cease to be extra-territorial in the international legal sense of the word. In the strategic sense, the whole Indonesian entity of land and water thus falls within the scope of another Indonesian military concept of some years standing, namely the concept of "Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management". The latter concept, originally developed during the late 1950s, reflected the provincial unrest and secessionism that plagued the Indonesian Republic at that time and, as a harbinger of **ketahanan nasional,** and as a strategy to meet the crisis, stressed the necessity of developing economic and political stability, a sense of national dedication, as well as the

Army's close involvement in public works construction and public service for the benefit of civilians (the Army's "civic mission") (21). The latter presumably was also in accord with the **dwi-fungsi** idea and the military's special role as "a social force".

Thus a highly motivated military establishment, integrated with the civilian population to whom it has demonstrated its friendly readiness to service in civic improvement, could and can provide not just national strength and "resilience" but a territorial compactness and "territorial managment" of strategic and logistical resources. Vice Marshal Soedarmono, of the Indonesian Defence and Security Ministry, declared at the end of February 1975 in Jakarta that the "archipelago principle" could best unify Indonesia "in the social, economic, defence and security sectors", adding that Indonesia had "long been employing the archipelago principle" in her national planning strategies (22). In connection with the latter assertion it is to be noted that during much of the colonial period, indeed deep into the present century an **international** rather than a **national territorial** perception of the seas and waterways within the Indonesian archipelago formally tended to predominate, although, on a *de facto* basis, and especially during World War II, strategic interests impelled the Government towards application of the "archipelago principle".

On 13 December 1957, the Indonesian Government first officially announced the **wawasan nusantara** idea, claiming "all islands and the seas in between" of Indonesia to be "one total unit", and on 18 February 1960 a Government act reaffirmed this principle, along with the right of "innocent passage" for foreign vessels, subject to regulation (23). These developments came in the course of secessionist movements on Sumatra, Sulawesi (Celebes) and other islands suspected of being aided by foreign sources. During the 1960s covert seaborne infiltration actions against Dutch-held Irian Jaya (West New Guinea), the confrontation against Malaysia, and later, the need to stop seaborne supplies to Chinese Communist insurgents in Sarawak and along the Sarawak-Indonesian border, further accentuated the need for closer control of Indonesia's internal waterways.

In May 1974, the commander of Indonesia's Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, Admiral Sudomo, noted that Indonesia was facing problems of smuggling (including, according to official Indonesian sources, the smuggling of Chinese into Indonesia from the Chinese mainland), poaching by foreign fishing vessels, acts of piracy, and the illegal passage of foreign warships through Indonesian waters (24). In early February 1975, all foreign fishing vessels were barred from entering the waters of the Maluku islands and of Irian Jaya, and a number of Taiwanese and Japanese trawlers were reported to have been captured recently (25). In both Irian Jaya and on the island of Seran and others in the Maluku group, there have reportedly been anti-Government guerrilla resistance movements operating.

Effective national resilience and "territorial management" both require comprehensive strategic control of land and waterways, never more so than in an internationally "permeable" system. And from this perspective Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik was not exaggerating when he declared last year that the **wawasan nusantara** concept "is life or death for us" (26). At the third United Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea, held from June until August 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela, the Indonesian delegation on much publicized personal instructions from President Suharto, made strenuous efforts to win general endorsement of the archipelago principle, preceded by individual Indonesian "task force" missions to the US, USSR and other countries. There were substantial differences of opinion on the archipelago question at the Caracas conference (27). And while some Indonesian press and official comment tended to suggest that there was widespread support, even from the major Powers, for the archipelago concept, in reality unqualified adhesion tended to come mainly either from States with little direct interest in the matter (e.g. such African States as Nigeria, Zambia and Senegal), or from other archipelago states (like Fiji, the Philippines, and some Caribbean nations), while among the major Powers only People's China seemed wholly sympathetic. The US and USSR reportedly were particularly concerned with the rights of archipelagic passage of their warships, and Japan with the fishing rights of its trawlers (28).

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WITH the international race for oil, the whole archipelago question, moreover, has become interlocked with the problem of off-shore and continental shelf exploration rights. Indonesia's very considerable off-shore oil reserves, still being surveyed and only barely tapped, add a significant, new strategic dimension not just to the **wawasan nusantara** idea but to the concept of effective "territorial management" as well. Strains with Indonesia's immediate ASEAN neighbours may also develop in this connection. For example, there has been concern in Malaysia regarding the effects of the "archipelago principle" on the waters separating West and East Malaysia, and, while President Suharto has assured the Kuala Lumpur Government that Indonesia would never interfere with shipping between the two parts of Malaysia, the fact is that numbers of small Indonesian owned islands in the South China Sea might well provide a basis for such intervention if there were a consistent application of the **wawasan nusantara** concept. Singapore, so heavily dependent on transit shipping and docking facilities for international carriers, "cannot be too pleased with the concept either" (29). At least as regards Indonesia's neighbours, the "archipelago principle" will then require expecially careful application, remembering that only a decade ago Malaysian-Indonesian relations were still severely strained.

On the other hand, such Indonesian restraint in the application of **wawasan nusantara** has already become apparent in the controversy over navigation through the Malacca Straits. While guaranteeing "innocent passage" to foreign vessels, the Indonesian position remains that the Straits are "the national territorial waters of its coastal countries" (30). The navigational problems posed by supertankers and the repeated passage of warships through the Straits without formal notification to the territorial Powers involved, may heighten tensions to the point that eventually makes super-Power acceptance of the "archipelago principle" wholly impossible. More than 4,000 oil tankers a year now go through the Straits, and a hundred times as many vessels of less than 75 tons annually use the Straits in coastal trade (not counting the numerous, even smaller, fishing craft). (31)

The strategic problems posed by so "permeable" a territorial concept as is inherent in **wawasan nusantara** - a myriad of waterways affording so many conduits of potential threats to national security - again underscores the importance for Indonesia of the rationale of guerrilla style "resilience". Just as the international big Power realities in South-east Asia require Indonesia to be diplomatically and economically "accessible", so the geographic realities of archipelago existence suggest a similar security vulnerability. **Wawasan nusantara,** like **ketahanan nasional,** therefore, implies a readiness to meet and "territorially manage" external pressures and subversion by a government based on a highly motivated, potentially stable, but non-aggressive population entity, inhabiting - despite the communications and logistical problems of island existence - a compact, administratively close-knit, national territory.

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THUS far our emphasis has been on what may perhaps be called Indonesia's strategically "absorptive" needs, i.e. her necessary capacity, despite inevitable diplomatic and geographic "permeability", to withstand and effectively neutralize potential or actual destabilizing influences coming into or already within her national defence perimeters. But Indonesian defense policy is not based on an isolationist, if resilient, "fortress Indonesia" concept. An active, diplomatic outreach by Indonesia into the the Asian region and beyond is considered necessary, not only because of the increasing global interdependence in development capital, marketing and commodity trade, but also because it directly enhances her territorial defence capability.

At the outset it should be emphasized, again, however, that formal military pacts or collective defence arrangements are excluded from this regional strategic outreach. As early as 16 August 1969, in his elaboration of the national resilience concept President Suharto declared in fact that military treaties would actually weaken "national resilience and identity" and hence would be ineffective, while commentators on the "territorial" defence concept have noted that defence treaties with other powers usually put the weaker power at the mercy of the industrially and technologically advanced partner, draining wealth away for arms purchases, creating a technological-military elite divorced by its assets from the mass of society, and so

generally undermining the development of high national morale and integrated leadership between the military and the civilian population. On 24 April 1975 Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik supported the idea of phasing out US military bases in the Philippines and Thailand, because, he said, "military bases of other countries in a nation always create suspicion". Malik was commenting on a statement by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos that his Government would make a serious "reassessment" of its security relations with the US (32).

On the other hand, short of a formal military defence pact, Indonesian policy does not appear to be averse to an increased integration or "compactness" in a military sense too in the ASEAN region, and exploration beyond ASEAN of trilateral or quadrilateral "groupings" with possible strategic implications. Earlier this year President Suharto, carefully choosing his words, in an address to the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary meeting at Jakarta, expressed the view that "long term" ASEAN co-operation should be developed not only in the "economic, social and cultural fields", but also in "still wider form", thus planting a "healthy seed" for what he termed "the growth of regional resistance" (33).

It is difficult to interpret the concept of "regional resistance" in other than strategic military terms. Although what Indonesians desire in this respect, at least at present, will, as already suggested, fall well short of a "threatening", multilateral defence treaty. In the present era Asian nations are experimenting with just such forms of implied or informal mutual security protection that do not necessarily place these nations unequivocally in a condition of total military or diplomatic dependence on another power. The Indian-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 apparently provides India with strategic assurances, while, at the same time, according to Indian commentators allowing for Soviet recognition of India's "non-aligned" foreign policy, and precluding formation of alliances directed against the other party (34). Whether the "security without alignment" treaty formula can be applied elsewhere in Asia remains to be seen. But some such arrangement, not just or necessarily with the super-Powers (indeed specifically excluding them!), may well begin to hold particular appeal as the diplomatic and strategic shockwaves of the Communist dominance in Indo-China begin to make themselves felt. The interest of prominent Indonesians in new "groupings" is therefore understandable.

In March 1974, following discussions between Indonesian and Australian foreign affairs officials in Jakarta, the Indonesian press reported that the two countries had "agreed in principle" on the formation of a new four power regional "grouping" (Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea) as had been suggested earlier by the New Zealand prime minister (35). It was not made apparent just what purpose this quadrilateral arrangement could achieve, that is not now attainable through existing, bilateral, diplomatic, military or other programmes among the four countries concerned. Nor was the relationship of such a "grouping" to other new organizational arrangements in the Asian-Pacific region, suggested earlier by Australian premier E.G. Whitlam and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, explained.

Then there has been Indonesian interest in a possible co-operative venture between Indonesia (as ASEAN's largest State), Japan and Australia in what has been called "the Asia-Pacific Triangle" (36). Such a relationship, in the view of some observers, would provide recognition of the fact that the commercial and investment economies of Indonesia, Japan, and Australia are already far more extensively interlocked than are those of the members of ASEAN, and would, also perhaps, assist in the formation of a larger Asian-Pacific association of states, free from direct dependence on powers external to the region (37).

What will become of these proposals remains to be seen. But one can perhaps suggest that the implications of the "Triangle" co-operation may well be far reaching. One of the principal Indonesian advocates of the "Triangle" concept, Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, deputy chief of the Indonesian State intelligence agency (BAKIN) and one of his country's top strategists, in an assessment of Asian-Pacific security questions made during the Indonesia-Japan conference held in Tokyo in Novemeber, 1974, called for a redefinition on the part of the countries of the region, of the threats to their security (38). Murtopo criticized old collective security ar-

rangements (like ANZUS and SEATO) on the grounds that they had an oversimplified threat perception, focused on a supposedly unified Communist international movement, and on armed invasion or subversion and infiltration. The emphasis on military defence had clouded security perceptions, according to Murtopo. This was not to say, he added, that the threat of subversion or insurgency did not exist in the region, or that the military aspect of security was of no importance - far from it (in fact, in the aftermath of the Indo-China debacle, Murtopo, on 18 April 1975, warned of the possibility of "expanding local activities" of the Communist underground among Indo-China's neighbours). Rather, Murtopo asserted, it was time to shift emphasis from military to non-military strategic questions, to shift particularly to the field of science and technology. Co-operation among the Asian-Pacific nations in new, non-military fields could be fostered, regardless of these nations' political or social systems.

On other occasions Murtopo has sounded similar themes, stressing the various "spirals of crisis" now confronting the world, e.g. in energy, food production, and the like. Then, too, speaking in Strasbourg on 29 April 1975, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik emphasized the necessity for a new co-operation among nations "in facing the task of international development", and pointed to the "vigorous reality" of the ASEAN framework as ideal in fostering the co-operation of the South-east Asian region with the industrially advanced nations.

Co-operation in a larger Asian-Pacific context, focused on common non-military strategic concerns, such as the food and energy crises, affords Indonesia a double policy opportunity. First, in a new international resource race, Indonesia, with her oil, has not insignificant strategic assets in building up a larger regional defence parameter: she will not necessarily have to be a "dependent" partner in any larger "grouping" of nations. Secondly, as Murtopo has indicated, "the current world economy truly forms a giant laboratory where unprecedented economic-financial experiments are being conducted" (39), and erstwhile political alliances and hostilities are increasingly being modified by new international structures and co-operative ventures (e.g. US-Soviet-Japanese co-operation in the exploitation of Siberia's natural gas resources). Indonesia's oil assets have begun to assist her in a foreign policy reorientation, away from her heavy dependence on the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), the consortium of the US, West European nations and Japan, that has been pumping millions of dollars in aid and credits into Indonesia. Unlike Jakarta's relative aloofness in the past, there is now a decided new Indonesian interest to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, and a reciprocal Communist willingness to assist in a broad range of development projects, from shipbuilding to electric power (40). In the international politics of commodity allocation and resource interdependence, a wider Asian-Pacific "grouping" offers Indonesia an outreach to major powers like the USSR and perhpas, even to People's China, signifying a non-threatening and "permeable" policy which need not conflict with the "resiliency" and "territorial management" strategies practised within her own frontiers.

But the apparent new interest which Indonesia is currently displaying in warming commercial and aid relations with the USSR and in such favourite Soviet schemes as the Asian collective security arrangment proposed by party secretary Leonid Brezhnev (41), in no way precludes continuing low profile bilateral military assistance agreements with the US or Australia. The supple pragmatism of larger "groupings" is not one-sided: it extends to the US and her treaty allies as readily as to the Soviet bloc or to other nations. Indonesia's regional concerns, whether among her ASEAN neighbours or in possibly larger units, is, therefore, perhaps more of an effort at diplomatic image-building than a directly effective security gambit. This is not to disparage the role which suggestions of larger regional co-operation can play in demonstrating a nation's policy flexibility, and therefore its readiness to respond to the interests of various Powers. It is to suggest, however, that the cornerstone of Indonesia's security system remains the doctrine of self-reliance and self-help, and the efficient "management" of her national territory, whether land or water. These policy themes have been summarized best, perhaps, by another recent comment by Adam Malik on the effects on the rest of South-east Asia of the Communist rise in Indo-

China, and since this article began with one quote from Indonesia's able Foreign Minister, it seems appropriate to end with another (42). Declining to see now-dominant Communist power in Vietnam as necessarily imperialistic and, expressing the hope that a Communist Indo-China "with its own identity" could co-exist peacefully along with the ASEAN powers in the region so as to present an effective front to big power influence, Malik again struck the theme of the need for national resilience. For Indonesia itself there must be economic progress, he said, a meeting of people's material needs, but also a strengthening of "the people's conviction" in the Pantjasila, the national ideology of Indonesia, which, as has been suggested above, is perceived in official Indonesian circles as the pivot of **ketahanan nasional.** How to balance development of national self-reliance and resilience in domestic affairs, with a pragmatic "permeability" also toward the Communist powers in foreign affairs, would appear to be the likely matrix of Indonesian security strategies in the future.

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COUNTER–INSURGENCY: *The author provides a historical analysis of the various counter-insurgency methods employed in South Vietnam from 1954 until the fall of Saigon: "Regretably for South Vietnam, and those countries and peoples which oppose aggression, Hanoi's callous determination to push the war to the bitter end no matter what cost to the Vietnamese, North and South, finally won through. And in their plans they had South Vietnam's irreconcilable contradictions and the Americans' mistakes to help them."*

South Vietnam: Pacification Denied

Lawrence E. Grinter

WHAT happened this spring in South Vietnam may not be adequately understood, if at all, for many years. The collapse shocked the world. Until shortly after the January 1973 Vietnam accords, the American Government's intelligence and operational communities were generally convinced—and I believe they were right— that South Vietnam was stronger, more stable, better defended and better led than at any time since independence in June 1954. Hanoi concurred in this assessment (1). And closely related to the country's progress over the previous five or six years had been its increasingly effective territorial security and pacification programmes which, while full of defects, nevertheless had brought a significant degree of security and development to at least 90 per cent of the people. But throughout 1973 and 1974, with Hanoi taking incessant advantage of the unenforceable peace accords, and with the South's growing inability to defend itself because of declining American aid and Communist violations, the pacification and territorial security efforts slackened.

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THIS article records the history of the struggle to devise a successful pacification and development strategy in South Vietnam. The paper argues that until the long slide began in 1974 culminating in the 1975 *debacle*, the Saigon Government's efforts to bring protection to a vast majority of the people were succeeding well. So well, in fact, that the Viet Cong (the Southern Vietnamese Communist insurgent apparatus controlled by Hanoi since the early 1960s) had been reduced to an almost meaningless guerrilla remnant saved from extinction only by the North Vietnamese Army. So what happened? The answer is that the Thieu Government, despite its remarkable provision of day-by-day security to the population, had never been able to fashion a **political community** in South Vietnam,—one that could bind the population into a mutually reinforcing and beneficial relationship with the government and the soldiers. The social and political fractures in South Vietnam, apparent well before the French left, had not been overcome. Consequently when the Army cracked, and in numerous instances brutalized the people, society disintegrated.

If we keep in mind this notion of political community, it will help clarify why pacification ultimately failed after such marked successes in the early 1970s. From 1954 until about mid-1968 the Government of Vietnam (GVN) response to the Communist challenge in the villages had been a failure. However after the 1968 Tet offensive the Government's fortunes radically changed bringing on the successes of the early 1970s. This was because the Government's pacification approach became more relevant to the Communist challenge, as it sought to involve the people. It also received more priority and was under better

management. These accomplishments had three principal effects: the one-shot military style counter-insurgency efforts of the 1950s and early 1960s stopped, and the long-term protection of the villages was given priority; local self-government and village initiative were encouraged; and an economic redistribution effort (the "Land-to-the-Tiller" programme) began to have very important effects on the majority of the farmers, especially in the Mekong Delta. But to have set the seal on this effort the Thieu Government needed more time, continued military and economic assistance (as Hanoi received) and less pressure. And Hanoi, which judged in late 1971 that it was in danger of losing the war and launched its Easter 1972 offensive (and paid dearly for it), kept up the pressure in 1973 and 1974 despite the so-called peace agreements. Yet, as late as a year ago, Spring 1974, it seemed probable that the Thieu Government would last, provided it received enough arms to defend the country. Then came President Thieu's decision in early March 1975, in the face of steadily mounting North Vietnamese pressure in the Central Highlands and declining US military aid, to abandon Ban Me Thout, followed by Pleiku and Kontum. The rest is well known. What had been a prudent plan, made **inevitable** by the need to conserve ammunition and fuel while trying to defend both population and towns, became a rout as the leadership of II Corps and then I Corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and then the whole armed forces disintegrated and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled in panic.

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WE begin with the definition of pacification that was being used prior to the Spring 1975 disasters, keeping in mind that pacification, to the extent it was successful, had to be ultimately judged on its ability to foster and encourage a **political community** in South Vietnam:

> The military process of establishing sustained local security in the countryside, the political process of establishing and re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the people and the economic and social process of meeting rural people's needs (2).

Thinking of the above process, why did pacification succeed between 1969 and 1973? What was the blend of concepts, programmes, and management that made the difference? And if pacification, as the tapestry around which the Saigon governments might have built a valid political community in South Vietnam, had been made the core element in combating the Communists, could the final *debacle* have been prevented? Let us examine the history of these programmes and see what they tell us about politics, administration and military power in South Vietnam.

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The Geneva Accords, Reconstruction and Civic Action (1954-1955)

THE newly independent Saigon Government began its pacification efforts almost as soon as the Geneva Accords were signed on 21 July 1954. But as in the situation following the 27 January 1973 accords, the fighting had never really stopped. The staggered ceasefire and other curious provisions of the 1954 accords were completely unworkable. And just like its successor organization 19 years later, the earlier International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC) was powerless to enforce the truce (3).

The 1954 ceasefire came to Vietnam amidst chaos. In the southern cities anarchy prevailed as power became scattered among the receding French regime, the weak Vietnamese civil service and the police and army units. In the countryside, feudal and gangster elements, regional *condottiere* and the Viet Minh shared power. Three major non—Communist fiefdoms emerged from the confusion in Cochin China: Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. The government administration was disorganized and unevenly staffed, many Vietnamese agencies having been run directly from Paris. The Vietnamese police numbered slightly less than 10,000 men, the army under General Hinh, about 140,000. Before the new Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, had been in office six months the army mutinied and it took Diem a full year to put down the rebellion.

After the Geneva signing, the Viet Minh began to reconcentrate into southern redoubts prior to what they anticipated would be a temporary transfer to Tonkin (4). About 8,000 special underground cadres stayed behind, intact, in the South (5). Bernard Fall, writing in March 1955,

eight months after the truce, noted that:

> "The southern government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem effectively controls less territory today than any other Vietnamese government since 1948. In fact, long-pacified provinces in South Vietnam are again subject to strong Viet Minh infiltration and in some districts the population openly has recourse to Viet Minh tribunals or administrative officials, whose chances of enforcing a decision are far better than those of local South Vietnamese government authorities." (6)

The South Vietnamese economy was also in serious trouble, being essentially a system of pumps primed from France and the United States. In Cochin China approximately 2 1/2 per cent of the landowners, mostly absentee French and Chinese, owned 45 per cent of the land while three-quarters of the Vietnamese farmers owned only about 15 per cent of the remaining paddies. Land rents in some areas were 60 per cent of the crops, which had to be paid in kind to the landowner (7). The physical scars of the French-Viet Minh war were not as conspicuous below the 17th parallel as above (8). But aggravating the South's problems was the flood of nearly 930,000 northern refugees, 80 per cent of whom were nominally Catholics (9). Close to one million other South Vietnamese had been displaced as a result of the war (10).

Such were the conditions in South Vietham in 1954. Reconstruction commenced with attempts to resettle the refugees. Highlighted by operation "Exodus" and the Cai San project, these efforts were modestly successful although serious problems of food, housing and mismanagement remained (11). The 1955-56 Civic Action pacification programme built on these earlier resettlement efforts, and was planned as a direct political challenge to the Viet Minh in their traditional areas. The programme was influenced by the special US adviser to Diem who had worked with Magsaysay in the Philippines, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale. The Diem—Lansdale plan incorporated:

> "...some of our concepts of winning over the population and instituting a classification of areas by the amount of trouble in each, the amount of control required, and fixing responsibilities between civil and military authorities. With a few changes, this (plan) was issued by President Diem on 31 December 1954 as the National Security Action (Pacification) Directive. . ." (12)

In late 1954 Prime Minister Diem put the first of some 1,300 Civic Action cadres into the field under the supervision of Colonel Lansdale and an energetic ex-Viet Minh cadre, Kieu Cong Cung (13). Heavily staffed with northern and Catholic anti-Communist zealots, by late 1955 about 800 cadres in 80 mobile teams were operating in Cochin Chinese villages (14). Dressed like farmers, the cadres were instructed to live, work and eat with the peasants (the Viet Minh's Tam Cung or "three withs") (15). It has been estimated that at the beginning of 1955, nearly 80 per cent of the civil servants in the country still lived and worked in Saigon. Civic Action was an exception to this, and civil servants accustomed to the better conditions of life in Saigon resisted going to work for the agency. The Province Chiefs also proved to be an obstacle (16).

In the field difficulties also occurred between Vietnamese farmers and the northern, Catholic pacification workers. One of the bitterest episodes occured during the "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign", which the cadres launched in the summer of 1955 (similar to Viet Minh denunciation tactics). The campaign got out of hand and there were reports of recalcitrants being stoned and beaten. In some villages the effort was regarded as carpetbagging (17). American support to the Civic Action effort was inconsistent. In September 1958 US Agency for International Development (USAID) support to the effort was finally stopped (18) as the Agency devolved into a propaganda and intelligence operation run by Diem's closest brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Civic Action never had the support of the Vietnamese bureaucracy, was too small, and was too dependent on American initiative and resources.

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Attempts at State-Building and Social Control (1955-1958)

RECONSTRUCTION and Civic Action were rural efforts. However in those first years Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu were preoccupied with urban problems: battling the rebellious army and the Binh Xuyen gangs for control

of Saigon, taming other separatist elements, and trying to master the administration of government. The control apparatus which Diem and Nhu finally devised was heavily influenced by their ideological precepts, particularly their personalist philosophy, by their desire to build a patriarchical family dynasty, and by the chaotic conditions they encountered. By 1957 their personalist ideological approach to government was beginning to pervade everything: their manipulation of the bureaucracy and other political competition, their attempts to pacify the countryside, and their dealings with the Americans.

To Diem's brother and "political counsellor" Ngo Dinh Nhu, fell the day-to-day tasks of overall administration. At the centre of Nhu's work was the Can Lao Party, a secret coterie of Tonkinese — seldom Cochin Chinese or Annamese —intellectual, labour and refugee interests tied mainly to himself. Incorporating elements of corporate-state and fascist ideology, Nhu's Can Lao (which probably numbered no more than 20,000 members) for a time became the regime's state within the state (19). Designed as a secret intelligence and informer apparatus, it gave Nhu financial and political leverage within the government and business environs. Eventually he tried to spread Can Lao equivalents into all sectors of the society. The National Revolutionary Civil Servants League (NRCSL) brought government employees into line; the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) concentrated on the provinces; the Women's Solidarity Movement (WSM) organized the wives of the civil servants, and for their daughters there was Women's Organization for Military Training (WOMT)-these last two run by Nhu's vitriolic wife, Madam Nhu (20).

This was the emerging system of politics in South Vietnam when, in 1957, the Communist insurgency was reactivated and the GVN began a new pacification effort (21). By 1958 guerrilla activities were no longer hit and run efforts, but an organized assault across the country (22). Co-ordination, although not yet full control, of the southern insurgency was being taken over by North Vietnam (23). In the midst of these deteriorating circumstances Diem and Nhu made a critical decision: instead of continuing to try and bring government influence out of the villages, **where the people lived** (as Civic Action had done), the regime began large scale **removals of the peasants** from their homes, regrouping them into agricultural administrative centres of often questionable conditions and security. Control of the population, rather than development of a political community now became the regime's goal. The start of a growing spiral of mistakes, eventually fatal, had begun.

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The Land Development Centres (1957-1959)

AS Diem and Nhu turned their attention back to the countryside in 1957, concentrating on imbedding the patriarchy into the villages, they recommenced the pacification efforts. Population regroupment was started among the Montagnards in the Central Highlands involving Land Development Centres (LDCs). Partly an extension of the earlier refugee resettlement efforts, the scheme was also a product of the government's land reform policies (24). The LDCs were planned to allow farmers to return to abandoned land; but Diem also saw the centres as devices for "deproletarianizing" the cities by dispersing unstable elements into the mountains. A "human wall" would be forged against Communist infiltration along the Laotian and Cambodian borders (25).

But in practice the scheme was essentially a military relocation operation. USAID committed about US$10 million to the project, and approximately 85,000 settlers were marked for relocation (26). Although it is not known how many of the people who were regrouped into the LDCs actually remained there, many slipped away. Most of the camps were poorly administered and insecure, a number also proved to be economically unfeasible. Communist agents were able to surround some of the settlements and use them as springboards into the coastal lowlands. A Michigan State University advisory team reported:

> "....the tribespeople resent Vietnamese superior airs, Vietnamese attempts to remake them in their own image, Vietnamese grabbing of land and other private property, and general Vietnamese unfairness....It is said that any province chief or other Vietnamese official who gets too soft towards tribespeople, surrounded as he is by them, soon gets removed." (27)

The camps at Pleiku and Ban Me Thout were used as political detention camps under the

supervision of the Army (28). Eventually some of the Land Development Centres became rallying points for the Montagnard separatist movement. Late in 1957, judging the programme to be uneconomic and politically tainted, the US Mission in Saigon suspended its support of the LDCs. It was later discovered that the GVN had failed to match American contributions to the land programme with any funds whatsoever (29). Yet the US suspension did not effectively pressure the Vietnamese. They simply reprogrammed other "indirect" American funds back to the LDC programme through their own channels (30). This sleight-of-hand with American money was to recur.

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The Agglomeration Camps (1959-1960)

IN EARLY 1959, with American support of other GVN resettlement efforts still continuing, and the welfare rationales of the earlier programmes forgotten, Diem and Nhu undertook still another population regroupment, this time with no economic or administrative pretences whatever. By 1959 the Ngos had tamed most internal rivals except the Communists. Casting about for techniques to neutralize growing Viet Cong strength, the Ngos latched onto the Pao Chia village surveillance system which had long been practised in China, used in Meiji Japan, and later employed by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese civil war (31). The Viet Minh had used variants of the Pao Chia system in Tonkin while fighting the French and the Viet Minh's southern remnants had renewed the practice in South Vietnam after 1954 (32). The Ngo regime's adoption of Pao Chia relied on linked, mutually regulated households (Lien Gia). From the village chief down to the hamlet and agglomeration camp leaders and heads of the grouped households, the entire apparatus was appointed. Under Nhu's direction the system was activated by Can Lao and NRM cadres (33).

The regrouping of Vietnamese peasants into agglomeration camps began quietly in the southwest portions of the Mekong Delta in February 1959, under orders from the Nhus' Ministry of Interior:

> "Chiefs of district are ordered discreetly to take up relations with the presidents of village sections of the National Revolutionary Movement, groups of friends, members of the councils of notables of the villages, hamlet chiefs, and with representatives of the population, so that these groups **spontaneously** call for the opening of a conference under the presidence of the chief of district. At these conferences, the policy of the national government will be praised, the policy and actions of the Communists will be condemned, and at the conclusion there will be a demand for the concentration of all Viet Cong families in order to cut their relations with the Communists...It is necessary to execute this concentration immediately." (34)

Pro-communist families were transferred into "regulated zones" (Qui Khu). Other families, those deemed "reliable patriotic and loyal", were regrouped into more secure concentrations known as "regulated hamlets" (Qui Ap). For both types of families the social and economic consequences to the farmers were largely ignored (35). Immediate and bitter reactions set in. In March 1959, after only two months operation, Diem ordered most of the programme to halt. Unable to provide adequate security to the population, unable to explain the camps rationale and paying little attention to the economic and social implications of the resettlements, the scheme died.

> "The regrouped families in the *qui ap* say they have committed no crime and yet they are obliged to be transferred, causing them wrong (sic) for their work and their pocketbooks, etc..
> The propaganda was insufficient. The program of *qui khu* and the *qui ap* was a severe one and from the point of view of implementation there was not enough propaganda to explain it. Even the hamlet chiefs committed the error of telling the population in the *qui ap* that they will never be able to return to their former homes. For this reason, these families are discouraged and long for the things they left behind." (34)

Diem heard out a final assessment of the scheme:

> "...in the *qui khu,* we grouped our enemies and gave them more reason to be against us. In the *qui ap* we grouped our friends without regard for economic and social considerations. We gave them reason to be unhappy with their lot and to turn against us." (37)

But even as this report was being written, Nhu was issuing instructions for a much larger regroupment scheme.

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The Agrovilles (1960-1961)

IN APRIL 1959, while officials were designing still more agglomeration camps, plans were drawn up for a much more ambitious resettlement and development programme known as "Agrovilles" (Khu Tru Mats) (38). Communist harrassment in the countryside was now approaching emergency proportions. Following a secret inspection trip to the South in late 1958, North Vietnam Politburo Member Le Duan had proposed a programme of violence which became the blueprint for the future course of the southern insurgency (39). On 13 May 1959, the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee in Hanoi approved Le Duan's proposals (40). As 1959 ended, Hanoi was taking over the direction of the insurgency (41).

The stepped-up attack took its toll. Landowners, officials, school teachers and health workers, went under, killed at a rate of one hundred a month. Working through the spring of 1959, with a clear premonition that Hanoi was going for a countrywide assault, the Saigon Government began a new national security plan in which the Agrovilles were to be the leading edge. The plan envisioned:

- The regrouping of major population elements into "key rural agrovilles" along the strategic communication routes connecting the major cities—Saigon, Hue, Da Nang, Dalat—and the outlying villages.
- The recruitment of more competent and dedicated local leaders for village administrative posts.
- The improvement of village self-finance.
- The formation of a vigorous youth movement—to combat the rising crescendo of Viet Cong recruitment in the villages—which Nhu took over: the Republican Youth (42).

Primary custody of the Agroville programme again lay within the Interior Ministry, i.e. Ngo Dinh Nhu's police and intelligence agency. On 7 July 1959, amid the anniversary fanfare of the Republic's independence celebration, Diem announced the Agroville programme:

> "....this year I propose to create densely populated settlement areas in the countryside, where conditions are favorable to communication and sanitation and where minimum facilities for the grouping of the farmers living in isolation and destitution in the back country exist." (43)

By the end of 1963 eighty central Agrovilles were to have been completed on former, largely uncultivated, French concessions. A great network of economic and armed rural enclaves averaging about 400 families each, or between 2,000 and 3,000 people, was envisioned. About 500,000 people were to be resettled (44). Officials at the Interior Ministry drilled the provincial chiefs to explain the Agrovilles' purpose thoroughly before uprooting the farmers. But under the pressure to meet Nhu's construction quotas, local officials began a scramble to get the Agrovilles underway. The government fell back on forced-draft corvee labour which, along with the inevitable system of bribes, caused resentment (45). Forced out of their traditional homesteads and often moved onto sites without shade, toilet facilities, or provisions for livestock, the peasants carried the project on their backs. Homes were dismantled and carted off, many simply caving in during the process. Ancestral tombs had to be left behind or, an extreme measure, dug up and moved. The Viet Cong put a special vigour into their anti-Agroville campaign, issuing threats against cadres and assassinating some of them. By the end of 1960, in the eleven chosen provinces only twenty-three of the original eighty Agrovilles were nearing completion. 32,000 out of the 43,000 people who actually moved to the sites stayed; this out of an originally planned total exodus of 500,000 (46).

The Agroville failure demonstrated on a considerably larger scale than the Agglomeration and Land Development schemes why the government's pacification programmes were failing. Imposed on the rural population without any significant attention to their needs and with little administrative or political preparation, the schemes caused serious disruptions to the people. Linkage between the government and the farmers

was one way: a political community was not being forged. But even as the Agroville programme ground to a halt, Nhu later denying that he had approved of it (47), the Political Counsellor had begun looking for better ways to regroup the people. Plans were being laid to regroup or barricade **a majority** of South Vietnam's rural population. The regime was trapped.

* * * * * * *

The Strategic Hamlets (1961-1963)

DESPITE Diem and Nhu's failure to establish a system of government based on effective linkage with the rural population, fundamental changes were occurring in the political and military relationship between South Vietnam and the United States. Heavy US underwriting of the Diem Government and the war effort was about to begin. Diem and Nhu, noting the type of American material which was arriving and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's penchant for figures, bent to impress the Americans with their quantitative achievements. Yet the old unresolved problems remained: Diem and Nhu's resistance to reform and modernization of the armed forces and bureaucracy; divisiveness in GVN and US agencies; no single, relevant concept of pacification; authoritarianism and paranoia in the Saigon Government.

It was also at this point, late 1961, that Ngo Dinh Nhu, to use his own phrase, "stepped out of the shadows" (48). Beginning in late June 1961, there were Vietnamese press announcements of official visits to "tactical" and "strategic" hamlets. Special military pacification operations began in August in War Zone D (49). Yet as the Pentagon Papers commented:

> "(The regime) stoutly resisted the adoption of a single integrated chain of operational command, showed no enthusiasm for detailed planning, continued (its) practice of centralized decision-making (sometimes tantamount to decision pigeonholing) and continued to play off the province chiefs against the generals." (50)

Nhu established an Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMCSH) under his direct and open supervision. American support of Nhu's effort fell primarily to the CIA (51). Nhu sought to explain the scheme:

> "....the system of Strategic Hamlets is a revolutionary system native to underdeveloped countries who have suffered misery and humiliation, divided minds, and Communist subversion." (52)

By fortifying **existing** hamlets, a "continuous front line" of "interdependent" combat villages would be established (53). Nhu apparently concluded that rural Vietnamese could not be "agglomerated" into units of five, ten or twenty thousand people (54). Commenting on previous failures, he said, "Since we did not know where the enemy was ten times we launched a military operation, nine times we missed the Viet Cong, and the tenth time we struck right on the head of the population." (55)

GVN officials began a series of energetic tours of the countryside. Dennis Duncanson, a senior British adviser in Saigon, commented:

> "It would, at the same time, be tactful to give the American Generals an earnest of goodwill and un-flagging determination—the more so because determination was flagging in fact. The whole apparatus of government could do with the impetus of a programme with easily verifiable objects which the simplest minds could comprehend and whose attainment could be ticked off day by day." (56)

Nhu set a goal of stockading approximately 14,000 of the country's 16,000 hamlets over the next fourteen months (57). The technical architects and referees of the hamlet programme, the British, headed by Robert Thompson, argued that only 5 per cent of the initial 11,000 hamlets had to be completely removed to new sites while another 15 per cent would require significant regroupment. About 30 per cent, or 3,300 hamlets, would require considerable internal rearrangement (half the houses regrouped), while 50 per cent, or 5,500, would require only minor changes (58). "Every effort should be made", said Thompson, "to avoid unnecessary movement of houses or construction work..." (59) Yet it was clear that British and American advisers were not fully aware of the coercion, cultural ignorance, and administrative malpractice in the government's previous and current attempts to resettle peasants (60).

Against British advice Diem and Nhu directed

that the first large-scale resettlements should take place in Communist areas in War Zone D just North-west of Saigon. Typical of the problems was "Operation Sunrise", begun on 22 March 1962 in Ben Cat District of Binh Duong Province (61). Despite initial setbacks, by May 1962 Thompson's initial scepticism seems to have turned into a determined optimism:

> "Very great progress has been made over the last six months in establishing strategic hamlets throughout the provinces visited. There are, however, still some gaps both inside the hamlets, in that all the ingredients for their success have not yet been completed." (62)

By March 1963, however, Thompson was less optimistic:

> "If we try to go too fast by extending into the red areas, leaving pockets and salients of Viet Cong behind, we run the grave risks of overreaching ourselves and overcommitting the forces available...." (63)

Despite the looming evidence of disaster, US optimism continued: "(The Strategic Hamlets) can be compared to the Normandy landing... if we fail to provide adequate support or give adequate emphasis to the full development of the strategic hamlets, the war and South East Asia are lost." (64) Nhu drove the hamlet effort along at a frantic pace. Province chiefs were ordered to establish a certain number of hamlets by a given date.

> "And this they did, often failing to provide the people with adequate alternative means of earning money and leaving them in locations so far from their work and markets that the transportation costs were prohibitive. The inhabitants of the hamlet were not ...protected against terror within or guarded against terror from outside." (65)

> "If you stand still long enough down there," remarked an American eyewitness, "they'll throw a piece of barbed wire around you and call you a strategic hamlet." (66)

In December 1962, official statistics put the number of planned hamlets at 5,000 enclosing over 7,000,000 people; by the end of 1963 there were to be 12,000 hamlets enclosing over 13,000,000 people. Yet most of it was a statistical illusion (67). But these difficulties were soon dwarfed by the political chaos in Saigon, the overthrow and execution of Diem and Nhu by the Generals, and the collapse of the war effort.

* * * * * *

The Search for a New Pacification Strategy: Hop Tac, Chien Thang, and the New Life Hamlets (1964-65)

WHEN the Ngo regime was overthrown on 1 November 1963, the pacification programmes, moribund since the summer, disappeared. Over the next year and a half, coups, attempted coups, and counter coups followed each other in alarming succession. Institutions of government deteriorated. The police and intelligence forces scattered. No government or leader could claim legitimacy or rule other than by military decree. Political witch-hunts racked the ministries. In the countryside US advisers worked with half a dozen Vietnamese chiefs in some provinces over the next eighteen months. A live-and-let-live arrangement developed between local officials and the Viet Cong.

Attention became fixed on the charade in Saigon where:

> "Constantly there are realignments, or revelations as to one's true colors. No position is ever irretrievable, no commitment ever final....The rule is: Be flexible, be changeable, adapt...Because it is a system of mutation, the reality, even if you do discover it, does not last long...Loyalty is a virtue, but consistency is not." (68)

The first full-fledged Viet Cong combat division equipped with the Chinese AK-47 assault rifle - the VC 9th - appeared in War Zones C and D. By early 1965 the ARVN had reached the limits of its capabilities.

The United States responded with direct intervention. "We were," observed the Pentagon Papers,

> "gravitating inexorably in that direction in response to forces already at work, and over which we had ceased to have much control.... We were therefore almost as dependent upon

(Lieutenant General Nguyen) Khanh (who on 29 January 1964 had overthrown the junta that had overthrown Diem) as he was beholden to us." (69)

On 2-5 August 1964 the Tonkin Gulf affair occurred. On 7 February 1965, six weeks after another coup in Saigon, President Johnson ordered air attacks against North Vietnam. Sustained bombing operations began on 2 March. A week later US Marines landed at Da Nang. By late June American airborne units had begun search and destroy operations.

The first stirrings of a post-Diem pacification effort began in the Mekong Delta in January 1964. The Strategic Hamlets were renamed "New Life Hamlets" (70). Forced resettlement was prohibited. In Long An province the Viet Cong dominated up to 75 per cent of the area (71). And between February and July 1964 there were five different province chiefs in Long An. As one US adviser remarked:

> "USOM experts stood helplessly by and urgently needed programs awaited approval and implementation by the stymied Vietnamese officials. Thousands of tons of barbed wire and pickets, commodities and building materials were sent to the province, but awaited approvals for distribution." (72)

Quang Nam province was also the scene of several modest pacification efforts during this period (73). In late 1963 the Minh Government planned a special pacification campaign ten miles South-west of Da Nang. However before it could be carried out local ARVN troops were transferred to other operations. By the spring of 1965, six different pacification plans had been tried in Quang Nam province and had failed.

There was one successful local pacification effort during this period—in An Giang province. The key to An Giang's peace and security was the Hoa Hao sect, which constituted about one and a half million people, 400,000 of whom lived in An Giang in 1965 (74). In 1957, in return for almost complete autonomy in their area, the Hoa Hao had surrendered most of their arms to Saigon's forces. The benefits of this arrangement to the Hoa Hao consisted of home rule, control of the rice and fishing, easy tax levies, and control over local ARVN troop movements (75).

It was in the III Corps area around Saigon, however, that the only concerted pacification campaign occurred in 1964 and 1965. The "Hop Tac" effort (76) was an outgrowth of alarm at the progress the Viet Cong were making in slowly strangling the capital (77). Based on "clear and hold" military operations followed by civilian pacification efforts, a giant security "oil spot" was to spread out from Saigon toward the Cambodian border and the South China Sea (78). The Viet Cong put up little resistance, however, apparently equipping themselves from American supplies pumped into insecure areas. As AID Director William Gaud in Washington later stated:

> "There is no question but that some of our AID goods still are being diverted to the Viet Cong....over unsafe roads where the Viet Cong are in control of the area.
>
> Unquestionably, large amounts of our supplies for refugee and medical relief have been stolen or sold for profit or diverted to the Viet Cong. But our program is designed to encourage support of the Government by the people of South Vietnam." (79)

Authorized in mid-August 1964, Hop Tac did not get underway until 12 September (80). The next day elements of the lead unit supporting the programme (the ARVN 51st Regiment), stopped operations and when next located by its American advisers were in Saigon participating in an abortive *coup d'état*. Deadlines slipped away, more supplies were lost (81). By the end of 1964 the effort had collapsed (82).

In late February 1964, coincident with preparations for Hop Tac, the Khanh government proposed a countrywide pacification plan called the Chien Thang (Victory) Plan (83). The core of the Chien Thang plan was supposed to be the New Life Hamlets. As the concept evolved it was a mixture of both the "oil spot" and the "measles" approach (84). There was also some new emphasis put on economic development (85). Chien Thang operations slowly got underway in the spring of 1964 but, as instability mounted in Saigon, execution quickly broke down. After Hop Tac, American and South Vietnamese technicians drafted one counter-insurgency plan after another. But most of the Vietnamese officials working on these pacification programmes were carry-overs from the Diem era. Although many of the post-Diem plans had a confessional

quality to them (86), the old expediency soon showed through. Thus, with hardly a pause, the generals chose to rely for their pacification cadres on the "Combat Youth" (the immediate successors to Ngo Dinh Nhu's Republican Youth). who were admonished and told to get on with the job, knowing that no questions would be asked (87).

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Rural Construction and the Return of General Edward Lansdale (1965-66)

AFTER the Chien Thang, Hop Tac and New Life Hamlet programmes had been tried and failed, pacification was renamed "Rural Construction" (88). But it was not until May 1965, after Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, Air Vice-Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, and the "Young Turks" had taken control in Saigon, that US authorities were able to get the GVN to seriously redress pacification planning. President Lyndon Johnson reappointed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Major General Edward Lansdale to Saigon with orders to press the Saigon generals for a "social revolution" in the countryside. Lansdale let it be known that once in Saigon he would urge the following: recognition of the Saigon military government solely as a caretaker authority until a quick return of freely elected leaders; the revivifying of a civilian, democratic National Assembly; the reshaping of local development programmes; and the long-term protection of the people as the first priority. Lansdale had written:

> "When the military opens fire at long range, whether by infantry weapons, artillery or air strike, on a reported Vietcong concentration in a hamlet or village full of civilians, the Vietnamese officers who give these orders and the American advisers who let them get away with it are helping defeat the cause of freedom." (89)

After talks with Lodge and Lansdale, Prime Minister Ky began to moderate his speeches (Lansdale's group apparently wrote some of them) (90). In January 1966, Ky pledged a new constitution by October and national elections the next year. In the countryside, he promised an era of "rural construction".

As Lodge and Lansdale pressed the generals to reform the government, the allied military build-up continued. American Marines and ARVN units took control of the combat effort surrounding Da Nang and up to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). US Army units occupied areas of II Corps and III Corps. South Korean, Australian, Philippine, and Thai contingents also arrived. Little systematic comparison has been made of these third country forces' approaches to pacification. But their methods highlight why the Vietnamese and their American supported programmes were having so much difficulty (91). Australian combat units entered South Vietnam in June 1965, and were headquartered in central Phuoc Tuy province, a Viet Cong haven, about forty miles South—east of Saigon. As Caucasians, the Australians were careful to minimize contact between themselves and the Vietnamese population. No Vietnamese were allowed into their base camps. Outside their camps, Australian soldiers were strictly controlled in their contacts with local civilians. No shanty towns, bars, or massage parlours appeared outside Australian camps. In contrast to the Australians, the South Korean forces had a distinctly oriental approach. They arrived in Vietnam in mid-October 1965 where they took over areas along the coastal plains of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa Provinces. The Koreans used an extensive system of patrols and ambushes, while training local Vietnamese militia forces or Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) units in garrison duties and local civic action projects. Unlike the Australians, they dealt directly with the Vietnamese population, deliberately setting out to enhance the status of local officials through "elder respect" celebrations in the villages. They also instructed Vietnamese youths in Tao Kwon Ko (Korean style karate). If doubecrossed the Koreans had a reputation for brutality (92).

The Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) was stationed near Tay Ninh City North-west of Saigon. The Filipinos did not have a combat role, devoting themselves entirely to civic action and intelligence gathering. Their work with villagers often involved short medical visits to isolated areas. Unlike the Koreans, the Filipinos did not emphasize training RF/PF or Vietnamese pacification cadres. The Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment arrived in Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa province in September 1967. The Thais emphasized long-term security operations similar to the Koreans, basing their strategy on restraining guerrilla units, on civic action efforts, and the improvement of associated ARVN and

RF/PF units. Like the Australians the Thais were cautious in dealing with the local people. Their tenure in Nhon Trach District was free of adverse incidents such as marred American and ARVN units' relations with local inhabitants (93).

Striking features of third country pacification operations in South Vietnam were the small areas in which they concentrated operations, the way this facilitated a more continuous security presence, and their cultural insight into the population. By mid-1965 the requirements for a successful pacification strategy were clear: the provision of continuous local security; the restoration of effective, responsible local government; and the improvement of living conditions. Nevertheless, political turbulence and military deterioration continued throughout the spring and summer of 1965, and most of the modest resources that were allocated to the Rural Construction effort were diverted back to conventional combat requirements.

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Revolutionary Development and the Rise and Fall of General Nguyen Duc Thang (1966-1967)

THE chaos which followed the Ngo regime subsided in 1966 and Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu emerged as the single most powerful man in South Vietnam. American military intervention had been crucial to Saigon's luck in riding out the Communist offensive. In the villages the Government ordered a new pacification effort known as "Revolutionary Development"(94). Appointed as head of the pacification drive was Brigadier General Nguyen Duc Thang. With the concurrent support of General Lansdale, Ambassador Lodge and the CIA, Thang began to energize the defunct Vietnamese pacification effort. Because of the past years' failures, the 1966 pacification plan was focused on four limited national priority areas (NPAs) (95). These included Quang Nam province in I Corps, Binh Dinh province in II Corps, and most of the old Hop Tac area in III Corps; in IV Corps priority went to An Giang province (96).

By early 1966, with the bombing of North Vietnam in its eleventh month and the US military occupation of South Vietnam steadily growing, the escalation of the war had begun to erode the support that the United States needed to continue its defence of South Vietnam. Estimates of the number of refugees now ranged from 700,000 to 1,000,000 (97). President Johnson abruptly called for a US - GVN summit conference in Honolulu in early February 1966. In Honolulu Johnson received General Thieu's and Ky's signatures on a pledge to deliver a series of reforms. But, as Frances Fitzgerald wrote:

> "While the American public might have assumed that the Honolulu conference, beyond its exalted language, served as pressure for reform in the GVN, theVietnamese understood it only as a renewed American commitment to the military regime ... If a program exceeds their interest or ability to carry out, they will merely agree to it enthusiastically and then do nothing about it." (98)

Hardly had the Honolulu meeting ended than General Thieu's and Air Vice-Marshall Ky's promised programmes became critically weakened by the outbreak of civil war in Annam. The second US-GVN summit meeting, scheduled for Manila, was put off until 24-25 October 1966 (99). At Manila the Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to assign a substantial share of the ARVN to "clear and hold" actions. But by the autumn of 1966, US forces had taken over most of the main force combat effort, and pacification had bogged down, as large military actions generated 600,000 new refugees. The GVN also declared that it would give "top priority" to land reform. However, if General Lansdale had not inserted land reform into the Honolulu Declaration in February, it is doubtful that it would have been mentioned (100). Thieu and Ky also announced a new amnesty programme for Communist defectors. But the GVN's "Chieu Hoi" (open arms) defector programme had been in operation since 1963 and it still had not made a dent in the Viet Cong; the ARVN commanders had not given it any priority (101). The Government was having real difficulty dealing with the Viet Cong's political infrastructure, i.e. the control apparatus in the villages, through which Hanoi drove the revolution from inside South Vietnam by means of a carefully developed cadre structure (102): "The Viet Cong are more than a Mafia plus ideology: theirs is a sophisticated political-military system with the end objective of establishing control over both territory and people. Political and military efforts are balanced to this end." (103)

In late 1964 the CIA moved to close the cadre gap between the Government and the Communists through training programmes shaped on earlier cadre efforts in Quang Ngai province (104). The old Diemist cadre elements were integrated under CIA supervision and renamed "Peoples Action Teams" (PAT). By early 1965 there were about 14,500 men in these PAT teams, which were turned over to the GVN and renamed "Revolutionary Development" (RD) cadre (105). The RD training camp was administered by Nguyen Be, an ex-Viet Minh officer, who had developed a similar cadre programme in Binh Dinh province (106). Under Be and the CIA, by early 1966 there were 400 RD teams (about 20,000 cadres) operating in the countryside.

A collateral effort began to resurrect the status of the village and involve the local population in the pacification process. In 1956 the Diem Government had done away with village government and local initiative. In 1967 village chiefs and village councils were given new authority (107); however, a general administrative and political malaise gripped the country. Against the background of these efforts the 1966 and 1967 Rural Construction/Revolutionary Development programmes continued to concentrate resources in the four National Priority Areas (NPAs) already mentioned. However, the 1966 goal of securing and clearing the NPAs and hamlets was not attained (108). For 1967 General Thang again cut back on pacification scheduling, aiming at only about 1,100 hamlets in twenty-six provinces. The ARVN still proved incapable of treating the civilian population well however. As General Westmoreland put it in 1968:

> "We were particularly concerned that South Vietnamese troops establish proper *rapport* with the people...we undertook special training intended to inculcate suitable standards of public conduct in units assigned to support pacification. Above all, they had to learn to respect the rights and property of civilians....Progress was slow." (109)

Progress was so slow that in January 1969, President Nixon's military advisers reported that the ARVN's leadership problem and poor relations with the populace were still regarded as "endemic". (110) The spring 1975 disasters proved that very little had changed.

A final complicating factor during this period was the hostility between Generals Thieu and Ky. Thieu had fashioned a power structure based on the army, the navy and later, the lower house of the National Assembly. Ky's organization rested on his control of the Air Force, the customs offices, and the Saigon-Cholon police forces (111). The showdown between Thieu and Ky came at the end of June 1967 when the army's National Leadership Committee met in Saigon. When it was over the committee had inclined toward Thieu, and Ky was obliged to stand as the Vice-Presidential candidate on the Thieu ticket (112). On 4 September Thieu and Ky, needing only a simple plurality to win, were elected. By October the first signs began to appear that Thieu was attempting to strip the corps commanders of important elements of their power. But General Thang, whom Thieu used in part to put pressure on the warlords, resigned.

Thang's resignation was a blow to pacification. But despite the Revolutionary Development programme's many inadequacies, the basis for a later pacification breakthrough was being forged.

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The Integration of Counter-insurgency Resources and the "New Model" of Pacification (1967-1969)

> "QUITE the most devastating remark about the war was made by a young American Major who was an adviser to a Vietnamese district sub-sector command. He was visited by two American Colonels from a combat division and briefed them on the situation in his district, where government control was rapidly diminishing and the small town itself was becoming surrounded. One Colonel remonstrated with him and explained how great were the successes which their division had been having in surrounding areas against Vietcong and North Vietnamese main force units. The Major replied: 'That is your war, Colonel. It's not mine.' The Colonels returned to dinner at their headquarters. The Major himself was killed that night."
>
> Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, page 145.

As Thompson's analysis suggests, a prac-

tically uncontrolled proliferation of American agencies and programmes had occurred in South Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers remarked:

> "Each agency had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communication channels with Washington, its own personnel and administrative structure—and its own field personnel operating under separate and parallel chains of command." (113)

A month after the 1966 Honolulu Conference, President Johnson appointed Robert Komer as Special Assistant for Vietnam pacification coordination in Washington. The US agencies supporting the pacification programme now came under the direct scrutiny of the White House and the long drive to integrate US field programmes began (114). As a halfway measure, on 21 November, the President ordered the integration of US **civilian** resources in Saigon supporting pacification into the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) under the Embassy (115). But OCO was stalemated from the start: it was too small to handle the job and had no resources of its own.

In April 1967, Komer, in Saigon on an assessment visit, concluded that, while the US military effort was self-contained and "very effective", the civilian pacification effort was still splintered and lacking in overrall planning. Johnson agreed and on 11 May 1967, he authorized the formal transfer of OCO and its parent agency resources to the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the countryside was "the indispensable first stage in pacification". To supervise the reorganization, a new pacification directorate under Komer was established within MACV, known as the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). But as soon as CORDS was formed, strong voices within the civilian agencies began predicting that the civilians would become mere appendages of the huge military complex (116). However, by mid-summer critics of the CORDS operation were beginning to concede that CORDS was making some headway (117). "To his credit," wrote William Corson,

> "(Komer) did not allow the pettiness of the Saigon-based bureaucracy to stand in his way. By skillful negotiations he reorganized the old OCO organization, made peace-after a fashion-with the US military commands, and placed good people in the provinces (and) applied modern management techniques..." (118)

One senior civilian, known to be a critic of previous planning, said:

> "I am quite pleased. We're beginning to get the benefits Komer talks about-military transport and supplies and that sort of stuff plus our ideas. A general I know said the other day he wasn't sure who had taken over whom in his thing." (119)

Komer and the CORDS operation also began to apply pressure on the South Vietnamese pacification agencies to follow suit. This was one of the few effective instances where the Americans were able to exert effective leverage on South Vietnamese officials (120).

But there were still many unresolved dilemmas in the GVN/US approach to pacification. Komer was a manager; he accepted the sociopolitical assumptions behind the ongoing GVN/US programmes largely at face value. What they really needed, in his view, was intensification not reconceptualization. The relevance of all this for the Vietnamese farmers they were attempting to influence was not measured. The CORDS "New Model" of pacification was, in Jeffrey Race's terminology, a "reinforcement" rather than a "pre-emptive" strategy (121). For example, in February 1967, Komer told the President that, over the long haul, pacification would succeed, simply overwhelming the Viet Cong:

> "Wastefully, expensively, but nonetheless indisputably, we are winning the war in the South. Few of our programmes - civil or military-are very efficient, but we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass. And the cumulative impact of all we have set in motion is beginning to tell. Pacification still lags the most, yet even it is moving ahead." (122)

But what about the Viet Cong infrastructure? And what about land reform? More than ten years after the initiation of the Viet Cong insurgency, there was still no serious effort to root out the Communist cadre apparatus, or to redistribute land. These were crucial failures of the pacification programmes, and they would be severly tested in the spring of 1968.

* * * * * * *

The 1968 Tet Offensive, the GVN Recovery and Accelerated Pacification and Development (1968-1972)

THE TRENDS of the Revolutionary Development period and the "New Model" of pacification (greater complementarity between American and South Vietnamese goals, the re-energization of pacification, and improvements in both governments' planning and execution) were put to their greatest test by the Communist Tet offensive of 1968. Tet changed the entire war. It sent a great shock throughout the Government of South Vietnam. And it precipitated the American disengagement. But Tet also decimated Hanoi's and the Viet Cong's combat forces in the South. Under the pressure from Tet, the Thieu Government paid real attention to protecting the population.

In the midst of Tet, many pronounced the pacification programmes dead and South Vietnam undefendable. Writing from Washington, one correspondent stated that the Tet raids:

> "...have as a practical matter killed dead the pacification program—and most of the assumptions that went with it....The scenes on American television are horrifying; in real life they must be unbearable." (123)

But pacification was not dead. In reality what had actually happened was that the Viet Cong had **by-passed** the RD cadre teams, police, and RF/PF outposts, using hamlets where their apparatus was still intact as stepping stones into the cities. Over 90 per cent of the Government's pacification forces were still intact (124). Moreover, the Communists lost 45,000 cadres and troops killed in the first month (almost as much as the **US** lost in **ten years**). This, of course, was not communicated on Western television screens.

Repairing the cities was the major GVN priority that spring. By the first of March, 1,600,000 refugees were on the rolls (125). On the nights of 4-5 May, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces struck again. But the effect of the May mini-offensive was temporary. An American spokesman summed up the official view of the problem:

> "Unquestionably there's been a considerable setback. The real question now is who will fill the vacuum in the countryside.
>
> It depends on how fast the South Vietnamese Government moves in and how aggressive and how fast the enemy will be.
>
> Our side is weaker, but I ask myself is the enemy weaker or stronger than he was on Jan 28. I would answer that he is considerably weaker." (126)

Hanoi failed to put the ARVN out of action or to topple the Government. And the Communists eventually lost over 50,000 men (one-fifth of their entire force structure). In Charles Joiner's words:

> "With cover dropped, with much of its cadre leadership lost, with reserves sapped and with regular NLF (National Liberation Front) forces suffering vast losses, the NLF was put back a decade ...." (127)

But Hanoi won a major psychological victory in the United States.

With Thieu taking direct command of the situation, the GVN beagan reconcentrating resources on protecting the villages. Called the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) (128), the effort began with the arming of the population while the Tet battles still raged. By late 1969, 2,000,000 people were on the rolls and about 400,000 arms had been issued (129). The Rural and Popular forces were expanded (130), eventually to number over 550,000 men (131).

An Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was begun on 1 November 1968. Eleven hundred hamlets were chosen for security upgrading. Thieu gave the APC a high priority and established the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC), chaired by Prime Minister Khiem (132). As soon as the APC was under way, Robert Komer stated unequivocally that the GVN was winning the pacification war (133). But corruption still pervaded the GVN, the Communist infrastructure was still alive and, as John Montgomery observed:

> "One veteran regional observer estimated that half of the government's Popular Forces in the countryside, working out of fortified positions, added "tax" and "rent" collections to their duties." (134)

Yet despite these shortcomings, a strategic turning point had been crossed. By early 1969 the necessary number of local government militia were physically in place or being trained to secure a very broad strata of the population.

By mid 1969, three central features of the Thieu Government's rural strategy for the early 1970s were apparent: sustained local security and an invigorated attack on the guerrilla infrastructure; re-energizing village initiative and land reform and self-help projects. While none of these broad programmes were particularly well implemented, by the end of 1970 they had produced a breakthrough in the countryside for the Government. Priority was first placed on adding more men with rifles in the villages (135) although as John Paul Vann observed:

> "Essentially, we (the GVN with our assistance) are doing occupation, i.e., we put enough rifles into an area to reduce the number of overt VC incidents to an acceptable — or livable — level. Then we go through a number of rote steps for a period of several months until "statistically" the cadre team had completed its job. At that time, the cadre team moves on quite often taking with it the number of rifles which tipped the balance of power to the side of the government." (136)

But by the end of 1970 the Thieu Government's goal of a clear majority of the population living in "relative security" had been met (137). Vann observed:

> "For the first time since 1961 all provincial capitals can be reached by road with unescorted single vehicle traffic during daylight hours." (138)

As a collateral part of the security question, the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign had doubled the rate of Viet Cong cadre ("Infrastructure") neutralizations (139). By July 1971, over 20,000 people had been killed under the programme out of a total of 67,000 "neutralized" (killed, captured, or surrendered) (140). In contrast GVN statistics on Viet Cong terror claimed that between 1 January 1968 and 31 December 1972, 26,948 people were killed and 61,542 were wounded by the Viet Cong (141).

But as Ambassador Bunker cabled Washington in August 1971:

> "Sixty thousand members of an underground organization in a population of 18 million represents one VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure for each 300 people. This has apparently been adequate to keep the VCI viable and enable them to make their presence felt." (142)

Turning to the problem of re-energizing the villages, as part of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, village and hamlet elections were held in March, June and September 1969 (143). But local politics in South Vietnam still had a clearly authoritative tinge. As one village chief told an observer:

> "This is a very difficult job. If you protect the villager's interests you cannot help hurting the interests of some very influential men. If you try to please these men, you must harm the villager's interests." (144)

On 1 April 1969, the Thieu Government implemented what some termed a "revolutionary" new deal for the villages (145). GVN Decree No. 045-SL/NV reorganized the village and hamlet governments and ostensibly gave them greatly enhanced powers. Actually, however, Decree No. 45 changed little of the previous basic law (No. 198-SL/DUNC, of 25 December 1966) which had placed major restrictions on the scope and authority of the villages (146). Despite these difficulties it was clear, nonetheless, that Thieu was presiding over the first decentralization of power in the history of South Vietnam (147).

The Saigon Government finally moved to address the problem of land reform. Despite years of pronouncements and exhortation, land reform had been ignored. Yet by 1968 for the Vietnamese farmer in the Mekong Delta and the Central Lowlands the overriding daily problem he faced was low income and unending debts (148). Pointing out these stark realities were the Communists who, where they could achieve control, would quickly redistribute land (149). When the Government had recovered from Tet, a series of edicts set the new land reform programme in motion (150).

After eight months of debate, in which National Assembly landowners called it an

"inhuman, immoral, unscientific, Communist policy of proselytizing the people" (151), on 26 March 1970, the Land-to-the-Tiller bill became law (152).
Later that year Allan Goodman remarked:

> "(The recent Land-to-the-Tillers law) leaves essentially intact the system of village and district government which perpetrated the tenure arrangements of the landlords and their control over local politics." (153)

However by early 1972, with peasant political participation growing,despite local elite resistance, the land reform programme was succeeding. As Roy Prosterman analyzed it:

> "Thieu's measure affects **all** private tenanted land — together with the government-lands distribution, it covers over 60 per cent of all cultivated land in the country — and the receipient is normally the present tiller. He gets what he presently tills... And he gets it free of charge." (154)

Three years after the bill was signed, the GVN had redistributed nearly one million hectares of farmland (155). Well over two-thirds of the tenant farmer families in South Vietnam were to be significantly affected by the new measures. The long odds were finally in favour of the farmer.

* * * * * * *

Hanoi's Easter 1972 Invasion, Pacification Setback, and the January 1973 Accords

IT IS now clear that sometime in the late spring or summer of 1971, Hanoi concluded, as it had four years before, that it was losing the war. Low-level guerrilla warfare could not withstand GVN/US pressures over the long term. The Viet Cong infrastructure had fallen to pieces. A pacification breakthrough had been achieved by Government forces. There had been no weakening of President Thieu's and President Nixon's stand against a coalition government in Saigon. The ARVN's May 1970 Cambodian invasion and the February 1971 Laotian incursion had caught Hanoi off guard, damaging critical logistic capabilities. North Vietnam's internal socio-economic situation in 1971 and 1972 was serious (156). The balance within the Politburo shifted toward the Le Duan–Vo Nguyen Giap proposals for a return to the offensive based on big unit battles, this time in the form of Soviet-assisted high technology warfare (157).

With the knowledge and assistance of the Soviet Union, Hanoi planned to mount punitive, devastating pressure against the ARVN in a killing attrition contest, halt the pacification programmes, wreck the "Vietnamization" effort, and rebuild the Viet Cong infrastructure. On the last day of March 1972, following a shattering 48-hour artillery barrage of 12,000 shells from positions inside and above the Demilitarized Zone, North Vietnam's 304th and 308th Infantry Divisions quickly broke through the border outposts as the defending ARVN 3rd Division cracked (158). On 7 April President Nixon ordered American air and naval forces into action, later extending the bombing to all of North Vietnam. In Hue, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong stopped the ARVN rout and restored order. On 8 May Nixon ordered the mining and blockade of North Vietnam's ports and a maximum interdiction campaign against logistic arteries throughout the country (159). The Soviet Union's response was minimal and the Moscow summit conference remained on schedule.

By early summer, with the exception of the siege of An Loc, the Communist advance was petering out. In mid-June Robert Shaplen reported:

> "The North Vietnamese and their Vietcong allies are now privately acknowledging severe setbacks, and the best available figures indicate that the nationwide Communist assault — or at least its first phase — has been a failure. In the first two months, the Communists, according to the most conservative American estimates, lost some twenty thousand dead and forty thousand wounded, or roughly a third of the total number of men they committed to the offensive." (160)

Hanoi had seriously underestimated the vigour of the American military reaction; mining the harbours and employing laser-guided bombs had allowed the United States to stop between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of the war material coming into North Vietnam. Secondly, a precise, surgical devastation of North Viet-

nam's hydro-electric industry and logistics complex was underway. Hanoi had also underestimated the effectiveness and intensity of US tactical air power in the South as well as the ARVN's staying power. But GVN losses of secure population were serious. In the Mekong Delta they were estimated at about 15 per cent. Along Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long and Bing Long provinces the North Vietnamese were able to physically control the border districts. All of Quang Tri province was lost. Binh Dinh province on the central coast was in serious trouble. In Quang Tin, Quang Nam, and Thua Thien provinces, gaps had again been left by the ARVN forces (161). By the end of 1972, the overall pacification picture showed a net loss of population security of about 20 per cent.

Just prior to the American Presidential election in November 1972, Hanoi undoubtedly concluded that the Nixon Administration would be returned to office and might stiffen its requirements for an Indo-China settlement. The first signals came around 8 October after six months of bombing, when crucial changes in Hanoi's position began to be revealed. On 23 October President Nixon halted the bombing and a draft agreement was quickly reached between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, which Hanoi divulged in a 26 October 1972 broadcast (162). Despite this important breakthrough major problems still remained, including the ambiguity of the North Vietnamese views in regard to new infusions of troops or war material (163). Most important there was no provision for the withdrawal of the estimated 145,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. It was precisely to these and other major unsettled questions that the Thieu Government forcefully objected.

Throughout November and early December negotiations continued. Between 4 and 13 December however, Hanoi began to retract previous concessions, setting forth new demands. On 14 December President Nixon called upon North Vietnam to resume serious negotiations within seventy-two hours. In the absence of a satisfactory reply, on 18 December Nixon ordered the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam. For twelve straight days American airpower pounded North Vietnam's military, logistics and communications facilities. Over 780 B-52 sorties complimented by more than 1,000 tactical aircraft sorties were carried out against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The administration's goals apparently were as follows: to forestall Communist activites designed to alter the pre-ceasefire balance in South Vietnam; to reassure President Thieu prior to applying pressure on him to make final concessions on the expected ceasefire; to force Hanoi back into serious negotiations; and to force North Vietnam into abandoning its post-agreement war plans. In early January Hanoi asked for a reprieve and the full Paris talks began again on 8 January. On 23 January Kissinger and Tho initialled the final version of the ceasefire agreement.

The 27 January 1973 "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" and its four associated protocols provided for an in-place ceasefire which formally began on 27 January despite heavy last-minute fighting (164). All remaining American and allied military personnel were withdrawn within sixty days and US bases were evacuated. By 28 March all publicly accounted-for American POW s had been returned. For the first sixty days the Four-Party Joint Military Commission oversaw the ceasefire. As disputes cropped up, they were referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the 1,160-man force made up of equal forces from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. But the ICCS was unable to settle any important issue, and as evidence of torture and death of US POWs in Communist camps appeared, Congress became even more reluctant to vote reconstruction money.

* * * * * * *

Aftermath of the 1973 Accords and the Spring 1975 Debacle

SUCH was the agreement which brought the "ceasefire" to Vietnam. Even as the truce was being signed, the actual nature of the conflict quickly overrode the legalities and, as we have seen, the fighting never ended. Eight days before the Paris signing, Hanoi's Lao Dong Party's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) published its battle orders detailing how the forthcoming agreement should be manipulated through "political struggle" supported by appropriate "armed struggle"

(165). The Third Indo-China War had begun. Sensing that the Communists' post-truce local attacks could be handled, President Thieu appears to have built the Government's strategy around four elements: maintaining pressure on Communist redoubts while preparing for a return to big unit conventional warfare if necessary; placing a new emphasis on economics and postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation; continuing to maintain control over local politics; and placing South Vietnam's economic-diplomatic case before various international forums (166). All of this was predicated, it must be emphasized, on the assumption in both Saigon and Washington that American military and economic aid to South Vietnam would continue, and would be sufficient to offset Hanoi's activities in the South.

By the summer of 1973, most American intelligence sources placed Communist combat forces arrayed against South Vietnam at about 125,000 NVA infantry inside the South, assisted by 25,000 Viet Cong main-force troops, 55,000 supply troops, 40,000 regional or provincial guerrillas, 100,000 part-time militia and another 25,000 NVA in eastern Cambodia: a total of about 370,000 armed men, or an increase roughly of 120,000 from the 250,000 for late summer 1972 (167). With this situation in the background a 13 June 1973 fourteen-point US-DRV joint *communiqué* called for a new cessation of hostilities and a "complete ceasefire" beginning on 15 June 1973 (168). However, as these negotiations were going on, the International Commission of Control and Supervision broke down (169). On 15 August 1973, all US air activity in Indo-China ended when the American Congress banned the reintroduction of any kind of US military forces — ground, sea or air — into the theatre. In September 1973 the US Congress appropriated only one-half of what President Nixon asked for in military assistance to South Vietnam for FY 1974: US $700 million. By the summer of 1974 there were over 285,000 Communist troops inside South Vietnam, more than half deployed in regular infantry divisions. The North Vietnamese had constructed at least twelve supply airfields since January 1973 and resurfaced or built nearly a thousand miles of road. Arrayed against the Communist forces were nearly 1.1 million GVN forces, but the vast majority of them were tied down to static defence roles trying to defend 90 per cent of the population (170).

Against this increasingly ominous military situation South Vietnam also had to try and tackle its economic and political problem. There was some prospect of shifting part of the economic assistance burden from the US to a consortium of countries including Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, West Germany and France (171). In May 1973 President Thieu announced a "seven-year economic plan", or "Post-War Reconstruction Plan". The plan was a direct expansion of the 1972-1975 Four-Year Community Defence and Local Development (CD&LD) Plan, and it sought to compensate for declining US economic and military support (172). But by 1974 the Nixon Administration's aim of applying US $7.5 billion in reconstruction aid to all of Indo-China (including the DRV for which a figure of about US $2.5 billion had been suggested) had made no head-way whatsoever in the Congress (173).

With the military situation worsening, and outside assistance shrinking, the Thieu Government began to curtail resources that had previously gone into the pacification and development programmes. In a renewed but lackluster effort to create a political party, Thieu made his fourth attempt to integrate the bureaucracy, the army and the village and hamlet power structures, this time in the form of a Democracy Party (Dan Chu) (174). But it tended to resemble Ngo Dinh Nhu's earlier civil servant leagues and youth organizations — a confused amalgam of workers, bureaucrats and agents. Democracy Party cadres attempted to draw on Thieu's previous currency with the village chiefs — the partial beneficiaries of the money and power injected into the villages in the 1969-1972 pacification plans (175). But the whole effort was clumsy and inefficient and increasingly jeopardized the accomplishments of the previous few years.

By the autumn of 1974 the handwriting was on the wall. The US $700 million appropriated by Congress for FY 1975 was not sufficient to allow one-for-one replacement of equipment and supplies expended, as permitted by the Paris accords. The US was unable to provide **any** new tanks airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces or major items, but only critical consumable items such as ammunition, gaso-

line, spare parts and medicine. Stockpiles were being depleted across the board. On several occasions President Ford publicly expressed his concern with the situation, as did President Thieu. On 28 January 1975 Ford proposed a US $300 supplement to military assistance for South Vietnam (176).

And so, with failing assistance from Washington coupled to worldwide inflation, and Moscow's and Peking's near blankcheck support for Hanoi, President Thieu made the inevitable decision in early March 1975 to begin ARVN withdrawals from the Central Highlands — the most difficult (and least populated) areas to defend. On 14 March, in a secret war council at Cam Ranh Bay, attended by Thieu and four of his ranking generals: Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, Chief of the General Staff Cao Van Vien, Presidential Military Adviser Dang Van Quang, and II Corps Chief Pham Van Phu, Thieu ordered **temporary** withdrawals from the Central Highlands. But General Phu, returning to Pleiku later that day, inexplicably ordered an immediate withdrawal that very night. Phu's troops set off pell-mell for the coast and the population panicked. A calamitous retreat ensued and in I Corps to the North, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, now fearing isolation, ordered withdrawals from Hue which in turn became a rout, and Da Nang soon became indefensible (177). On 10 April President Ford tried to rally the US Congress and people to send last ditch aid to Saigon's army which was standing in the III Corps area (178). But by mid-April all that was left of South Vietnam's army was five worn-out divisions in the Saigon area surrounded by sixteen to twenty North Vietnamese divisions, as Hanoi poured the rest of its army over the border in preparation for the kill. President Thieu resigned on 21 April. In Saigon, Hanoi's spokesman, in the wake of Thieu's resignation — which they had said was all that was necessary for them to negotiate — refused to accept any government which was anything but a satellite of their cause. On 24 April, as the final Americans were being evacuated from Saigon, President Ford declared that the Vietnam War was over for the United States, and shortly after noon on Wednesday 30 April, Communist tanks knocked down the main gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon where the two-day President, Duong Van "Big" Minh, formally surrendered South Vietnam.

* * * * * * *

BETWEEN 1954 and mid-1968 the Saigon governments pacification and development programmes failed because they were little more than ill-devised blends of stop and start military and police operations, social control techniques, emergency welfare efforts, and attempts to extend political-administrative linkage from the capital to the countryside. During those sixteen years, the names of the programmes suggested their trial and error nature: Reconstruction, Civic Action, Land Development Centers, Agglomeration Camps, Agrovilles, Strategic Hamlets, New Life Hamlets, Hop Tac (Co-operation), Chien Thang (Victory), Rural Construction, Rural Reconstruction, Revolutionary Development. Affected by the political and administrative trauma that rippled through the Saigon governments, orphaned by the thrust and priorities of American support, never really coming to grips with the nature and pressure of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese challenge, pacification was always seen as the "other war". As the underwriters of Saigon's efforts, the Americans' difficulties were a product of reliance on conventional military methods, culturally unsuitable and impractical approaches to development, an inability to devise conceptually relevant programmes, and insufficient leverage on the Saigon governments. In turn, the South Vietnamese failed to come to terms with the Communists' strategy because of their fundamental political weaknesses: their inheritance of France's colonial legacy, their debilitating internal pursuit of power, and their reliance on American aid and doctrine rather than internal political support.

The Vietnamese Communist approach to insurgency was a stage-by-stage pre-emptive revolutionary social process, based on redistributive policies of a socio-economic nature enforced by violence. Hanoi's balanced, carefully disciplined approach to revolution — "People's War" — relied upon:

> "The fashioning of a reliable tool - a hardened, united, tested Communist party. After the party has been organizationally consolidated and has developed its political themes, a move to broaden its base of

political support is made .... When conditions are ripe, the party converts itself and its allies from political to "armed struggle" — the stage of "people's war" — which means not the abandonment of politics but merely an advance to a level of struggle where the final decision will be reached by military means." (179)

Ho Chi Minh spent **twenty years** on the organizational phase before he ordered military action against the French. The Viet Cong and Hanoi took six years, from 1954 to 1960, to remodel the Viet Minh apparatus in the South before they moved into serious armed action.

But between 1968 and 1973 the GVN's pacification and development programmes achieved successes because priority was finally given to protecting and involving the people in their own defence, and policies of economic redistribution were promoted. Yet overall, the record now proves that the Saigon authorities never fashioned a **political community** in South Vietnam. Until the spring of 1972 South Vietnam did not need a conventional army; it needed rural power based on a mutually beneficial relationship between the people, the Government and the army. Over the years the Saigon governments did not need unlimited American financial assistance; they needed to develop their own internal sources of revenue and support. South Vietnam needed the American bombing campaign against the North less than it required an effective development and population protection strategy in the southern countryside. Regretably for South Vietnam, and those countries and peoples which oppose aggression, Hanoi's callous determination to push the war to the bitter end no matter what the cost to the Vietnamese, North and South, finally won through. And in their plans they had South Vietnam's irreconcilable contradictions and the Americans' mistakes to help them. Robert Shaplen's insight on the situation years ago unfortunately seems the most appropriate conclusion to the story:

> "And so it goes — a kind of compulsive mutual - vivisection society, in which everyone wants to cut everyone else up to determine the cause of the national disease, which may be incurable ... It will end sometime, of course, as all wars do; and by then most of the Americans will have gone home, leaving behind what we started with — a handful of advisers assisting in an enterprise that very few of them will ever understand." (180)

Notes and References

1. See Hanoi's Lao Dong Party's Central office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Directive 02/73 "On Policies Related to the Political Settlement and Cease-fire", dated 19 January 1973, *Viet-nam Documents and Research Notes,* No. 113 (Saigon: US Mission, 1973) in which Hanoi conceded that the army of South Vietnam (ARVN) and government (GVN) were "more stable and better organized" at all levels than in the Diem period, and that the Thieu regime firmly controlled the government with a "core of dedicated counter-revolutionaries". As cited in William S. Turley, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 'Third Stage' of the Revolution", *Asian Survey,* January 1974, Vol XIV, No 1, pp 88.

2. This is the official United States, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), later Defense Attaché Office, definition used by Saigon and Washington.

3. See "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam", (Geneva, 20 July 1954), reprinted in Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), pp. 2689-2705. The GVN's protest, not formally preserved at Geneva, is in *Keesing's Research Report, South Vietnam: A Political History, 1954-1970* (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1970), pp. 8-9.

4. Most evidence puts the formal number of Viet Minh assigned for regroupment at between 90,000 and 135,000 personnel. See Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 133; George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong", *Foreign Affairs,* XLIV, No. 3 (April, 1966), p. 357; Ellen J. Hammer, "South Viet Nam: The Limits of Political Action", *Pacific Affairs,* XXXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1962), p. 27; and US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Vol. IV.A.4; pp. 7-8 and IV.A.5, pp. 16-17.

5. Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (New York: Praeger, 1967), Vol. II, p. 853. The Pentagon Papers indicate that both US and GVN intelligence estimates put the Viet Minh residue in the South, active and part time, at between 5,000 and 10,000 guerrillas; the most accepted figure was 8,000, of whom 5,000 were armed and 3,000 were political. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations,* Vol. IV.A.4, pp. 7-8 and IV.A.5, pp. 16-17.

6. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina Since Geneva", *Pacific Affairs,* XXVIII, No. 1 (March, 1955), p. 4.

7. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams* (New York, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 308. Monthly rates of interest could reach 10 per cent. Milton C. Taylor, "South Viet Nam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress" *Pacific Affairs, XXXIV,* No. 3 (Fall, 1961), p. 249.

8. See Theodore Shabud, "Economic Development in North Vietnam", *Pacific Affairs,* XXXI, 1 (March 1958), 49-50, and Brian Crozier, "The International Situation in Indochina", *Pacific Affairs,* XXIX, 4 (December 1956) 312. Buttinger's detailed summary of the evidence is in his *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled,* Vol. II, pp. 903-908 and pp. 1119-1123.

9. Bui Van Luong, "The Refugee Problem: The Role of Friendly Nations", in Lindholm, *Viet-Nam: The First Five Years,* pp. 48-50. Also see George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam* (Rev. ed., New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969), p. 75; John D. Montgomery, *Cases in Vietnamese Administration* (Saigon, Washington: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUVAG)/Agency for International Development (AID), 1959), p. 50; Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 207; Bernard Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams,* p. 290.

10. United States Operations Mission to Viet Nam, "Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight for Freedom", (Saigon: United States Operations Mission to Viet-Nam, October 9, 1954), p. 12, and John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

11. For details see Montgomery, *Cases in Vietnamese Administration,* pp. 47, 49, 53-54, 58, 60, 85, 90, 93; Kahin and Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam,* p. 75; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Joseph J. Harnett, "The Refugee Problem: The Work of the Roman Catholic Groups", in Lindholm's *Viet-Nam: The First Five Years,* pp. 77-82; US Operations Mission, "Exodus", p. 18; Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam,* p. 207; Bernard B. Fall, "South Viet Nam's Internal Problems", *Pacific Affairs,* XXXI, No. 3 (September, 1958), p. 252; and Robert G. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 123.

12. *New York Times,* 5 July 1971, p. 11. Excerpts from the report of the Saigon Military Mission headed by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale for the period August, 1954-August 1955 appear in the *New York Times,* 5 July 1971, pp. 11-14. Lansdale's later account of these activities is considerably more sanguine. Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1972), pp. 224-227.

13. Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group,

Report on the Organization of the Special Commisariat for Civic Action (Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUVAG) June, 1957), p. 8. Also see Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, pp. 181, 216-220.

14. MSUVAG, *Report on the Organization of the Special Commissariat for Civic Action*, p. 1.

15. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, pp. 52-54, also see Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, pp. 212, 232-243.

16. Montgomery, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, p. 71. Also see MSUVAG, Report on the Organization of the Special Commissariat for Civic Action, pp. 2, 3, 10

17. *My Thuan: A Mekong Delta Village in South Vietnam* (Saigon, Washington: MSUVAG/AID, May, 1961), p. 29. Also see John C. Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam: Doctrines of Authority in Conflict", (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1964), p. 290, and US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. A. 5.2. pp. 27-28.

18. Montgomery, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, pp. 180-181.

19. Nhu modeled the Can Lao along the lines of both the Communist Party and the French Sûreté. See Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", pp. 230-231. Also see Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, pp. 218, 401-402; Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 289; Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, p. 340; and Robert G. Scigliano, "Political Parties in South Vietnam under the Republic", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIII, No. 4 (December, 1960).

20. Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", p. 230, and Scigliano, "Political Parties in South Vietnam under the Republic", p. 331.

21. The Pentagon Papers make an extensive effort to compare the evidence on the origins of insurgency in South Vietnam after 1954. The conclusion is that three interpretations of the evidence are possible: that the DRV intervened in the South in reaction to US escalation, particularly that of President Kennedy in early 1961 (the "Dove" thesis); or that the DRV manipulated the entire war (the official US or "Hawk" position); or that the DRV seized an opportunity to enter an ongoing internal war in 1959 prior to, and independent of, US escalation. The Papers conclude that while no absolutely conclusive evidence can be brought to bear in defence of any of the three interpretations, the truth lies somewhere between the latter options. This writer agrees with that conclusion. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, Vol. IV, A.5. "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960", Summary, pp. 1-3, and Vol. IV, A.5.3, "Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam: Links with the Viet Cong and DRV Strategy", pp. 32-71.

22. See Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", p. 251.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256. Fall concluded that Viet Minh agents in the South and the North Vietnamese Government were closely co-ordinating their activities. Also see P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam's People's Revolutionary Party", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV, 4 (Winter, 1962-63), 375-383. The Viet Minh's development and consolidation of power above the 17th parallel is treated in compelling detail by Huong Van Chi in his *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), and by Bernard B. Fall in his *The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1963). Also see George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong", *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV, 3 (April, 1966), 347-72.

24. The land reform programme, which never really got off the ground, was contained in three Presidential decrees: Ordinance No. 2 of 8 January 1955; Ordinance No. 7 of 5 February 1955; and Ordinance No. 57 of 22 October 1956. See Price Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", in Lindholm, *Viet-Nam: The First Five Years*, pp. 200-208, and Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, pp. 355-356. Also see David Wurfel, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVI, No. 6 (June, 1957), 81-92.; J. Price Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Viet Nam", *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVII, No. 8 (August 1959), 113-126.; J. Price Gittinger, "Progress in South Vietnam's Agrarian Reform. Part I", *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIX, No. 1 (January, 1960), 1-5, and "Progress in South Vietnam's Agrarian Reform, Part II", *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIX, No. 2 (February 1960), 17-21; James B. Hendry, "Land Reform in South Viet Nam", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX, No. 1 (October, 1960); and Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", in *Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence*, ed. by Wesley R. Fishel (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 153-175.

25. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, pp. 57, 114, 200-201, and Wesley R. Fishel, "Political Realities in Vietnam", *Asian Survey*, I, No. 2 (April, 1961), 17.

26. Montgomery, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, p. 73 and *Cases in Vietnamese Administration*, p. 97, and Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, pp. 44, 105.

27. Bernard Fall citing a Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group report (at the time unpublished) in Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", p. 253

28. Kahin and Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*, p. 103, Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, pp. 199-200, Milton C. Taylor "South Viet-Nam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress", p. 242, and US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, Vol. IV, A.2, p. 18.

29. Montgomery, Politics of Foreign Aid, pp. 72, 80.

Also see Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Viet Nam: An Agroville in Development* (Saigon and Washington, D.C.: MSUVAG/AID, 1963).

30. A typical example of this "now you see it, now you don't" approach to American support to the GVN, concerning diverted highway maintenance money, is in Montgomery, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, p. 127.

31. See Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 244, as cited in Ray Cole Hillam, "Insurgent Communism: The Problem of Counter-Measures in Malaya, Vietnam and the Philippines" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1964), pp. 63-64.

32. See John D. Donoghue and Vo Hong Phuc, "My-Thuan: A Mekong Delta Village in South Vietnam", MSUVAG Mimeograph, Appendix A, p. 61.

33. See John Donoghue and Vo Hong Phuc, "The Village of My-Thuan", in *The Delta Village of My-Thuan: Some Administrative and Financial Aspects*, ed. by Truong Ngoc Giau and Lloyd W. Woodruff (Saigon and Washington, D.C.: MSUVAG/AID, 1963), pp. 5-13.

34. Ministry of Interior order dated 9 July 1959, quoted in Joseph J. Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, pp. 6-7. Emphasis in original.

35. Scigliano. South Vietnam: *Nation Under Stress*, pp. 178-179.

36. From the report by a delegation of village officials and government agents from Binh Minh district, Vinh Long province, observing *Qui Khu* and *Qui Ap* developments in Long My district, Phuong Dinh province. Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, Appendix I, p. 34.

37. Major Pham Ngoc Thao quoted in Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*. p. 7.

38. In Vietnamese, literally "Closer Settlement Areas", although Diem usually spoke of them as *Khu Thu Mats* or "Prosperous Dense Centres". Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, p. 9. The origin of the French expression Agroville ("Rural Town") goes back to earlier pacification operations in Tonkin.

39. Carver, "Faceless Viet Cong", pp. 359-360.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 362 As a captured Lao Dong document stated:

> "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet Nam (Viet Minh Communist Party) unified from north to south under the direction of the central committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho."

This particular document, dated 7 December 1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen province, Republic of Vietnam. See US Department of State, *Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam*, Far Eastern Series 130, Pubn. 7839 (February, 1965).

41. Pike, *Viet Cong*, p. 78, Robert G. Scigliano, "Political Parties in South Vietnam Under the Republic", pp. 336-337.

42. Relying principally on Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, pp. 9-10. Shaplen suggests that what Nhu really may have had in mind for the agrovilles, despite its picturesque name, was a concept similar to Soviet collective farms or Chinese communes. Shaplen, *Lost Revolution*, p. 143.

43. This portion of Diem's "Double Seven Day" speech is quoted in Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, p. 1.

44. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, pp. 179-180. Also see Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", p. 186; Zasloff, *A Study of Administration in Binh Minh District*, p. 8; Fishel, "Political Realities in Vietnam", p. 18; Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Vietnam*, pp. 13, 16; and Nghiem Dang, *Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 157-58.

45. Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", p. 187, and Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, p. 46. Also see Bernard B. Fall, *Two Vietnams*, p. 310, Wesley R. Fishel, "Political Realities in Vietnam", in *Anatomy of a Conflict*, ed. by Fishel, p. 223, Nghiem Dang, *Vietnam: Politics and Public Administration*, p. 158, and Zasloff, *Rural Resettlement in Viet Nam*, p. 21.

46. Dang, *Viet Nam: Politics and Public Administration*, p. 158. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, p. 261. Also see Nguyen Khoc Nhan, "Policy of Key Rural Agrovilles", *Asian Culture*, July-Dec., 1961 Vol. III, No. 3-4 pp. 29-49 for specific data on the Agrovilles.

47. In an address to civil servants at Phan Thiet on 10 February 1962, in the presence of members of the foreign diplomatic corps and aid missions. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, p. 262.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

49. See *Viet Nam Press* for weeks ending 24 July, 30 July, 6 August and 3 September, 1961 as cited by Milton E. Osborne, *Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, April, 1965), p. 27. Also see Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, p. 55, and US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. B.2, p. 16, and Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam: Doctrines of Authority in Conflict", p. 191.

50. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.B.2, pp. 9-10.

51. Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 45. Also see Pham

Chung, "An Analysis of the Long Range Military, Economic and Social Effects of the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam", *Defense Documentation Center Contract SD-181* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Department of Economics, University of New Mexico, 1964), p. 12 as cited in Ton That Phu, "The Hamlet Program: A Tool for Nation-Building in South Vietnam" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1969), p. 47.

52. *Times of Vietnam* (Saigon), as quoted in Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", p. 200. Also see "The Strategic Hamlet: Edifice of Revolution", *The Times of Vietnam* Magazine, IV, No. 43 (October 28, 1962), p. 6, as cited in Phu, "The Hamlet Program: A Tool for Nation-Building in South Vietnam", pp. 36-37, and a more concrete and technical statement of the programme's objectives: Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, pp. 124-25.

53. Nghiem Dang, "Local Politics and Administration", in *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict*, ed. by Fishel, p. 570. The entire hamlet operation was strikingly similar to Japanese "collective hamlet" operations in Manchuria between 1933 and 1937. See Chong-Sik Lee, "Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940", *RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-5012-ARPA* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, January, 1967).

54. Maynard Weston Dow, *Nation Building in Southeast Asia*, (Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Press, Inc., 1966), Rev. ed., pp. 158, 163.

55. *Viet-Nam's Strategic Hamlets*, GVN Publication (Saigon, 1963) p. 19. Quoting Nhu on p. 23 as cited by Osborne, *Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam*, p. 29.

56. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, p. 312.

57. Ibid., p. 312. The *Vietnam Press*, Nhu's outlet for statistics, indicated that between 11,000 and 12,000 hamlets were planned. Osborne, *Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam*, p. 32, citing April, July and October, 1963 Vietnam Press statistics. Also see "Notes on Strategic Hamlets", (Saigon: USOM Office of Rural Affairs, August 15, 1963), pp. 18-19.

58. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 122.

59. *Ibid.*

60. See for example Thompson's statement that the farmers "understood perfectly well the whole purpose of the (Strategic Hamlet) program." *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 127, 129.

61. *Newsweek*, 30 April 1962, p. 43. Also see Admiral USG Sharp and General W.C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office 1968, p. 79. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 129. Jerry Rose, "Our Undeclared War in Viet Nam", *The Reporter*, May 10, 1962, p. 32. Also see US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations* , IV.B.2, p. 22.

62. Thompson *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, pp. 130-133.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

64. "Notes on Strategic Hamlets", p. 16.

65. Clutterbuck, *Long, Long War*, p. 67.

66. The officer is quoted in Halberstam, *Making of a Quagmire*, p. 184.

67. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet Nams* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 373. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress*, p. 181. "Notes on Strategic Hamlets", pp. 18-19. Also see *Viet Nam's Strategic Hamlets* (Saigon: Directorate of Information, February, 1963) and *Notes on Strategic Hamlets* (USOM, Saigon: Office of Rural Affairs, August, 1963).

68. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 109-110.

69. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. C.1 pp. 84-85.

70. The Vietnamese translation for New Life Hamlets is "Ap Tin Sinh".

71. See *New York Times*, 15 January 1964, p. 1, and excerpts from memorandum, "South Vietnam", from Secretary McNamara to President Johnson, 16 March 1964, reprinted in the *New York Times*, 13 June 1971, pp. 35-36. Also see Lieutenant Colonel Edwin W. Chamberlain, Jr., USA, "Pacification", *Infantry* (November/December 1968), p. 38.

72. William A. Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 118.

73. This discussion of Quang Nam province is largely taken from Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, pp. 95-117.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

75. Sir Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 151-152.

76. Vietnamese for "co-operation", or working together.

77. *New York Times*, 10 March 1964, pp. 1, 3. Also see General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 309-310, *New York Times*, 8 March, 1964, pp. 1, 26, and *New York Times*, 31 March 1964. pp. 1, 15, and 15 June 1964, p. 6.

78. General Westmoreland states that the Hop Tac provinces included Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An and Phuoc Tuy. William Nighswonger indicates that later, in addition to these,

certain districts in Go Cong, Kiem Hoa and Phuoc Thanh were included. See Sharp and Westmoreland, *War in Vietnam*, p. 89, and Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, p. 128.

79. Gaud is quoted in the *New York Times*, 29 February 1968, p. 8. Also see Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, p. 364, for the Viet Cong's reliance on these uncontrolled distributions of US supplies. Confirmed in August 1964 by the USOM Director in Saigon in the *New York Times*, August 15, 1964, p. 2.

80. Drawing here upon a US Mission, Saigon, briefing paper written by Frank Scotton and others, sometime in late 1967, entitled "A Summary of Pacification in South Vietnam". Also see Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam*, p. 119, and of course, US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.C.8, pp. 1-7.

81. The USAID director conceded that up to 15 per cent of the AID commodities distributed in the provinces during this period were going into "disputed or twilight" areas because there was no way of pinpointing whether a given village was loyal to the GVN or controlled by the Viet Cong. *New York Times*, 15 August 1964, p. 2.

82. *New York Times*, 15 November 1964, p. 23. See Sharp and Westmoreland's critique of Hop Tac in *War in Vietnam*, p. 89-90, and a private US Embassy appraisal done for Lodge, in US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.C.8, pp. 4-6.

83. The plan was signed by Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thieu and Major General Tran Thien Khiem of the Joint General Staff. See Enclosure to Military Assistance Advisory Group, Strategic Hamlets Division, Memo. of 13 March 1964, subject: Annex E "Technique of Pacification Operations to the Chien Thang Plan". Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Armed Forces, dated 22 February 1964.

84. US and GVN pacification planning documents throughout 1964 and 1965 often referred to the "spreading drop of oil" technique—an analogy first coined by the French in Tonkin between 1892 and 1896. Relevant is the GVN Ministry of Defence Joint General Staff's Plans Division Memorandum, "Basic Concept on Rural Construction", undated, as distributed by MACV J332, Memo. of 2 July 1965.

85. In June 1964 the GVN published a Central Pacification Committee decree which outlined criteria by which to evaluate the status of the New Life Hamlets over the next year. (See, for example, USOM/MACV Joint Directive number 2-64 of 8 October 1964, subject as above.)

86. See for example Colonel Hoang Van Lac, "Concepts of New Rural Life". Translations of Colonel Lac's comments are in MAAG/Strategic Hamlets Division Memo. of 25 February 1964, Subject: Concepts of New Rural Life.

87. Pertinent is Enclosure to MAAG, Saigon, Strategic Hamlet Division Memo. of 11 March 1964, Subject: New Life Hamlets Annex to GVN National Pacification Plan.

88. By GVN Decree No. 64, 5 April 1965, the term "Pacification" was supplanted by "Rural Construction" because the latter term had a more dynamic connotation to it in Vietnamese. See MACV J332 memo., Serial No. 0577, 23 April 1965, Subject: The Concept of Rural Reconstruction and Certain Definitions and Procedures.

89. Major-General Edward G. Lansdale, "Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLIII, No. 1 (October, 1964), p. 84. Also see *New York Times*, 18 August 1965, p. 3, and 21 August 1965, p. 3.

90. See, for example, the quotes from Ky's speeches and praise of Ky by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg in a US Mission, Senior Liaison Office, Saigon briefing paper of 30 March 1966, entitled "GVN Concepts of Revolutionary Development/Rural Construction".

91. Background material for this discussion is taken from the writer's personal observations of these third country units in the RVN while he was conducting research in the Republic of Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, and from Defense Department data and public sources.

92. *New York Times*, 10 October 1965, Supplement, p. 3, and 23 October 1965, p. 3, and Sharp and Westmoreland, *War in Vietnam*, p. 278. Carl Rosenthal, *A Study of Rear Area Security Measures, Korea (1950-1953)* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office (SORO), The American University, July, 1965), p. 124. For details on the Korean's operations in South Vietnam see excerpts from the *Chicago Tribune*, 13 March 1966, as reprinted in *Korean Report*, April-June, 1966, p. 10, 12, and *Newsweek*, 22 May 1967, p. 48.

93. For a comment on this see LTC John O. Allyn, USARV, *Civic Action/Psyops Newsletter*, No. 3 (10 April 1967).

94. On 5 April 1965, the GVN supplanted the term "pacification" with "rural reconstruction" which in turn was changed to "rural construction" on 30 July 1965. See directive on Rural Reconstruction Policies, GVN Central Rural Reconstruction Committee Instruction No. 1535, dated 11 December 1965. In January 1964, when the junta had renamed the Strategic Hamlets "New Life" Hamlets, they were later made a part of the Rural Reconstruction Programme within the general concept of the Chien Thang national pacification plan. (See GVN Decree No. 64, 5 April 1965.) The name "Rural Reconstruction" continued until 30 July 1965, when Premier Ky renamed it "Rural Construction", and in February 1966, the American Mission began to refer, to it as "Revolutionary Development". See George K. Tanham, *War Without Guns* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 35.

95. For the effect of the political turbulence in Saigon on the 1965 pacification plan, see US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations,* IV. C. 5, pp. 51-54.

96. Charles Mohr, "To Win the People to Win the War", *New York Times*, 13 February 1966, p. 4E.

97. George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States* in Vietnam (Rev. ed.; New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1969),

98. Frances FitzGerald, "The Struggle and the War: The Maze of Vietnamese Politics", *Atlantic*, August 1967, Vol. 220, No. 2, p. 84. FitzGerald's later analysis of the conference in her book, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), tends to be more colourful than accurate. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232, 275-276, 279, 292-293.

99. See James L. Trainor, "What Business Does the Military Have in Pacification/Nation Building?" *Armed Forces Management,* August 1967, p. 33. Also see US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.C. 8, pp. 88-90 and pp. 116-118.

100. Critchfield, *Long Charade*, p. 218.

101. Relevant is Lawrence E. Grinter, "Amnesty in South Vietnam; An Analysis of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Vietnam" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967). Also see US department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.C. 9 (b), pp. 35-36.

102. See R. Michael Pearce, "The Insurgent Environment", RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-5533-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, May 1969) for a careful analysis of Communist organizational strategy in the villages.

103. David W. P. Elliott and W.A. Stewart, "Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dinh Tuong: 1966-1967", RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-5788-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, January 1969), pp. 100-103.

104. John C. Donnell, "The War, the Gap and the Cadre", *Asia.* No. 4 (Winter 1966), pp. 62-63 and and John C. Donnell, "Pacification Reassessed", *Asian Survey,* VII, No. 8 (August 1967), 572. John Mecklin, "The Struggle to Rescue the People", *Fortune*, April 1967, p. 240. Also see US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vietnam, Hearings*, pp. 371-375,

105. See US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. C. 8, p. 55.

106. Robert Shaplen, *The Road from War: Vietnam 1965-1970* (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 36-37. Author's visit to Vung Tau, August 1966. Also see Nguyen Be, "The New Essence of Life: Chung Thuy", Saigon, June 1966, Booklet. "The Vietnamese People's Struggle: Solution to the Viet-Nam War", Vung Tau. September 1968, Booklet. Also pertinent is Donnell, "Pacification Reassessed", pp. 570-571.

107. See GVN Decree No. 203d/NV of 10 May 1964. The most important of the later decrees which formalized the villages' new responsibilities were GVN Decree No. 198-SL/DUHC, of 24 December 1966, and GVN Decree No. 45 of 1 April 1969. The most detailed private analysis of village level development in Vietnam is Jeanette Koch, "The Development of Democratic Institutions at the Village Level in South Vietnam". Unpublished M. A. thesis, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., September 1970.

108. Of 1,831 hamlets only 440 hamlets were considered pacified by the end of 1966. MACCORDS/Saigon, "An Assessment of Revolutionary Development/Pacification", 5 June 1967, p. 5. Also see MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate Fact Sheet, Subject: Hamlet and Population Goals, 1967, dated 21 December 1966. Thang's program for the 1967 campaign is outlined in his speech at the convention of Province chiefs held at Bien Hoa, 22-28 February 1967. (Unofficial translation, mimeographed.)

109. Sharp and Westmoreland, *War in Vietnam*, p. 234.

110. See excerpts from responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1, order by Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at the request of the President on 21 January 1969 as reprinted in the *New York Times*, 26 April 1972, p. 16.

111. See especially the evidence about both Thieu and Ky in Alfred W. McCoy, et. al., *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), Chapter 5.

112. See Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon", *The New Yorker*, 7 October 1967, pp. 152-153.

113. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. C. 8, p. 20

114. Said Komer, "My job is to hold a blowtorch to these agencies, to expedite. I figure out how to expedite as I go along." Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Management of the War: A Tale of Two Capitals", *Fortune*, April 1967, p. 137.

115. MACRDS Fact Sheet 6 December 1966, Subject: Organization of Office of Civil Operations. See McNamara's, Katzenbach's and Komer's influence on the decision in US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV.C. 8, pp. 106-115.

116. See the article by William Tuohy in *The Honolulu Advertiser*, 12 May 1967, as reprinted in CINCPAC Newsbriefs, 13 May 1967. Also see *The Washington Post*, 18 May 1967.

117. R.W. Apple, Jr., *New York Times*, 10 July 1967, p. 2.

118. Corson, *The Betrayal*, p. 213.

119. *New York Times*, 10 July 1967., p. 2.

120. See Lawrence E. Grinter, "Bargaining Between Saigon and Washington: Dilemmas of Linkage Politics During War", ORBIS, XVIII, No. 3 (Autumn 1974)

121. Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 141-209.

122. US Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, IV. C. 8. p. 73. This writer wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. Komer for two interviews on this and related subjects.

123. Ward Just, *Washington Post*, February 4, 1968, p. B-1. Three days before this was written, when Viet Cong sappers had attacked the US Embassy, the Communists' Liberation Radio broadcast an appeal to the population to "face the fact that the Americans cannot protect themselves. How can they protect you?" *New York Times*, 1 February 1968, p. 14. On 8 February Senator Robert Kennedy picked up the theme in a major speech on the war "Our enemy," he said, "has demonstrated that no part or person of South Vietnam is secure from their attacks." *New York Times*, 9 February 1968.

124. *New York Times*, 25 February 1968, p. 20. *Washington Post* 16 February 1968, p. A-15. *Time*, 16 February 1968, p. 32.

125. See David E. Lilienthal and Vu Quoc Thuc, *The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and Programs*, Vol. II (Saigon and New York: Postwar Planning Group/Development and Resources Corporation, March 1969), p. 280. Also see highlights of a meeting of the Council of Vietnamese Studies, South East Asia Development Advisory Group, 3 April 1968, p. 2; Charles A. Joiner, "South Vietnam: Political, Military and Constitutional Arenas in Nation Building", *Asian Survey*, VIII, No. 1 (January 1968), 71; and Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam*, p. 170. Also see Shaplen, *Road from War*, p. 191.

126. *New York Times*, 25 February 1968, pp. 1, 20, *133-135.*

127. Joiner, *Politics of Massacre*, pp. 177.

128. In Vietnamese, Nhan Dan Tu Ve. The PSDF was officially established on 3 May 1968, by GVN Decree No. 159-TT/SL and reconfirmed in the General Mobilization Law, GVN Decree No. 003/68 of 19 June 1968.

129. *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 January 1969, p. 6. See also Robert W. Komer, "Clear, Hold and Rebuild", *Army*, XX, No. 5 (May 1970), p, 21. "Pacification: A Look Back and Ahead", *Army*, XX, No. 6 (June 1970), 24, and MACCORDS "Four Year Community Defense and Local Development Effect's Briefing", MACV, Saigon, 10 January 1973.

130. Keesing's Research Report, *South Vietnam: A Political History, 1954-1970* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp. 139-140. Also see Samuel L. Popkin, "Pacification: Politics and the Village", *Asian Survey*, X, No, 8 (August 1970), 668.

131. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam*, p. 235, and *New York Times*, 25 October 1968, p. 16.

132. The ARVN termed the APC the "Le Loi" campaign after the 15th. century Annamese warlord who called himself "Prince of Pacification" (Binh Dinh Vuong). Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, pp. 41-42, 382-383. The number of hamlets actually targeted in the APC was over 1,300 (*Honolulu Advertiser*, 29 January 1969, p. A3 and *New York Times*, 12 February 1969, p. 9). Political pull and criteria divergences were commonplace and even some abandoned hamlets were counted in the APC quotas. But generally the GVN stayed close to CORDS guidelines. Also see *New York Times*, 25 October 1968, p. 16.

133. Reprint of excerpts from Ambassador Komer's farewell news conference in Saigon, 3 November 1968. American Embassy/Saigon Telegram 031200Z, November, 1968 (unclassified). Also see *Washington Post*, 18 November 1968, p. A14, and R. R. Jones, "Profile of Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) Hamlets as of 31 October 1968" (Saigon: Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc.), data sheet, (Mimeographed), and Robert W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam", *Rand Paper P4443* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, August 1970).

134. John D. Montgomery, "Land Reform as a Means to Political Development in Viet Nam", *Orbis*, XII, No. 1 (Spring 1968), 23.

135. R. W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Viet Nam", p. 18. Also see MACCORDS, "RF/PF Handbook for Advisors", MACCORDS-TSD-RF/PF Revised Edition, Saigon, November 1969, p. 6, and Samuel L. Popkin, "The Myth of the Village: Revolution and Reaction in Viet Nam" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969).

136. John Paul Vann, "Thoughts on Pacification",

DEPCORDS II Field Force Memorandum, Saigon, April 1968, pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed.) Mr. Vann, the most experienced and knowledgeable American civilian adviser in South Vietnam, a man whose career approached legend, died in a helicopter crash in the Central Highlands on 9 June 1972.

137. See Robert G. Kaiser, "Many in US Mission Feel V.C. Can't Recover", *Washington Post* 30 October 1969, pp. A1, A12 and Robert G. Kaiser, "Pacification Appears on the Upswing, *Washington Post*, 30 October 1969, pp. A1, A23.

138. John Paul Vann, opening statement, 18 February 1970, before US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970, Hearings*, p. 90. Also refer to Allan E. Goodman, using US Government data in his "South Vietnam and the New Security", *Asian Survey*, XII, No. 2 (February 1972), 126. Also see pp. 121-22. Jerry Mark Silverman confirms this overwhelming sense of security and normalcy in early 1972, in his "South Vietnam and the Elusive Peace", *Asian Survey*, XIII, No, 1 (January 1973), pp. 20-21.

139. *New York Times*, 25 July 1971, section 4, p. 2, Also see MACCORDS Phoenix Fact Sheet Saigon, 16 July 1970. Subject: GVN Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Program, p. 3. (Mimeographed.), and Goodman, "End of the War as a Political Setting", p. 678.

140. Phoenix deaths:

1968	2,559
1969	6,187
1970	8,191
(January-May) 1971	3,560

New York Times, 20 July 1971, p. 2, and *Washington Post*, 21 January 1972, p. D15. Also see *Charlotte Observer*, 21 July 1971, p. 8A.

141. MACCORDS, *"Four Year CD and LD Effects Briefing"*, 10 January 1973.

142. Excerpts from Bunker's classified cable, dated 30 August 1971, are in Jack Anderson's "Cables Show Doubletalk on VC", *Washington Post*, 21 January 1972, p. D15.

143. JUSPAO/Saigon, "Village and Hamlet Elections", JUSPAO/Saigon Psyop Circular #22, 8 September 1969, p. 3.

144. Popkin, "Pacification: Politics and the Village", p. 668.

145. As Ambassador William E. Colby said,

> "Decree #045 on 1 April 1968 revolutionized not only the village's relationship to Saigon and interim bureaucratic levels, but, most importantly, its relationship to the people."

Statement for the record, US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970, Hearings*, p. 709.

146. Compare GVN Decree No. 198-SL/DUNC, 24 December 1966, Articles 14-15 and GVN Decree No. 045-SL/NV, 1 April 1969, Articles 13-14.

147. See Goodman, "South Vietnam and the New Security", p. 129. A comprehensive discussion of the whole notion of political development in South Vietnam is also in Goodman, "Politics and War: The Basis of Political Community in South Vietnam" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971).

148. CORDS officials apparently continued to complain to the Vietnamese about the illegal and excessive rent collections in the countryside. Larry A. Niksch, "The Pacification Program in Viet Nam", Legislative Reference Service Paper (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 14 November 1967), p. 16. Also see William Bredo, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Viet Cong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict", *Asian Survey*, X, No. 8 (August 1970), pp. 740-741, and *Land Reform in Vietnam*. Prepared for the Republic of Vietnam and USAID by the Stanford Research Institute, SRI Project No. 1U-6797/AID Contract No. AID/VN-8, December 1968, and Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-to-the-Tiller in South Vietnam: The Tables Turn", *Asian Survey*, X, No. 8 (August 1970), 753.

149. For comparisons of Viet Cong and Viet Minh land redistribution schemes, see Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform as Foreign Aid", *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1972), 131, Goodman, "Political Implications of Rural Problems in South Vietnam", p. 675, Bredo, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam", p. 747, Jeffrey Race, "How They Won", *Asian Survey*, X, No. 8 (August 1970), 638, and Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

150. These included the November 1968 prohibition on illegal rent collections, the February 1969 extension of the prohibitions, (the "rent freeze") and on April circulation. See "Regarding freeze and occupancy of rent in newly pacified villages and hamlets", GVN Circular No. 033/TT/Th.T/PC2, February 12, 1969, and "Freeze of Occupancy and Rent in villages and hamlets nation-wide", GVN Circular No. 069/TT/Th.T/PC2, 25 April 1969. Also see *New York Times*, 16 February 1969, p. 1, MacDonald Salter, "The Broadening Base of Land Reform in South Vietnam" *Asian Survey*, X, No. 8 (August 1970), 733; AID/Vietnam Director Donald MacDonald's testimony in H.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970. Hearings*, p. 602; and Thomas C. Fox, "Vietnamese Land Reform Advances, but Slowly", *New York Times*, 4 January 1972, p. 4. Also see *New York Times*, 11 July 1969: and Montgomery, "Land Reform as a Means to Political Development", pp. 20-21.

151. *New York Times*, 25 March 1970, p. 15.

152. GVN Law No. 003/70, March 1970, the "Land-to-the-Tiller" Policy.

153. Goodman, "Political Implications of Rural Problems in South Vietnam", p. 675.

154. Prosterman, "Land Reform as Foreign Aid", p. 135. Emphasis is Prosterman's.

155. MACOORDS, "Community Defense and Local Development Plan Effects Briefing", 10 January 1973, and GVN Pacification and Development Council. *Four Year Community Defense and Local Development* (CDLD) Plan (1972-1975), Annex III: Local Self-Development, Appendix F: Land Reform.

156. Masao Yamashita, "Glimpses of the Internal Situation in North Viet Nam", *Pacific Community*, II, No. 4 (July 1971), pp 767-779; Honey, "Three Critical Years", pp. 759-765; Pike, "North Vietnam in the Year 1972", pp. 51-55.

157. For details on the power struggle between the Troung Chinh and Le Duan-Vo Nguyen Giap factions in 1971 and 1972, see Patrick J. Honey, "Ba Nam Trong Coi Nguoi Ta; Three Critical Years for Hanoi", *Pacific Community*, II, No. 4 (July 1971), 760-761, Phan Thien Chan, "Leadership in the Viet Nam Workers Party: The Process of Transition", *Asian Survey*, XII, No. 9 (September 1972), 775-781, and Douglas Pike, "North Vietnam in the Year 1972", *Asian Survey*, XIII, No. 1 (January 1973), 46-51.

158. See Craig R. Whitney, "Big New Phase of the War Is Opening", *New York Times*, 6 April 1972, pp. 1, 16, and Joseph E. Treaster, "Advancing Foe Drove 250,000 from Homes", *New York Times*, 6 April 1972, p. 16.

159. See the transcript of the President's broadcast address on Indo-China in the *New York Times*, 10 May 1972, p. 27.

160. Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Vietnam", *The New Yorker* 24 June 1972, p. 70.

161. For a scrutiny of the pacification setback in Quang Ngai province and in the vicinity of Da Nang city, see Craig R. Whitney, "Pacification Hopes Battered in Vietnam", *New York Times*, 21 June 1972, pp. 1, 14.

162. *New York Times*, 27 October 1972.

163. *Ibid.*

164. The full text of the Vietnam agreement and its accords is in the *New York Times*, 25 January 1973.

165. COSVN Directive 02/73 dated 19 January 1973 as cited in Turley, "The Democratic Peoples Republic of Vietnam and the 'Third Stage' of Revolution", *op. cit.* pp. 79-80.

166. Also see Jerry M. Silverman "South Vietnam and the Return to Political Struggle", *Asian Survey*, January 1974, Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp. 65-77 for details of Thieu's internal political, administrative and economic policies during 1973.

167. Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Indo-China", *The New Yorker* 2 June 1973, pp. 44-46.

168. Text of the 13 June 1973, Joint Communique on Vietnam is in *New York Times*, 14 June 1973, p. 18.

169. *New York Times*, 30 May 1973, pp. 1, 6; 30 July 1973; 1 August 1973, pp. 1, 3; and 15 August 1973, p. 14. Shaplen, "Letter from Indo-China", p. 44. Also see the remarks of Michel Gauvin, head of the Canadian delegation to the ICCS, upon leaving Saigon on 19 July 1973, in *New York Times*, 20 July 1973, p. 4. Senator Edward Brooke confirmed Gauvin's pessimism and tended to substantiate his belief that the Hungarian and Polish delegations were under strict orders from their governments to use their membership in the ICCS to forestall any true assessment of NVA/VC activities in their areas. See Brooke's report in US Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, *The United States and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Indochina.* Summary Report of Senator Edward W. Brooke, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 15 June 1973, p. 29.

170. Allan E. Goodman, "South Vietnam: War Without End?", *Asian Survey*, XV, No. 1 (January 1975), p. 71.

171. Fundamental to any developmental strategy, however, would be the necessity of getting nearly one million people off the welfare roles. See Henry Kamm, "Horde of Ghost Refugees Get US Food in Vietnam", *New York Times*, 8 March 1973, pp. 1, 12. Joseph B. Treaster, "Saigon is Moving Refugees to Get Broader Control", *New York Times*, 5 July 1973, pp. 1, 14 and Joseph B. Treaster, "Saigon is Forcibly Moving Thousands in Delta Region", *New York Times*, 1 August 1973, p. 3. For a careful analysis by a returned American economic adviser of how corruption has been institutionalized in refugee projects, see Douglas Brown, "Bureaucracy and Dependency in the Third World: The See Son Refugee Project in South Vietnam", *The New Scholar*, III, No. 2.

172. Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture, Fishery and Animal Husbandry Development, *Post War Reconstruction Plan* (Saigon, February 1973). Also see "Thieu Rushes Rebuilding of Nation; 7-Year Plan Cannot Wait Until Guns are Silent", *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 21 May 1973, p. 1.

173. See Graham Martin, "Economic Assistance and the Future of South Vietnam", a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 25 July 1974, *The Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI,

No. 1834 (19 August 1974), pp. 291-94. A common projection of economic aid requirements for South Vietnam used in US and GVN planning circles is as follows:

In Millions of 1972 US Dollar Equivalent

FY 1974	*FY 1975*	*FY 1976*	*FY 1977*	*FY 1978*
750	*700*	*640*	*580*	*520*

Brooke, *The United States and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Indochina,* p 36. Also see Wilford H. Welch, "The Business Outlook for Southeast Asia", *Harvard Business Review,* May-June 1973, p. 82.

174. See Thomas Lippman, "New Party Supported by Thieu is Launched in Vietnam", *Washington Post,* 7 December 1972, p A-21.

175. Shaplen, *"Letter from Indochina",* p. 52.

176. *Department of State Bulletin,* 17 Feburary 1975.

177. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Vietnam: Autopsy of the Collapse", *Washington Post,* 19 April 1975, p. A-19.

178. *New York Times,* 11 April 1975, p. 10.

179. Hammond Rolph, "People's War: Vision vs. Reality", *ORBIS,* XIV, No. 3 (Autumn 1970), 574-575.

180. Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon", *New Yorker,* 31 January 1970..

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Addendum

W.A.C. Adie, the author of "China and the Asian-Pacific Chessboard" in SPECTRUM, Volume 3, No. 3, April 1975, wishes to acknowledge that the tables of Japanese trade figures, included as an Appendix to his paper, were taken from an MA thesis "Normalization of Relations in Communist China's Foreign Policy towards Japan", submitted by Cha Se-tak to Queensland University in April 1974.